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SOME KEY TERMS IN THE. DISSERTATION 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
A regional human rights instrument created by the OAU to promote and protect human 
and peoples rights in Africa. Adopted in June 1981, it is now binding on 52 of the 53 
member states of the OAU. 
African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
An organ created by the African Charter on Human and Peoples, Rights and established 
within the Organisation of African Unity (OAU), mandated to promote and ensure the 
protection of human and peoples' rights in Africa. 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
A political organ created within the OAU and charged with the responsibility of 
making decisions for the African continent, and solving continental crises. The body is 
composed of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity, and 
meets once a year. It is the supreme political organ of the OAU and the only organ 
empowered by the African Charter to take action on the Commission's 
recommendations. 
Exhaustion of local remedies 
One of the conditions imposed by the Charter which has to be fulfilled before a 
communication submitted to the Commission can be considered. It requires that the 
complainant ensure that all the legal remedies available at the national level been 
utilised in order to resolve the dispute to be brought before the Commission. Thus the 
Commission is regarded here as the last resort. 
x 
Organisation of African Unity (OAU) 
A regional organisation made up of independent African states. Created in May 1963, 
the Organisation's main aims were to foster African unity, and to combat colonialism 
and apartheid. 
Other communications 
Communications submitted to the African Commission emanating from sources other 
than states. Article 55 of the Charter permits individuals, groups of individuals and 
NGOs to file communications against states they believe have violated any of the rights 
enshrined in the Charter. 
Promotional Functions 
A function conferred on the African Commission under article 45(1) of the Charter 
enabling it to sensitise people on their rights, freedoms and responsibilities. This 
usually involves the organisation of workshops, seminars, symposia, colloquia and 
conferences. 
Protective Functions 
A function conferred on the Commission under article 45(2) of the African Charter, 
which enables the latter to supervise and monitor human rights abuses within state 
parties. This usually involves receiving and considering complaints from individuals, 
NGOs or groups of individuals, and even from state parties themselves .. 
States' Periodic Reports 
Reports that states parties to the African Charter are required under article 62 thereof to 
submit to the Commission after every two years from the date on which the Charter 
came into force for the state. Through these reports, the states are required to indicate 
the legislative and other measures taken to give effect to the provisions of the Charter. 
Sub-regional Commission on Human Rights 
Commissions to be established within each of the five political sub-regions recognised 
by the OAU; that is, North, South, East, West and Central Africa. 
SECTION ONE 
1 :0 General Introduction 
The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights1, (the African Charter), which was 
adopted in Nairobi, Kenya on 28 June 1981 by the 18th ordinary session of the 
Organisation of African Unity (QUA) Assembly of Heads of State and Government and 
came into force on 21 October 1986, is the youngest regional (continental) human 
rights instrument in the world. The Charter was adopted after much international 
activity and with support from governmental and non-governmental human rights 
organisations faced with the lamentable state of human rights on the African continent. 
Mr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, former President of the Federal Republic ofNigeria, is credited 
with first suggestjng an African Human Rights Convention. According to Maurice 
Glele, Azikiwe, in his memorandum to the "Atlantic Charter and British West Africa" 
advocated the adoption of an African Convention on Human Rights.2 This call was later 
echoed during the conference on the Rule of Law (the Lagos Conference) organised in 
1961 by the International Commission of Jurists (ICJ).3 The conference resolutions 
provided in clause 4 that: 
''in order to give full effect to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948, the 
Conference invites the African Governments to study the possibility of adopting an African 
Convention of Human Rights in such a manner that the conclusions of this conference will be 
safeguarded by the creation of a court of appropriate jurisdiction and that recourse thereto be 
made available for all persons under the jurisdiction of the signatory States". 
1. Registered with the United Nations on l0/09/91No26363, 
2 Maurice Glele "Introduction a la Charte Africaine des Droits de l'Homme et des Peuples" in Droits 
et Libertes a la fin de XXe siecle (1984) at 313. 
3
· Ke'ba Mbaye, Keynote address, "Introduction to the African Chartt:r on Human and Peoples' Rights" 
Report on a Conference held from 2-4 December 1985 convened by ICJ in Geneva (1986) at 19-20. 
1 
From 1961 when this pronouncement was made, to 1981 (two decades) when the 
Charter was adopted, several other conferences were held in Africa aimed at creating a 
human rights body.4 This culminated in the formulation and subsequent adoption of the 
African Charter in 1981. 
Like its counterparts, the European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms (the European Convention) and the American Convention on Human Rights 
(the American Convention), the African Charter provides for the establishment of a 
Commission to oversee the implementation of the rights, freedoms and duties it 
guarantees. Unlike the other two regional human rights instruments, however, the 
African Charter does not provide for a human rights court. 
!tis .a settledJact that o£the three.maj-0r ~egieNal.human,,rights.i.Jastmmen~-ioo,:Mflean 
~~~e,E,_~~"~~! .. 9!1!Y.Jhe~.~mungest.huL.i~.also,.in almosL.a1l~.respect§.l,""Jh~ .. ~.c:;~~-st. 
Structural. shortcomings and a· lack of apolitical \\{ilLsJr911gly"'~ygg~Ltb~J~lu:tPJ"Q!U~~­
()fJ2~tth.the,.Clw11«c.awi .. ill~-organ.iLci:~~t~.~-";:,.J!!~.runmission .. ~ .. .catm0~he .. fulfilled 
wJ!hout substantial :teMision and ~Q.Jlfilmi?tiQll. Qiyen~~afJhe 
~~~-~YsJ~Ul..S.QJar,Jh~!e is no.doubt that.aip.~jor 9yerha.:t1-lis:i1.rgentl):'.required. The 
adoption and entry into force of the African Charter and the subsequent establishment 
of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (the African Commission), 
on 2 November 1987, have generated concern among non-governmental organisations 
(NGOs), practising lawyers, international lawyers and all those concerned in the 
promotion and protection of human rights. The Charter is seen as a human rights 
instrument specifically designed to respond to "African concerns, African traditions and 
African conditions".5 
4
· Seminar on Human Rights in Developing Countries, Dakar, Senegal, February 1966; Seminar on the 
Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Specific Reference to Africa, Cairo, 
Egypt, September 1969; Seminar on the Study of New Special Ways and Means for promoting Human 
Rights with Special Attention to the Problems and Needs of Africa, Dar -Es -Salaam, Tanzania, 1973; 
OAU summit meeting which passed a resolution sponsored by Senegal and the Gambia for the drafting 
of an African Charter on Human Rights, Monrovia, Liberia, 1979; Seminar on the Establishment of 
Regional Commissions on Human Rights with Special Reference to Africa, Monrovia, Liberia, 1979, 
Conference of Ministers of Justice to consider the draft African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, 
Banjul, The Gambia, January 1981. 
5
· Evelyn A Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedure. 
(1996) at 16. 
2 
It has features of other regional human rights instruments which set out internationally 
recognised individual rights, but also proclaims unique concepts, such as peoples' 
rights and duties, that have been a source of concern for many human rights advocates. 
Mfil~Q!l~J!!S rni,s,~i;tJ~QQYL1he_.African~human"~ri8hts.,s.ystenLinclude, .. intt{C,.a/ia,.Jhe 
structure_,Qf_fu~_ghm1.~;rjl§~lf; .fut:: .practicalicy ... of.its µnigµe. cp!!~ept Qf "peoples' .. rights 
.~!Jlg!!es".;.,_",at19the effectiveness 9f the .2!San jt creates ,,~the.Commission .. ::. in 
12l'.Q!UQ,ting.and.protecting human.rights on.a .continent that has one of..the:worstrec()rds, 
qf human rights abuses .. 
The Commission, which is established under article 30 of the Charter, is empowered 
under articles 48, 49 and 55 to receive and consider, subject to certain limitations, 
communications alleging violations of the Charter from member states, NGOs and 
individuals. Upon consideration of such communications, however, the Commission is 
restricted to submitting a factual report of its findings and recommendations to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the Organisation of African Unity. It 
has no power to impose sanctions or award damages. The Charter gives the 
Commission no express authority to hold States accountable for human rights 
violations. These restrictions notwithstanding, the Commission's own Rules of 
Procedure, coupled with the reluctance of the commissioners to give a broader 
interpretation to some of the ambiguous clauses in the Charter, have rendered the 
Charter a mere "paper tiger" or a "sleeping beauty" and the Commission a "talk shop". 
In addition to the procedural issues, the Charter is characterised·· by incoherence, 
clawback clauses and unjustified limitations of certain fundamental rights and 
"-~~·,,....,.~-~-·-«+>''-~··"""'"'"'~'' -·' ·-
fr~~Qms. TJ:le system has filrth.er 1Jeett .clouded by .the. impracticalities of..cooceptssuch 
~J~-~°"ples' rights and. dlJfa:s .~ enforceable under the Chatler. ~ .. PI~s~nts"a .dilemma .. 
the Commissioners must overcome. 
3 
One is therefore tempted to conclude that 1l!_e <irafters of the .. ~li,arter, and the African 
~<!..4§nLin_y~icular:, .. neYer. envisaged .. a. sµpra,p.ational .. oi:gan. that.would.interfert: with 
~~~~~-~3:!!~P.,~~ ~9verei~tyin "violati~1:( o(article ~11(2) e>fthe QAU Charter of 196.3. 
~fut..this-may·be that ·until.,very .. recentcy (the.JSl9Qs)" the.QA.Uhas.lacked.a 
leader with sufficient moral force to channel the aspirations of the continent. 
,,,...______,__-""'"··-~ . ' 
"Since the leaders all h~g sll}~!lfec.i pan~, p9n~ dareq cast the first stone, and so the <:;omplicity 
of silence contiiiued"6• 
-......... --~-·~- ..... ~-'"~-' ·--· ..... -' 
The African Charter as it currently stands, cannot be used as a vehicle for the protection 
of human rights, even allowing for ingenious interpretation by the African Commission. 
The i!!~~tutional structures.Q~()XlQed in theC:::Jtarter are in need of major restructuring. 
In addition to revising the Charter's Sl;lbstantjye provisions, the Commission's powers 
should be clarified and . bro<ld<med. The Commission should be given precise, 
identifiable and express powers to carry out its mandate; to undertake investigative 
human rights missions in members states; and be mandated to prepare publicly 
available reports and recommendations, including the exercise of all the promotional 
functions outlined in article 45(1)(a) and (c) of the African Charter. 
Tlie Charter must be reformed and/or interpreted in the light of the democratic 
i!!lP.!?~atives .!!'1.at have found a.new voice in recenttimes. Clauses in the Charter that 
qualify._ the rights it guarantees and subordinate them to local legislation need to be 
removed or reconsidered. 
A new system of inyestigation and .. enforcement is. necessary .. to give strength"and 
"'>Ys•~,,, ·'"""-~·••>-.•- ' 
~fficac;y Jo the_aspirations of human rights' safegy::rrds in Africa. ~~~~~ ~~ set up a 
viab!~ .sY§!em .. tliaLti'!s the .Yllfettere.<i. po:wer.tC>.fh1d memJ?e~r _states .. gl;lilty of l:J:µman 
~11.!~ .Yiolations and mak~ those findings stic1c, we cannot claim to have a genuine 
hUll!.!l!l rights mechanism on the African continent. 
Today, with more African nations becoming democratic and more liberal leaders rising 
to positions of authority in a number of African countries, there is some cause for 
optimism that Africa can begin to move in this direction. Africa, being the latest 
6
· Cameroon Post 8 July 1996 at 2. 
4 
continent to establish a regional human rights mechanism, has a great potential to 
correct the shortcomings of the Inter-American and European systems and to come up 
with a novel human rights protection mechanism. 
This dissertation seeks to render a critical analysis of the African Charter vis-a-vis the 
protection of human rights on the African continent. The study also makes a 
comparative analysis of the African Charter and the European and American 
Conventions. It discusses the African human rights protection system on the basis both 
of the practice and procedure of the African Commission, and in the light of the practice 
and experiences of other regional human rights bodies. Focus has been placed on the 
activities of the Commission: how it interprets and attempts to ensure implementation 
of the Charter, the constraints it faces, and why . The last part of the work will offer 
practical recommendations on how to perfect the African human rights regime. 
The analysis is preceded by a general overview of the concept of human rights and the 
notion of human rights in Africa. 
• 1: 1 The Concept of Human Rights 
Human rights were originally perceived as the natural rights of every individual, and as 
such, those rights had a distinct anthropological quality;7 that is to say, they were 
determined by their author's perception of the nature and essential characteristics of the 
human person. The particular rights and freedoms that were thus thought to be natural 
concomitants of being human were identified by contemplating the condition of an 
individual in a stateless society. By eliminating all considerations that might be 
conditioned by a person's station in life as a member of the body politic, philosophers 
attempted to penetrate the true essence of the human condition and sought to translate 
that vital modality of being human into rights talk. 8 
7
· From Human Wrongs to Human Rights Part IV Centre for Human Rights Pretoria (1995) at 50. 
s. Ibid. 
5 
Human rights were considered something which man is said to posses in his natural 
state, devoid of the intervention or support of society. He brings them with him into 
society which is created to protect these rights by enacting laws.9 Th~.~cµ:!y theoretical 
<l~sjgn ()f the. i<:ie':ls>f ht,1!!1'1!!Iight~_emerne.ci. fnm1 the pQlitica,l pbilosoPb.Y: .of J Qhu.Locke 
(!.§.3.2-:1'.ZQ.4),.~.L~e.soughtt~lidentify ... the.basic .. righti:i ~tLtb~jn£!ixidYal.J?S,,P9§!Ulatjng 
the existence ... oLthe.ltuman.personiIL_a .. stateless. si~.w.hich...h<L~i~teQ.~~.1he .. 
icJx!!f£, .. _~gexistenPe gf . .im;livig11als in "peace~ goQdwill •.. nJJillial. ~sistance and 
wpreservation" .11 
~~~y~:r:,. a.9c9r<:iing .t() J.~ocke, the .state of nature suffe:r:ed Jrg:tll certain drawbacks 
resulting from the absence of a superior power to regulate. the conffa~tipg inJerests of the 
inQiYiduals_Jllcing ... in.,,thaL~tate,_ ... J'he ... individuals. ~onsequently: ... concluded a ... soci':ll 
~o,mpac! .""..!i~!~~Y.!h~Y.icri11~d_fu.rc.es.to-iorm .. a .. c.Ml.~Qcie!y ( the .pactum .. unionis.)~ .and 
~y f!1ean.~.Qf!:! s_econd sogialcompact(the paqtum subiectioni$) institute.d a government 
1Yi!l_i political power to protect their respective natliral. rights. !he civil government 
cl~tiYesjustification.Jor its _existence and cq11tinuous exerci.~e gfpolitigal power from 
tlJ&_c_gp.1:[ac.ma1 dutr to protect the natural. rjgJits oL.its .subjects. Failure by the 
government to safeguard the interests of its subjects effectively, will automatically 
dissolve the social compact and leave the subjects free to conclude a new contract with 
another sovereign. 
Governments can recognise these rights and ensure their protection by law. ~-­
E.rinciple that law should .protect the basic human rights of the ... individuaLagaiu.st the 
~bl1ses.of gQ.Ye.mme:pJs~.g_@ at least .be trac~d.backto. Jobn .Locke's Twa .. Treatises.of. 
yo.vernment, published in -1690. Locke ... believed thathuman .. beings, ... not . gov~mments, 
~first in the gen§rnlJmler.~'-Jle filfil~dJhat. 
1 
"If man in the State of Nature be so free, as has been said; If he be absolute Lord of his own 
Person and Possession, equal to the greatest and subject to nobody, why will he part with his 
. Freedom? Why will he give up this Empire, and subject himself to the Dominion and Control 
\ 
of another power? To which 'tis obvious to Answer, that though in the State of Nature he hath 
such a right, yet the enjoyment of it is very uncertain, and constantly exposed to the invasion of 
others. For all being Kings as much as he is, every Man his Equal, and the greater part no strict 
1 
Observer of Equity and Justice, the enjoyment of the property he has in this state is very unsafe, 
9·~·· • is John Natural Law and Natural Rights (1980). 
10 d ote 7 at 48. 
11 S Carpenter (ed) Two Treatises of Civil Government (1690) (1924) 2.3.19. 
6 
[ f very unsecured. This makes him willing to quit a condition, which however free, is full of fears 
and continual dangers: And 'tis not without reason, that he seeks out, and is willing to join in 
l; Society with others who are already united, or have a mind to unite for the mutual Preservation 
\ of their Lives, Liberties and Estates". 12 
Locke's prose was re-iterated in 1776 in the American Declaration of Independence in 
. which the thirteen United States of America proclaimed: 
"We hold these truth to be self-evident that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by 
their creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are Life, Liberty and the pursuit of 
Happiness. That to secure these rights, Governments are instituted among men, deriving their 
just powers from the consent of the governed ... ". 
Q~(;:!_~~~ xears~ it has been. ,r~C,ognis~d that human rights are. not just .piou!> dec1~atiqps. 
]'hey 1lll!st. be. euforg~,aple. They must be practically implemeqted. This places the 
bU[c:l_~11 of their protection and implementation squarely on the international and national 
a~en~ies ch'!rged with the responsibility of enforcing and interpreting human rights 
instruments. rh!.~ .. !ecogni!ion of the practicality and enforceability of human rights has 
mea!lt that governments have to put in place limits .both on the exercise of these rights 
b:vjn,gi'::iciuals, as well as.,on the powers of their agents. 
~~r instance, human rights have to be enjoyed with due regard to the rights and 
freed~:Q!§. of other~: Limitations on the enjoyment of individual human rights have 
f.Q.1]!1,d.exp;i::~ssi.011 ill aJl hlJlllan rights instruments,. JJ.e they national (as in constitutions), 
!~&q!!~Uas..in the.Afrkan <;barter), or international (as in the UN Covenants). In.some 
cases, however, these limitations are so severe as to render the enjoyment of basic 
human rights a mockery (as, for example, South Africa during the apartheid era, and in 
most one party regimes). 
To.day:, ... there-are· many~~rceptions of human. rights: ... the .. .clas.sicaLp,ng the .. western 
e~mostJy:.by the developed countriesjqJ~urope .. and.America~.the SD.ecifisls~Jlie 
Islamic •. amt tli~.~fug'!11.99ncepts cliampi<;>tted .hx.Jhe.Third.~orld .. or. developing 
~olUltries, etc. etera. T~lfissical theory holds. the.vie\¥. thatbt1m,:1n rig];lts .exi~1 iJL.only 
~hile.specificity the,0risls ;;u-gue i:tgainst.the .. unhr.ersali.ty ofhumannghts. The 
c.;!ll:Ss.icaJ c9p.cept presupposes that human rights are . universal .to ... alLsocieties, 
12
· John Locke Two Treatises of Government ( Laslett rev ed. 1963) at 395. 
7 
irrespective of social structure, while the theory of specificity maintains that human 
rights exist in the context of societal structure, that is to say, members of each society 
enjoy human rights depending on how that society is structured, be it socially, 
economically, politically or otherwise. However, the contemporary concept of human 
rights assumes that human rights have always existed with human beings. They existed 
independently of, and before the notion of statehood. Thus, as Judge Takana cited: 
"A state or states are not capable of creating human rights by law or convention; they can only 
confirm their existence and give them protection. Human rights are not a product of a particular 
judicial system, or the preserve of a particular continent or people, but are the same and must be 
recognised, respected and protected everywhere mankind is found" .13 
This means that human rights must be protected on both the domestic and international 
levels because there is only one notion of human rights applicable to all human beings. 
Therefore, the observation made by Professor Jack Donnelly that: 
"Most non-western cultural and political traditions lack not only the practice of human rights but 
the very concept . . . as a matter of historical fact, the concept of human rights is an artefact of 
modern Western civilisation" 
is disputable in that it implies that the concepts of human rights espoused in non-
westem traditional societies are not regarded as "rights" and that there is in fact no 
practice of "human rights" in these societies. 
In terms of both the classical and the modem concepts of human rights, the principle of 
the protection of human rights derives from the concept of the individual human being 
and his relationship with the society, which cannot be separated from universal human 
nature. If a law exists independently of the will of the state and accordingly cannot be 
abolished or modified by its constitution because it is deeply rooted in the conscience of 
mankind and of every reasonable man, it may be called natural law in contrast to 
positive law. Generally, the guarantee of human rights and fundamental freedoms 
possesses a supra-constitutional significance. It is in a class of jus cogens which cannot 
be changed even by agreement between states or individuals. 
13
· Judge Takana in the ICJ, citing Judge Philip Jesseys South West Africa (Namibia) Cases Second Phase 
ICJ Report (1966) 6 (see especially the dissenting opinion at 284-316). 
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T~e $!eat American and :Fi::enchJexts of 177614, 178915 and 1791 16 set forth principles 
which are instantlyrecognisable as.propositions.ofmpd~rn human rights law.17 These 
principles~~~y 9.~. !3.lllll1J1arised.as-follows; 
---~·~·-·--
•. The principle of universal inherence: every human being has certain rights, capable 
of being enumerated and defined, which are not conferred on him by any ruler or 
earned or acquired by purchase, but which inhere in him by virtue of humanity 
alone. 
•. The principle of inalienability: no human being can be deprived of any of these 
rights by the act of any ruler or even by his own act; or in a democracy, even by the 
will of the majority of the people. 
•. The rule of law: where rights conflict with each other, the conflict must be resolved 
by the consistent, ind~endent and impartial application of just laws in accordance 
with just procedures. 
1:2 Internationalisation of Human Rights 
In terms of the traditional doctrine of national sovereignty, a sovereign state has 
complete freedom of action to deal with its own nationals (personal sovereignty) and 
with its own territory ( territorial sovereignty). It follows from this principle that in all 
matters falling within the domestic jurisdiction of any state, international law does not 
permit interference, let alone intervention, by any other state. Such matters do not fall 
within the concern of international law. Accordingly, so long as personal sovereignty 
continued to be regarded as exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of sovereign 
states, "what a government did to its own citizens was its own affair and beyond the 
reach of international law or legal interference by others states" .18 This principle was 
enshrined in the Covenant of the League of Nations, by virtue of article 15 which 
stipulated that nothing contained in the Covenant shall authorise the League to 
intervene in matters that "are exclusively within the domestic jurisdiction of states". 
14
· The American Declaration of Independence 1776. 
15
· The American Constitution of 1789. 
16
· The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizens 1791. 
17
· Paul Seighart The international law of human rights (1982) at 8. 
18
· JP Humphrey The international law of human rights (1973) at 12. 
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The principle has also found concrete expression in article 2(7) of the UN Charter of 
1945 which provides specifically that: 
"Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorise the United Nations to intervene in 
matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any State or shall require the 
Member to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter, but this principle shall 
not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII" .19 
However, matters stood differently in the case of aliens. As part of its national 
sovereignty, a state was always entitled to demand respect for its own nationals abroad, 
as any maltreatment of them could constitute a violation of the personal sovereignty of 
the state to which they belonged.20 This demand, however, flowed only from the 
doctrine of national sovereignty itself - so that, if a state fell short of the requirement of 
protecting another state's nationals, for example, by expropriating their property, the 
compensation was due to the other state whose personal sovereignty had been violated, 
and not to the individual whose property had been taken. So in such a case, the state is 
the sole claimant.21 Whether that state chose to pass the compensation on to the injured 
individual was, in international law, entirely its own affair.22 
For centuries, one proposition remained unchallenged: by reason of the doctrine of 
national sovereignty, the law of nations could not recognise any rights vested in any 
individual against any sovereign state - his own or another.23 
By the nineteenth century, however, international law was developing a doctrine of 
--·---.,~ .~ 
legitimacy of "humanitarian intervention" in cases where a state committed atrocities 
against its own nationals which "shocked the conscien,ce of mankind" .24 There was .the 
--=---·~·---.. --~------·-·~" - ' - . , 
$!'owing realisation of the inseparableJink between individual liberty andinternationaL 
~~~-~~~Lsec.m:ity,_Jhe .. consequences .. of the .. act.hi ties .. of the. Ottoman .troop~ affected 
~.eYeJ:"aLother states and thre.aten.ed peace and security in.Europe. JY~!!gJel3_~ers _had to 
<!!~cu_~~ )!Q':Y ~o. ensure the protection of these liberties, not only within their own 
19
· PR Ghandhi International human rights documents (1995) at 15. 
20 See Mavrommatis Palestine Concession Case PCIJ Series A No 2 in which the court pointed out 
that "by taking up the case of one of its subjects, and by resorting to diplomatic action or international 
judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right, its right to ensure in the 
person of its subject, respect for international law ... ". 
21 MN Shaw International Law (1986) at 421. 
22 Sieghart note 17 above at 12. 
23. Jbid .. 
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territories b~~ !!1!:~1.1~9.11,L the WQrlcl, ThUS, when the BritisJ:i !:-il:Jeral J;>0litician, 
,.,,.,.,,,,....,~-----"'"''--·-'·"-'~·· "m·~ 
Qla,qst()ne, invok~cl tJ;ie doctrine of humanitarian intervention to support the freedom of 
fu~-.P~Qple .of Bulgaria from Otto:r;nan trogps, he faced very JittJe opp9sition. 25 Ihis 
~ugi.fill:t!wi@ .. inte:ryention doctrine was invoked largely. against the.Ottoman Empire in 
rn~l.gnbehalf of the Gre~~ PeopJ.e; by Fntnce in Syrja in 1860~1861~ an_d,i:igaipjp 
(~,,,.---·-'"~ 
1.§.76 when aroun4. goo§'lC®stians were massacred by irregular Ottoman troops in. 
"·-.. .....-/ 
'Y!i~ti~_~()clay Bulgaria. 26 
T.Q!~_process continued, albeit slowly. After t}ie Fi~t .World War, minority treaties were. 
C?s>n<?!l!4~<lwitJ1 the League of Nations as a guarantee which sQught .to. protect the rjghts 
qfJigguistic and ethnic minorities within the new state. territories created by the treaties 
_()_[Versailles and St. Germain. For instance,..article4.ofibe Ge11'I!@.g_::.Polish Cqnyeptiop. 
qpJ)pper Silesia of 1922..brokeJlew .ground in -~aranteei11gJhe rights of indi_viciuals -
ilJ&!l!gfilg .the rights.to life, liberty and the free exercis.e of rnligiQJ:l, l:lJ:lcl egu.<:tl.~.eat:r;n.e11t 
before thuw,.. .. even agains.t.a state'i;; 9W natim1als .• .A P0le and a Czech were the first 
private individuals in the history of international law to establish personal rights against 
'!,_~~1~as.ar.e.s:ultQfthis treaty. 27 The. same. periocl saw inte:rnational collaboration in fue 
abolition of both the national and international slave trade. The first true international 
_._,_,__ > ' ' '> '" ' -•M>•' < >' ' ' ''•"" ' ',-.•,,~ 
l}uman.rights treaty ., .. the .. Slav.ery Convention_.,. was.adopted in 1926. 28 
Ibi:_turning.pgintand the.subsequentdownfall offu,e doctrine of n(l.tional sovereignty, 
aj)east as far as. itrelatesto human rights, came in the late 1930s and early 1940s, when 
l!!!Precedentedatrocities were perpetrated by the regimes oflta.ly,_Russia, Germany.and 
oJh~r.dictatorialregimesjn Europe and As.ia (which were aU lawJullyio,p9wer),.agaip.st 
millions . ..of..th_eicown ci!iz~:Q.S.· ;Many of these atrocities were carried out with complete 
l~(l.lity . UJ1Qer the respective . national legislation: the .domestic laws authorised ... the 
Jl~IfilgQJ!S._injusticeofthe~act~,29 Moreover, these laws had been enacted by legislatures 
lawfully installed under the constitutions of these sovereign states. Under the strict 
24
· Id at 13. 
25
· Ibid. 
26
· Ibid. 
27
· Ibid. See also the case of Steiner and Gross v The Polish State, Upper Selesian Arbitral Tribunal cases 
188 and 287 1927-28 Annual Digest. 
28
· Ghandhi note 19 above at 2. 
29
· Sieghart note 17 above at 14. 
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doctrine of national sovereignty, any foreign criticism of those laws was illegitimate 
and an interference in domestic affairs.30 
W@n .. the$econd. World.War ended .• shoi::ked by the .barbaric atrocities committed. aJJ.d 
S1;1.ff~tings ci:t11sed. IJ,y_~o.1P:e states against their nationals, the. victoriou.s. Allied Pow;enL 
~e!~~~~Q!!!n_e_cLto.intmduce into international. law;11ew c()ncepts . c:lesignecl to . mitlaw 
~~!!.-~Y~P:tsj11Jhe.future, .or to make..theirrecurrence .. at le~tJe§.sJikely. 31 The.Jnell!!s 
adopted was the establisbinent of new inter..,.gmi:emmeutal organisations, such as. the 
...._,_,_.,_.,,.,,.,._~ _ _,~-~·~~»· -~·-" ,._,_,,_;c F '•" 
Uni1~9.Nll~!9J1$, ~cl the developrnenLof a. new branch of i11ternational law~ specifically 
concerned with relations between governments and their .. own subjects. 
Since then, several international human rights instruments have been adopted by the 
UN which now impose obligations on many governments as to what they may or may 
not do to individuals over whom they exercise state power. To the extent of those 
obligations, the strict doctrine of national sovereignty has been restricted in at least two 
crucial respects. First, how a state treats its own subjects is now the legitimate concern 
of other states, in other word~Jan issue falling under international law. Secondly, there is 
now a superior international standard, established by common consent, which may be 
used for judging the domestic laws and actual conduct of sovereign states within their 
own territories and in the exercise of their internal jurisdictions, and may therefore be 
regarded as ranking in the hierarchy of laws even above national constitutions. 
I?.l:lring_@.cl after the Second World .War, the Allied Powers cam.e to the conclusion that 
it wasJhe gr~ggal in~.l1gement of individual liberty with impunity within member 
states that had led to the war. They then pledged to ensure that protection of individual 
"""""'•-,~~-•""•' ' ,- , ' 
r!ihts internationally would have to become their major priority if there were to be 
international peace and security. To roa.ke sure thattbeirplec,lges be.came axeality, tbe 
30
· Ibid. 
31 The landmarks in these movements were the Atlantic Charter of 14 August 1941, with its call for 
"freedom from fear and want", the declaration of 1 January 1942 by the twenty-six United Nations then 
fighting the Axis Powers, to the effect "that complete victory over their enemies is essential to defend life, 
liberty, independence and religious freedom, and to preserve human rights and justice in their own lands 
as well as in other lands"; the Dunbarton Oaks proposals of 1944 for the establishment of the United 
Nations Organisation which would, among other things, "promote respect for human rights and 
fundamental freedoms", the phrase to which the San Francisco Conference of 1945 added the words "for 
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victorious Allied Powers adopted legally binging treaties that expose4Jlw treatJ.nent of 
~jgy.fils.b.;yJ:beirgQ.Yernments to international scrutiny. ~~p!Je the. pro~Jam8:!i_cm in 
~~ZLaj'_th~J.JN. Ch~er that: "[n]othing cQptfill)eclinthe present Chzjer s}.1all 
authorise the United Nations. to intervene in matters. which are .. essentially within the 
--~--·----·""-· •• ···- .,_, • , • ·-".. " •• "¥" • -
g.muesticjurisdicti211 of any State .. ~·:~ Chapter VII of the same Charter permits_ the lJN 
to_ intervene in situations where a government's treatment of its s;_itizens threatens 
international peace and security, for ex~ple, . the Rwanda genocide ... of 1. 994:· These 
~ ... ~ .. ,~·,_~~<'"-'~·- . ' ' ,, 
legally binding human rights instruments signed by governments rank higher in 
international law than domestic laws, and prevail when there is conflict between the 
two. This principle is aimed at ensuring an effective inter-state relationship, thus 
preventing states from abrogating their international responsibilities by invoking 
domestic legislation. As far back as 1925, when the Permanent Court of International 
Justice (PCIJ) gave an advisory opinion in the Exchange of Greek and Turkish 
Population case,32 the court pointed out that 
" ... a principle which is self-evident, according to which a state has contracted valid 
international obligations is bound to make in its legislation such modifications as may be 
necessary to ensure the fulfilment of the obligations undertaken".33 
Also in 1930, with regard to the Interpretation of the Convention between Greece and 
Bulgaria respecting Reciprocal Emigration,34 the PCIJ stated that 
" .. .it is a generally accepted principle of international law that in relations between powers who are 
contracting parties to a treaty, the provisions of municipal law cannot prevail over those of the 
treaty".35 
And in stressing the Universal Declaration's universal character by which human rights 
issues transcend the domestic jurisdiction of states, Dr HV Evatt of Australia, the 
President of the UN General Assembly in 1948, stated (after the Declaration had been 
adopted) that: 
"It is the first occasion on which the organised community of nations has made a declaration of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and it has the authority of the body of opinion of the UN 
as a whole, and millions of men, women and children all over the world, many miles from Paris and 
New York, will turn for help, guidance and inspiration to this document". 36 
all, without distinction as to race, sex, language and religion". 
32
· Andrew Drzemczewski European Human Rights Convention in Domestic Law: A Comparative Study 
(1983) at. 20-21. 
33
· Advisory Opinion No 10 PCIJ (1925) Ser B. 
34
· PCIJ Ser B No 17 32. 
35
· Drzemczewski note 32 above at 21. 
36
· Quoted in UN Department of Social Affairs" The impact of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights" (1953) Doc 
ST/SOA/5/Rev 1 at 7. 
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However, it undoubtedly remains the case that some nations, especially those in the 
Southern Hemisphere, have not yet accepted, do not yet conform, or conform only 
inadequately, to the new obligations under international human rights law. 
Another argument which is sometimes heard is that "human rights" are an exclusively 
Western concept, whose "imposition" on the rest of the world, constitutes a form of 
intellectual, political, or legal neo-colonialism or neo-imperialism.37 But this argument 
is gradually losing ground as it becomes evident that concepts of legitimacy, the justice 
of laws, the integrity and dignity of the individual, safeguards against arbitrary rule and 
freedom from oppression and persecution, are to be found in very similar form in every 
civilisation throughout the world and throughout history. People in Africa, Latin 
America and Asia are as human and deserve as much respect for their dignity as do 
people in Europe and America. 
In spite of these differences in the approach to human rights, since the end of the 
Second World War there has been a progressive development towards the international 
protection of human rights on both international and regional levels. The post World 
War Two international instruments for the protection of human rights commenced with 
the adoption of the UN Charter on 26 October 1945. Although the Charter (the 
constitution of the UN) is a legally binding document, the absence of any definition of 
human rights in the document has greatly weakened the legal authority of its clauses. 
An attempt was therefore made to supplement them in 1948 by the adoption of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR).38 This document, which defines 
fundamental rights such as, the right to life and liberty of the person, to a fair trial in 
criminal proceedings, and fundamental freedoms such as freedom of expression, 
religion and association, is a declaration adopted by resolution of the UN General 
Assembly and not a legally binding document.39 It was not intended to be a legal 
37
· This argument is commonly heard from Third World leaders, especially African leaders who want to 
use this as a means to continue suppressing their citizens. They believe that by invoking the vices of 
colonialism and imperialism, they can move their citizens to rebel against any form of Western criticism 
of their human rights records. Unfortunately for them, this hasn't been the case, for the citizens have 
become more and more aware of the universality of human rights and each day they pressurise these 
regimes for reforms. 
38
· The International Bill of Rights UN Fact Sheet No 2 Rev (1996). 
39
· Leah Levin Human Rights: Questions and Answers UNESCO ( 1981) at 17. 
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instrument binding on members. 
Nevertheless, it has gained considerable authority as a general guide to the content of 
fundamental human rights and freedoms as understood by members of the UN. It also 
provides an important link between different concepts of human rights in different parts 
of the world. The declaration has been described as "a common standard of 
achievement for all peoples and all nations" .40 In terms of its preamble, the declaration 
is intended to provide a common understanding of the human rights and freedoms in the 
Charter. 
Despite its non-binding nature, the declaration has been affirmed by numerous 
resolutions of the United Nations' bodies and related agencies; invoked and re-invoked 
by a broad range of decision makers, national and transnational, judicial and others; and 
incorporated in many international agreements and national constitutions. The result is 
that the Universal Declaration is now widely acclaimed as a Magna Carta of 
humankind, to be complied with by all actors in the world arena. What began therefore 
as mere common aspiration is now hailed as an authoritative interpretation of the 
human rights provisions of the UN Charter and established customary law, having the 
attributes of jus cogens and constituting the heart of a global bill of rights. Through 
repeated practices of states, it is now generally held to have crystallised into a binding 
instrument.41 At the First UN Conference on Human Rights held in Teheran, Iran, in 
1968, the Final Act, the Proclamation ofTeheran states in article 2 that 
" the UDHR states a common understanding of the peoples' of the world concerning the 
inalienable and inviolable rights of all members of the human family and constitute an 
obligation for the members of the international community". 
The UN General Assembly accepted this view of the declaration when by Resolution 
2442 (XXIll) of 19 December 1968, it endorsed the Teheran Proclamation. The UN 
General Assembly has on several occasions used the declaration as a basis for appeals 
to urge governments to take measures to promote respect for and observance of human 
40
· Id at 15. 
41 J Humphrey No Distant Millennium: The international law of human rights (1989) at 154-166; see also 
articles 31 and 32 of the 1964 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. 
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rights. The UN adopted several resolutions against the apartheid regime of South 
Africa, including the following: UN General Assembly Resolution (UN GA Res.) 2145 
(XXI), whereby it decided that the mandate of South Africa in Namibia was terminated; 
UN Security Council Resolution (UN Sec Council Res) 276 (1970) declaring the 
continued presence of South Africa in Namibia illegal, (all these because South Africa's 
treatment of the people of Namibia was considered by the UN to be against the 
principles enshrined in the Declaration). The UN General Assembly in Resolutions 
23 72 (XXII), 2403 (XXIII), 2498 (XXN) and 2517 (XXIV) and Security Council Res 
269 (1969) recognised the legitimacy of the Namibian national struggle. The UN 
Security Council in Resolution 282 (1970) ordering an embargo on the shipment of 
arms to South Africa, recognised 
" ... the legitimacy of the struggle of the oppressed people of South Africa in pursuance of their 
human rights and political rights as set forth in the Charter of the UN and [in] the UDHR". 
Subsequent efforts after the adoption of the 1948 Declaration have been focused on 
arriving at covenants aimed at further defining the rights and freedoms and providing 
machinery for dealing with complaints of violations of the Covenants. While the 
UDHR was drafted with remarkable speed (it was passed on to the Economic and 
Social Council - ECOSOC - a year after the drafting work started and proclaimed by the 
UN General Assembly on 10 December 1948); the "no power" doctrine prevailed for 
almost twenty years. These years of concentrated efforts at standard-setting culminated 
in December 1966 with the adoption by the UN General Assembly of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) and the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR), and the Protocol to the latter. 
Together, these instruments are commonly known as the international bill of rights. 
From standard setting, the UN moved to reinforcement of its monitoring mechanisms. 
A few months after the adoption of the 1966 Covenants, ECOSOC authorised the 
Human Rights Commission, for the first time, to place on its annual agenda, an item 
relating to violation of human rights, including authority to examine communications.42 
42
· ECOSOC Res 1235 (XLII) of 6 June 1967. 
42
· UN 6.A--Re~-60 (III) 78 UNTS 277. 
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Apart from the abovementioned international human rights instruments, the UN has 
adopted over seventy other human rights instruments including the Genocide 
Convention of 194943 and the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial 
Countries and Peoples of 1960.44 All these are aimed at entrenching the universal 
protection of human rights. 
Eespite t~~,~:Y~!~~llr.~~~~~!~g~d concep! of the protection of human ri.gh!s, .!heir 
!!!!£lem~!!!~llQI! an~L~Qforcement dep.endJargely .. on.the .. various .. conc.epti<J~J>,elcl n:xJlut 
differe.nLp5(QP,leS,,.Qf .the.world. Peoples. from .different.parts. of,the globe .rec.ogp,i~e th~ 
ne~d to protect lwmau,ughts.hu.tad_QRLl!letP,ods ti.iat suit their particular nee<!s. 
1 :3 The African Notion of Human Rights 
Africa presents a paradoxical picture in the study of contemporary international human 
rights. The reality that one witnesses in contemporary Africa differs greatly from that 
envisaged by the departing colonial masters. The colonial powers expected that 
constitutional provisions and a Western-trained judiciary would protect human rights as 
defined, determined and delineated in the constitutions left behind at independence. 
Either through coup d'etat, or by proclamation of states of emergency or siege, 
however, constitutional safeguards, and often whole constitutions, have been abrogated, 
annulled, or amended, so subverting the human rights that had been declared sacrosanct 
in the constitutions of various African nations. 
Recognition and protection of human rights certainly existed in the pre-colonial 
period.45 However, African definitions of human rights differed in key respects from 
those propounded by the West. The conception of human rights in traditional African 
society is not sanctioned by a normative system deriving its validity from a 
constitutional base or Grandnorm, but is rather premised on social values positively 
confirmed by African beliefs in the past and transmitted to posterity through oral 
history and manifested through positive traditional practices. The durability of these 
values is guaranteed by the fact that they symbolise some of the basic elements which 
hold society together. The context of family, clan and ethnic solidarity provide the 
frameworks within which individuals exercise their political and social liberties and 
duties.46 
The African traditional systems of human rights are underpinned by social forces 
peculiar to each society and are not the creation of a modem constitution.47 The 
a~rogation of a constitution, therefore, will have no effect on.the traditional.concepts of 
human rights.48 
45 Claude E Welch Jr "Human rights as a problem in contemporary Africa" in Claude E Welch & 
Ronald Meltzer (eds) Human rights and Development in Africa (1984) at 11. 
46. Ibid. 
47
· Michelo K Hansungule, The African theory of human rights (1995) at 1. 
48
' Ibid. 
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There is, however, another point of difference that one might detect between African 
traditional conceptions of human rights and the conceptions of human rights fostered in 
modem societies. In the latter, the rights are considered universal and individualistic in 
nature, and apply on the same footing to every human being irrespective of geographic 
location.49 In the former, human rights exist within the context of a particular group or 
community.so In general, African law is a law of the group, not only because it applies 
to micro-societies (lineage, tribe, ethnic group, clan or family), but also because the role 
of the individual is largely insignificant. 
In traditional African society, the importance of the society, administered by traditional 
rn;lrm§~.":'~ em12hasised, and individual rights were viewed within the context of the 
group. It was within the group that the individual found security to enjoy his or her 
,q,, ,,_ 
..,.......,.._,.._,w·-'··""'_,_,,,:~-c.,,.. ,._., 
rights. The individual was subjugated by the archetype of the totem; of the common 
ancestor or protecting spirit As Professor Collumb aptly states: 
I "Living in Africa means giving up an individualistic, competitive, egoistic, aggressive and 
\ 
dominant way of life, so as to live along with the living and the dead, with the natural 
environment and the spirits which people it or endow it with life". 
\ 
ll!<:'..,.whole gm1cept of human rights revolved around the African "communitarian 
}~~.~!.'':_!?.~c::i~!Q.!lS .. within .eac.h society were ma.de by con!le!1S1:1S ~1:1.~her than by 
comp§Jit,i.of1'--'!1:19: economic.surpluses were geI].en1ted. lltld disposed of on a distributive 
rather than a profit-oriented basis.st Thus, as Issa G Shivji, a Tanzanian writer, puts it: 
"African traditional society is based on collectively (community) rather than on an individual 
and therefore, the notion of individual is foreign to African ethno-philosophy". 
l~J!U:he seeming absence of the individual conception in the traditional.society hardly 
itlll2li~.S~the absence of individual rights. These are there, but individual rights and 
int.er.es.ts are defined in groups or communities through which the individual finds 
~ ·---"-"'' 
~J?I.~.§~.ion. ~t would also be wrong to assume that the authoritarianism or absence of 
yVestem styled democracy in most African states, reflects the nature of human rights of 
~~ ,traditional African political systems. This seems to be the central thesis of those 
49
· Welch Jr note 45 above at 7. 
50
· Lakshaman Marasinghe "Traditional Conception of Human Rights in Africa", in Welch & 
Meltzer note 45 above at 33. 
5
1. Rhoda Howard "Is there an African Concept of Human Rights?" in Vincent RJ (ed) Foreign 
policies and human rights: issues and responses (1986) 13. 
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who deny the existence of the concept of, and even the practice of, human rights and 
democracy in non-Western systems. Rather, when one speaks of human rights 
violations in Africa, one refers mainly to the violation of human rights as guaranteed by 
externalised constitutions: texts adopted outside the norms of traditional African beliefs 
and values, texts that advocate adversarial ideals rather than the home-grown African 
culture of dialogue and reconciliation. Externalised texts took little or no account of 
what the traditional African societies regard as human rights. While the modem concept 
of human rights protection relies on the courts and other agencies for the enforcement 
of human rights, traditional African societies relied on,....-communal solidarity and the 
moral up-bringing of its people. It is believed that if individuals are properly brought up 
to respect one another, respect their elders and live in solidarity with one another, there 
will be no room for human rights violations, and consequently no cause for the 
establishment of courts for their protection. 
Studies conducted into the African concepts of human rights as recognised by 
traditional societies, illustrate enormous satisfaction as to the basically democratic way 
in which the society protects its own human values: the choosing of leaders, the 
settlement of conflicts, the provision of social amenities, the rendering of assistance and 
support, etc etera. The rights guaranteed in modem constitutions are fully guaranteed 
and enjoyed in traditional societies, although not embodied in texts negotiated by a 
certain portion of the population. Basic rights such as the right to life, the right to 
shelter, the right to food, the right to association, assembly, expression etc etera. are 
recognised and guaranteed, and even the head of a particular community cannot, 
without the consent of the subjects, and by due customary process, deprive an 
individual of any of these rights. 
The right to life, for example, is sacred. At every libation, at festivals and on other 
occasions, prayers are offered for the protection and preservation of individual life and 
life in general respectively52• 
52
· Victor Dankwa "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Hopes and Fears" in The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Development, Context and Significance African Law Association 
(1991) at 3. 
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Witness the following prayer at the beginning of a farming season in Ghana: 
"The year has begun, we shall be going to cut the bush, And if (as) we ... go to cut, we pray for 
our lives, Let our cutlass cut bush and creepers, But do not let it cut (a) Human leg"53 • 
The following Akan proverb also exemplifies the importance that traditional societies 
attach to the right to life: 
"It is man that counts. I call upon gold, it does not answer. I call upon my drapery, there is no 
answer. It is man that counts"54 • 
In my village, Oshie, in the North-western Province of Cameroon, for example, not 
only is it forbidden to take some other person's life, it is also forbidden to take one's 
own life. A man who for any reason kills another person is severely punished. 
Depending on the circumstances that led to the killing, the killer can either be expelled 
from the village for life, or for a certain period of time, or be asked to pay, after 
consultation with the family of the deceased, compensation in the form of "blood 
money". The death penalty imposed by some modem societies is not practised because 
it is forbidden to take life. In Western societies, the right to life includes even the right 
to affect one's own life, for example, suicide, euthanasia (and even to affect the lives of 
others through legalised abortion). The African communitaria,l ideal sees it as a duty 
upon society to protect the life of everyone, and to ensure that not even an individual 
takes his or her own life. If a man takes his own life, his funeral shall be blocked, that 
is to say, nobody will be allowed to shed tears or even to feel sorry for him. Nobody is 
allowed to visit the funeral house until it is announced that the deceased's family has 
paid something to enable the ban to be lifted. Anyone fo~d crying at the scene of the 
/ 
funeral shall be heavily fined. The community believes that since he or she didn't value 
his or her life, he or she should be buried like an animal. This in our village, is a great 
humiliation to the relatives of the deceased, and serves as a deterrent to would-be 
suicides for they would not want to "disgrace their family". A woman who attempts an 
abortion and dies in the process is treated in the same manner. Such is the value 
attached to life that the whole community comes to mourn if one of their number dies. 
The importance that the people in this community attach to life demonstrates their 
desire to inculcate into the younger generation the inviolability of this God-given right. 
53
· Anne Klingelhofer "Agriculture" in David Brokenscha (ed) Akwapim Handbook (1972) at 137. 
54
· KA Busia The position of the Chief in the Modern Political System of Ashanti (1951) at 35. 
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It is believed that if all the members of the community are brought up to respect their 
lives and those of others, it will be very unlikely for these persons to take life for 
granted, theirs or others. 
The importance attached to the right to life could also be noticed with other basic rights. 
Non-centralised or amorphous societies such as the Ibos of Nigeria, Nuer of Sudan, 
Tonga of Zambia, and the Ashanti in Ghana are said, during the pre-colonial era, to 
have had very strong egalitarian and democratic traditions. 55 In most indigenous African 
political traditions, it was not unusual to find that decisions affecting the community as 
a whole could not be made until they had been publicly debated. For example, in some 
tribes in the Bamangwato of Botswana, (considered to be one of Africa's most 
democratic societies)56, important decisions of governance were made with the 
participation of all adult members of the community. The Ashantis of Ghana and the 
Yurobas of Nigeria, operated systems which checked and carefully balanced and 
sanctioned the abuse and disregard of tribal powers. The Bugandas of Uganda are 
known to have gone even further and killed most of their Kabukas (Kings) in defence of 
their rights and freedoms,57 and in the famous break-up of the Shaka Zulu empire, 
several of his best soldiers and loyal citizens rebelled against him in an uncharacteristic 
fashion due to his alleged gross human rights violations.58 
Once in a group or community, the African is entitled to various other rights due to 
members of that group. These rights: association, assembly, speech, movement, 
property, did exist and were enjoyed by traditional African societies. 
The African has been known for being associational or communitarian in attitude. It is 
therefore unfair to deny the existence of this right within the society.59 In traditional 
Yoruba society, for example, the right to family membership (association) is considered 
as a distinct legal right. Family membership endows the members with a number of 
55
· "Human Rights and African Development" in Encyclopaedia of Public International Law (North 
Holland)(1985) at 285-290. 
56 Hansungule note 47 above at 11. 
57
· Busia note 54 above at 35. 
58Hansungule note 47 above at 10. 
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rights including, the right of succession to family property which is held in common; 
the right to be supported in times of scarcity; and the right to claim societal and 
psychological help at moments of need. In modem societies, the problems associated 
with old age, infirmity, widowhood, and being orphaned, generally all fall within the 
sphere of social welfare underwritten by the state. In the context of a traditional society, 
these problems are generally the concern of the members of the extended family.60 
Membership of an extended family is regarded as a fundamental right, and any attempt 
to exclude a person from such membership unlawfully is considered, in Yoruba for 
example, as a violation of human rights. This right is so deeply rooted among the tribes 
of Nigeria that it has found expression in the constitution of the country. One leading 
case in this area that came before the Nigerian courts is Aoko v Fagbemi and DPP.61 
The applicant was found to have committed adultery which was a criminal offence 
under native law and custom. The family council decided to expel her from her 
extended family. She applied to the Nigerian courts for an injunction. The court allowed 
the injunction on the ground that adultery was not an offence under the Nigerian 
Criminal Code, and therefore her expulsion constituted a violation of her fundamental 
rights under section 22(10) of the Federal Constitution ofNigeria.62 
With the right to freedom of association follows other rights. In the past, Africans 
would associate with each other based not only on kin, but also on sex. Boys of mature 
age were usually assembled to be taught the basic ethics of manhood, including how to 
run a family, the village set-up, the politics in the village, and succession to the throne. 
Some are even trained to be adjudicators to settle village disputes among their piers. 
Throughout the session, the African principles of generosity, hospitality, tolerance and 
duty of the children to look after and respect their parents, and the duty of the parents to 
look after their children are emphasised. Girls too assemble to learn about their roles in 
society. Persons of different age groups could assemble freely to discuss issues 
affecting their lives.63 But today, in most African countries, demonstrations and 
assemblies require the prior procurement of a permit from state authorities. Today, a 
59 Ibid. 
60 Marasighne note 50 above at 4 7. 
61 1961 1 All Nigerian Law Reports at 400. 
62 SNC Obi Modern family law in Nigeria (1966) at 38. 
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single police officer can disperse a crowd ofthousandlofpeople who have assembled to 
enjoy their rights of expression, association and assembly, just because they do not have 
a permit to assemble. It was unheard of in traditional society that people needed permits 
to assemble. 
Freedom of movement in traditional society, particularly among the tribes in the 
Southern Province of Zambia has always been exercised without government 
intervention. These tribes have been drifting to other parts of the country in search of 
more fertile land for their farming needs. 64 In the past few years they have moved right 
up to the north of the country. The most striking thing about their movement is that the 
migrations are taking place without government interference. And as they move, they 
are exercising their freedoms of movement and residence. 
Among the Y orubas, freedom of speech has always been regarded as a common, or 
communal right.65 It is subject, however, to a very real limitation, namely, the principle 
of respect. 66 This principle involves respect for both oneself and others. The respect for 
others raises a notion of stratification along a hierarchy of respect determined within 
each social unit. The hierarchy of respect for parents, for elders closely related by 
blood, for elders belonging to the same extended family, and for the head of the whole 
family, provides a classic paradigm. 
"The defamation of a person higher in status [or an elder], such as a chief, is a very serious 
offence which often calls for heavy compensatory payment [but not incarceration as in some 
modem societies]".67 
The limitation introduced by the principle of respect and the need to leave most slander 
and libel to mediation and conciliation through family councils as matters affecting 
family status, must be viewed as indicative of the fundamental belief that all freedoms 
are limited by the need to preserve social harmony. 
63 Hansungule note 4 7 above at 11. 
64 Ibid. 
65
· Marasighne note 50 at 36. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Francis M Deng Tradition and Modernisation: a challenge for law among the Dinka of Sudan 
(1971) 226. 
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Viewed in this way, the limitation placed upon the freedom of speech in a modem 
society is largely controlled by a normative system which could be manipulated by a 
ruling elite which control the legislative machinery. In a traditional society, 
manipulation is very unlikely because the freedom ts internalised and therefore 
becomes part of the common weal of the society. 
Apart from the political rights and freedoms, the existence of which have often been 
denied by W estem scholars, economic rights, such as the right to own property was 
completely ruled out. In the celebrated English case of Re Southern Rhodesia (1921) 
AC 211, the Privy Council in London held that the concept of property was foreign to 
the natives. This case involved the sale of a large piece of land by an African chief to 
the British South African Company for mining and for the other English settlers. Seeing 
that most of their tribal land had changed hands as a result of this agreement, the tribal 
people decided to challenge the agreement. It was in the course of this proceedings that 
the Privy Council, then the highest court of the former Rhodesia, now Zimbabwe, held 
that: 
"Africans did not entertain the concept of property in their ideals and therefore it would be 
improper to hold the so-called contract valid when the mind of the two contractors could not 
have been said to have agreed as to the contract". 
In this way, the Westerners denied the existence of the principle of property (such as 
land) and therefore the human right to property in the jurisprudence of traditional 
African society, and so began to dismantle the African ideas in order to replace them 
with the English idea. 
The protection against any unlawful incursions into the right to hold movable property 
under native law and custom is an absolute one.68 Problems, however, arise particularly 
with immovable property, primarily land. Under the traditional system in Yoruba, for 
example, family land is not subject to private ownership.69 Although the community as 
a whole owned the land in question, individual members in each community would be 
entitled to parcels ofland on the basis of the formula in the respective community. 
68. Marasighne note 50 above at 40. 
69. Ibid. 
25 
Once an individual is a member of a community, that individual has a right to land. No 
one, not even the head, can deprive him or her of this right. Land in the West and most 
modern African societies, can be owned by individuals who can exclude others and 
who have the right to alienate it as they wish. In traditional African society, this is not 
possible as individuals can own only (absolute) rights to use of the land but not the land 
itself. This is owned by the community as a whole for the respective members. 
The fact that family property, such as land, is considered communal property is basic to 
property rights as conceived by most traditional societies in Africa. Any act of 
alienation of such property requires the consent of all members of the extended family. 
The limitation upon the freedom to own immovable property is a recognised principle 
among most traditional societies in Africa, justified principally on the ground that land 
and the extended family are inseparable and therefore any parcelling of the family's land 
(to individuals) which may eventually lead to the incursion of other extended families 
into the domain of the first, could begin the process of social decay and societal 
disintegration. An extended family without family land has been likened to " a building 
without pillars or walls".70 In 1912, a Nigerian Chief, in a submission to the West 
African Land Commission said: " I conceive that land belongs to a vast family of which 
many are dead, few are living and countless yet unborn". 71 
In the Nyakyusa, a Bantu community south of Tanzania, land is not owned in any 
absolute sense either by the man and his household who live on and cultivate it, or by 
the village group, or by the chief, but by all of them jointly.72 The holding of land is 
both "communal" and "individual". It is communal in the sense that the individual's 
rights are dependent upon his social relationships, upon his membership of some group 
with a definite cultural idiom and social organisation of its own.73 The holding ofland is 
individual in the sense that at any moment, particular people have definite rights to 
70. Ibid. 
71. TO Elias The nature of African Customary law (1970) at 162. 
72. Geoffrey Wilson The land rights of individuals among the Nyakyusa (1968) at 29. 
73. Ibid. 
74. Ibid. 
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participate in the use and to share the produce of particular pieces of ground. 74 
Indeed, the experience on the ground clearly shows considerable satisfaction on the 
land allocation rules in traditional system than is the case in the modem system. 
Whereas there are lists of applicants awaiting allocation of "state land", at the Ministry 
of Lands under modem state systems, there are no equivalent lists at traditional 
institutions. 
From the foregoing, one can firmly assert that the notion of respect for human dignity, 
the freedom of expression, and other basic rights were firmly entrenched in the daily 
administration of traditional African societies. 
In terms of contemporary notions of human rights, colonialism produced some 
beneficial effects in ameliorating some of the limitations arising from certain 
traditional practices. For instance, the abolition of vicarious liability in criminal cases 
can be said to have made punishment in such cases humane and fair. 75 
However, it must not be forgotten that colonialism accounts, partly, for the dismal state 
of human rights in Africa today. 0( all the major continents of the world, Africa 
endured the most recent and most widespread colonialism. 76 Indigenous peoples were 
brutalised, tortured and even killed by the colonial masters; valuable resources were 
extracted from the continent for use in Western counties. Most of the anti-human rights 
laws that characterise most of the statute books in Africa today were imposed by the 
colonialists. An authoritarian framework for local administration was installed, 
reducing most indigenous rulers to relatively minor cogs in the administrative 
machinery. Initial constitutional arrangements were drawn overwhelmingly from 
patterns familiar to the departing colonial powers, hence reflecting the assumptions far 
75. Dankwa note 52 above at 5. 
76. Welch & Meltzer note 45 above at 11. 
77 Ibid. 
78 Id at 15. 
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more common in the metropole than in particular African societies. As they were 
externally imposed, these constitutions lacked popular support and legitimacy.77 In the 
social sphere, the imposition of colonial rule brought new complexities and changes in 
existing indigenous practices. When collective and individual expression came into 
conflict, the values of the colonising power were presumed to be superior to those 
indigenous to African societies. The European rulers thus had both the will and the 
power to impose new procedures and values.78 For example, several matrilineal African 
societies had practices of inheritance by which property passed from father to nephew, 
aimed at ensuring the stability and continuity of the extended family, rather than from 
father to son. Colonial legal codes, based on different assumptions, assaulted this belief 
by stressing inheritance through direct descent. 
From the foregoing, it is clear that colonial administration undermined traditional 
norms and expectations of political, social and economic rights. The frameworks 
brought by colonialism reflected Western liberal assumptions; traditional expectations, 
such as those about the responsibilities of chiefs or the nature of judicial settlement 
were jeopardised. The overall effect was one of weakening the effectiveness of 
indigenous standards and traditional institutions without firmly implanting new ideas. 
"The concept of human rights in Africa", according to Chris Mojekwa, "was 
fundamentally based on ascribed status ... ",80 or, to cite Latif Adegbite, 
" ... the indigene in traditional Africa enjoyed greater freedom than his modem counterpart. 
Admittedly, these rights were not guaranteed by the state so that he could, at his own instance, 
enforce them against the whole world ... ".81 
Unlike the w~sttt,m COQ,c,ept qf human rights whic.h emphasises. individuaLright~.Jh~ . 
...-,::,.,..,_ __ ,, ___ ~,,, __ ,,,. ~,, _ _.,., -
African concept shares significant similarity with the Islamic concept in that both 
~tpp!J.asise.rights based on community. B~c~nise of the differencesin conceptualisafo:m, 
thSLlll~@§~oLenforcementof these rights also differ from one :region to the otluL .. And 
79Mojekwa "The African perspective" in Jack L Nelson & Vera M Green International Human Rights: 
contemporary issues (1980) at 91. 
80Latif0 Adegbite "African Attitudes to International Protection of Human Rights" in Asbjom Eide & 
August Scheu (eds) International Protection of Human Rights ( 1968) at 69. 
81 Ghandhi note 19 above at 125-134. 
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~.caus~ . .it is .. :v:ery .. difficuJt .. to.negotiate ... an .. enforcem<m,t Jliechanism su,ited . .to,,alt the 
peoples in all the .. regions, some. regiQns ha:ve opted to est(lbli§h .. hllll1a.Il rights 
institutions that will dealwiththe problems ofhuman rights in thatparticulru: regiqn,. 
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1:4 Regional protection of human rights 
International protection of human rights .. jn general, and the regional protection of 
......___ _ _. . ._.,..,,, .. ,., . .,. __ ,, .. ~~,_,_,_ "'" -- - -
1!1J!l).@ rights in particular, are recent developments in international human rights law. 
'" ' ''"'" "'; ""' ',, ·- -
Since the adoption of the 1948 UniversaLDeclar~tiop,the. world haJLWitJ;lessed the 
,,---- '""'· ,, - -- < ·-- ·- ' ' ' ' ' ' 
e§!~.2li§htnent of three regional human rights instruments; namely, the .. european 
' 
\ Conventign on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of 1950,~1for .the. continept of 
Europe; the American Convention on Human Rights of 1969,82 for the Americas; and 
.......... ~ ...... . 
t 
\h.e African C])arter on Human @d J>eoples' Rights of 1981 83, for the contin,ept of 
Africa. 
-. 
The . existence of these three systems for the protection of human rights, and the 
possibil!ty of a fourth regional system in the Arab World84 lead to the question whether 
regional arrangements are compatible with the universal concept espoused by the UN 
aJ},dJ1)e West, or whether they are likely to diminish the value of the human rights work 
oftl!e YN and p.erhaps even undermine its effectiveness. 
There is a good deal to be said on both sides of the question. On the one hand, 
experience has shown that despite the universally acknowledged nature of human 
rights, their protection and promotion rely heavily on regional systems and the political 
'Yi!!. gf member states .. _:gi Europe, for example, it was possible, albeit amidst some 
s.c.epticism, to concl\lde. a QQ!lY.entipn containing binding obligaJions .and. setting.up~ne~ 
i.!ilirrnational machinery.at.the time when.this.was nolfeasibk.m the worl4at large. J'he 
bistqry of the .two UN. Covenants adopted in 1966 exemplifies .the .. difficulties in 
!legotiating detailed human rights provisions that will he acceptable to the goverprn,ents 
of states of widely varying cultures, traditions, ideologies and stages of econo1llic 
<l;eve!9pmeri.t .A.gree111ent on such matters is. easier to achieve between governments 
~ithin the same geographical region, sharing a common history and cultural tradition -
82 Id at 147-164. 
83 /dat175-185. 
84 AH Robertson & JG Merrils Human rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Protection of Human Rights (1989) at 222. 
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a prq_~~ss ~hi9h the UN has been encouraging and promoting. 
Tuo:ugh the. UN Covenants have now been widely ratified,Jhej}umher ofsti,ii~.$ whlch 
~~~Jlccepted their optional provisions is still limited'"~~- RegiQP.aLsystems c.l:!ttimPJ.(),X~ 
tp.e effectiveness .. of the._intematiQ11aLJJrote9Ji9n_ gLhwn.an rights; JheY S~-l>~e. .. 2J 
~ign!fi~.WJ.t_wlevance..where therejs .. i11sufficienLprote..ction_at.nat!QmtUeY~l .or .wli~re 
qpiyers11.l ius.troment~ _are .. not resp.e.cte.d. Jf a r~si.<?.~aljnsJnnuentc~_l;>ej:ustifie<JjnJhis 
'Yl!)')!l "gn,epart of the world, logic requires the same yiew as. regards regional SY§tell1S 
elsewhere. 
~,,__,,,_.,.....,,, 
On the other hand, it can be argued that human rights belong to human beings by virtue 
of their humanity and should thus be guaranteed to everyone on an equal basis without 
distinction wherever they live. The Arabs and the Asians should enjoy the same human 
rights as the Europeans, Americans or Africans. 
Human rights should indeed be the same for all persons everywhere, at all times. In 
other words, the normative contents of all international human rights instruments 
should in principle be the same. There may, of course, be variations in formulation, due 
to differences in drafting or legal traditions, but the basic rights and fundamental 
freedoms should be the same for all. The touch-stone here should be the UDHR which 
sets out "a common standard for all peoples and all nations". 
!!js therefore reasonable,. on practical groµnds, to set up regional arrangements f01: the 
tu'9t~ction ofhuman.rightsJVbich may qiffer from each other, provided that the rights to 
be protected are. essentially. the .same and are substantially those established in the 
Uni~ersal Declaration. This reasoning can be .supported by at least .two .. argume11ts .. 
E.!!~J}y,_giye,n,Jhe diversity of.the modem state system, it is natural that regional systems 
Qf <::P:force,m:eµtshould. be more readily accepted than universaLarrangements....A_s1ate 
~()t be forced to. submit itself to a system of internationaLcontroland . .will do so only 
if it has confideuce in the .system. J:LiS.111JJch m~m~ likely tQ have .such. confidence if the 
85 As of30 June 1995, 132 and 131 countries had ratified the ICESCR and the ICCPR respectively, while 
84 and 28 had ratified the First and Second Protocols to the latter respectively. 
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!!!!em~tional machinery has .been set up by a group of like-minded countries which may 
~lr~!!clY_.9_~_partners.in .. a xegionalorganisation.Jbap if tmsJ§)19t Jhe. ca,se. Moreover,, <!. 
state will be willing to give more power to a regional orgat1withrestrictedmemhership, 
----~~-~••••••~- •'----•--"•'••••~•••~-~'-•"-< "' -•' ~" _,, • '-o" 
i_g_~e.other.members.~e its .. friends and neighho.urs,.than to a world,..wide. organ 
in which it and its associates play a relatively small part . 
... -- ·~"~ ,. - ____ , . ., - . -·- - ' 
~~~Q.l!clly, 911 .::t_tpgr(:': practical level, it is obviously .ea,sier c:tnd more convenient for .. a .. 
ca,se, ... !9J2e .. heard within the region than somewhere else. To take Africa as an example, 
~d-be..more .. cQ11venient, and. probably less expensive for .alLconcerned. when .a 
~?-~E.1~1.1:!J?.Y.9J!.e state against c:tn()ther,. and qfortiori an ip.diyidual .a..ppli~ation against 
a stat~e heard in Banjul, rather .. than in New York or Genev:a . 
.--
~~gi9nal~~stems for the protection and promotion of human rights are also consistent 
with theworld-wide system of the UN. Articles 33 and 55 ofthe_UN Charter expressly 
r~_£ggnise the principle ofregional settlement of disputes threatening international peace 
aud.s_e,e_m:jty. The same.principle is expressly reiterated in article 44 .of the ICCPRand 
£'1!:1.!:>e,properlyextended.to.disputes over the violations of human rights. 
As mentioned earlier, when it comes to the drafting, contents and measures of 
implementation of the regional human rights instruments, the position is different. 
While it is desirable that the most effective system possible should be established 
everywhere, it is a fact that the same system is not at present acceptable in all parts of 
the world. 86 
&.!Qi.~jl!1!£grr~, jt. would be appropriate to examine the three major }uu:nan rights 
instruments in the world, with particular emphasis on their origin and history, control 
-.,.,.._.,.",~-<~·- ,_ ' ' '· ' -- ' '. 
machinery, procedure and modifications. 
86 Robertson & Merrils note 84 above at 223. 
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1:4:1 Origin and History 
1:4:1:1 Europe 
After the Second World War, the Congress of Europe was held at.The Hague in May 
!9.:1:8 .. and brought together prominent politicians from sixteen .9:i,fferenJ coµntries. 87 . ln 
i~s messllge to Europeans, adopted at the final session, the Congress P.roclaimed: 
i "We desire a Charter of human rights, guaranteeing liberty of thought, assembly and expression 
\ 
as well as the right to form a political opposition; we desire a Court of Justice with adequate 
. sanctions for the implementation of this Charter ... ". 88 
\ 
On 5 May 1949, the act creating the Council of Europe was signed in London by ten 
states. 
The European Convention was discussed and adopted l;?y a generation of Europeans 
s.~ared by the atrocities perpetrated by the Axis pow:ers,.89 .and faced with a growing 
~~<?logical conflict between. the East .and the West.90 The events of the war .made 
Jil!IQP~_countt:ies.~ially conscious of the .V,alue .. of .democracy~and .. the.protection 
2.Ll!!!!!!~YLQgQts_,J3y the. end. of the war the. commur1.ist ~eatJ}~. J?~<?C>me. a reality. 
~~tween 1948. <llld 1949, Europewitnessed the communist seizure of C:z;echoslovakia .. 
civil waLjn_ . Greece~ .... and. the }3erlin Block~J!e/1 ~-~~pean leaders feared any 
encroac]:n,µent on individual liberty, believing that dictatorships and the gradual 
s_t2pressjgJ:l of individual rights were.therootc.ausesof:war. 
Historically,JheEµropeans were familiar with bills of rights but wereJJJJffillliliar with 
-~i:-· ~--~-,,- ,-,-- ' , , " ' _,,,,,' ,_ ,_ "_,_,__'~"'~-,.._,~_,. '",, ,,_,,_, ___ - --~-'""""¥_,'"'""--- - '-"' - " & 
judicial enforcement of the rights they embodied. ~uropean .states. were culturl!llY 
i.@ntifiahle_units with.the .cause .. of individual l}uman tights finnlyrooted i,11 tlieir p~t: 
__ , - ''"'''<'""" "'-•'H,¥-•' ~- > ' 
87 -:+-See note 6 above at 71. 
88 Ibid. See also Mark W Janis & Richard S Kay European human rights law (1990) at 22. 
89 Carol M Tucker "Regional human rights models for Europe and Africa: A comparison" Syracuse. 
Journal of International and Comparative Law vol 10:135 (1983) at 140. 
90 Ibid. 
33 
The Magn_a_Cm:t~{l215J_,Jb~El1glishBi1lofRigh~s.(16891::md_ilieFrenchJ)~~laration 
I 
qithe.Rights_ofMl:lll'.ll!.cl gf th4il..citizen(179~_,-al.Len1Qb.a§is<Xl. a. liberal attitude tow_an:L 
.iodividt@trigbJ§. C,Ql1§~qµe,11tly, when fa<?~d with a, growing communist threat, post war 
.em:ope(ll! sta,!~s_, !Jound by .their comm91Lideology, democracy and individual liberty, 
~sef!dyJo surrender s9roe of their spvereign powers to protect _these. ideQlqgies.?2 
!}ris willingness to transfer power w"1S"the. key to a workable ... inter.,govemmental 
'!IT<mgement itt. Eurs>P~ •.. alld. is .. the . CQ11lersJ9J1e .. gL ;my. ;w.,ork<;ibl<t. i11ternational 
.~~g@ent. To this .end, references. to human rights.in the final texLQf.the._CQµp.9jl of 
Ell!QPe were. not mere affirmations of faith, butwere maj.e conditions. of membership. 
TJ.1~. ~9_yp.ci} of Europe stjpulated. t}le protectio11 a11d promotion of human rights as one 
of its principal goals from inception in 1949, Article 1 (b) of the Statute states 
' '\. ". . . this aim shall be pursued through the organs of the Council by discussion of questions of 
'\ common concern and by agreements and common action in . . . the maintenance and further 
realisation of human rights and fundamental freedoms". 
~icle 3 of th,~ Statute .. pr_e,sctjbes observance of human. rights. as an obligation of 
~-·-"'·""~ .,.,.- ----
membersh~p. It states: "Every Member of the Council must accept the principles of the 
rule oflaw anq of the .enjoyment by all persons within its jurisdiction of human rights 
and fimdamentaLfreedoms ···~ '.', and.article 8 sets.outsanctions that.could be imposed as 
a result of violation .of article J: 
~ ....... -~_,_,,,,,., ..... ~«•0~· --~. •< 
"Any member of the Council of Europe which has seriously violated Article 3 may be 
suspended from its rights of representation and requested by the Committee of Ministers to 
withdraw under Article 7. If such member does not comply with this request, the Committee 
may decide "that it has ceased to be a member of the Council as from such date as the Committee 
may decide".93 
_§_uc~.~!:~. the feelings, that Council members resoly~d to be bound by such 
fundamental principles of democracy as free elections, Ullive,rs~l suffrage and secret 
---~·-··-~"""''"h''""""'~-~o A ·W • -
Qallot,. and to. allow for the first time in international law, priv~te .indiy~g;uals .and 
associations to bring any alleged breach of thes~L.p.rinciples.~befo:r:e a European 
C.Qmmission on Human Rights. l:bu,s, when the Convention was signed in Rome in. 
91 AH Robertson Human Rights in Europe (1963) at 1-14 
92 Id at 141. 
93 The Statute of the Council of Europe 1949. 
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1950, the w.orld watched closely to see if European states would he willing to. empower 
~" ••• -..~'< ' ,, ' 
C:!ll intema.tional commission and .a .court to .safeguardjpgividual :rights as guaranteed in 
th~ Convention. 
l\.1oreover, European citizens have a .long'.".standing culture of individual Jiberty. Tbey 
are aware of their rights and responsibilities, and know the limits of state action. 
J!istitution,s. such .as-cthe. .. police,, ... the ... army, the judiciary.etc etera. _which are. the .main, 
@§J!mtionsJor the .protection .of human rights, all understandJb~it:.xespectiYe roles .and 
~~ell ""egu.ipped for. Jhe .. task. .In. short, t}ie European human rights system. has 
c:t<iYanc.edto..a stage \\There itI1owJocusesmore on protection than.on pr()motio.n.. 
The commitment of the Council of Europe to the protection of human rights was put to 
· a severe test when the Greek military overthrew the civilian regime in 1967, suppressed 
representative institutions, and imprisoned political opponents.94 Greek membership of 
the Council was about to be suspended in conformity with the organisation's adherence 
to the observance of human rights when the military withdrew and renounced the 
European Convention.95 Greece returned to the Council in 1974 after the restoration of 
democratic civilian govemment.96 
1:4:1:2 America 
:q_!<~.!Q~_Q()uncil of Europe, the Organisation of American States (OAS) also exhibited 
an _early concern for the protection of human rights within member states. The preamble 
to the OAS Charter drawn in 1948 states, inter alia, that the signato:ries are 
I "confident that the true significance of American solidarity and good neighbourliness can only 
I mean the consolidation on this continent, within the frameworks of democratic institutions, of a 
\ system of individual liberty and social justice based on respect for the essential rights ofman".97 
94 Edward Kannyo "The OAU and Human Rights" in Yassin El-Ayouty & I William Zartman (eds) The 
OAU After Twenty Years (1984) at 161. 
95 Ibid. 
96 Ibid. 
97 Ibid. 
35 
Tb,~J!l!~r-America!l Colilillission ofHuman. Rights { IACHR) wa.s setJ1p .ill, .!2.~.9 and 
Wa.§..l!lJ~gr'!ted.into the OAS fr~ew<>:d~jn 1967~ 98 The Alllerican Convention on Human 
Bjghts._w.<!§_s!..@:~.~ in!~(j9 a!ld Catl1e into force in 1978. 
The IACHR wc:is created under Resolution VI of the 5th meeting of Gommltc:ition of 
..... ~~-~· " ,.,,, .. 
l\:Lll:!!.s,ters. ofForeigJ.}Affairs of the OAS, in Santiago, Chile, in 1959.J~arttwo.of.Jhe. 
!~S,Qlution pro.vided~ that the .... .Commission. was to. be composed. of .SeYen .m.emh~rs 
sel~.t..il!.Jheir. personal capacity. from. slates presented._by .. tM_g.QY~rnment§.~~Ili~. 
P-ll!P~se of the CC>IIlIIli.ss!m1would .be .to "promote.respec.Lfor human righ~: .99 
The then Council 0f the organisation approved. the Statute of the Commission on 2~ 
l\{<lY J9()0. UncJer article.2. of the.Statute, the Commission :was estc:ibljshed as an 
(ll,ltonoIPol.ls e!!!itygfthe QAS. !furn.all rights were understood to be those spelled out 
i.n..Jhe_Jlogot•:L 1948, American .. Dedaration of the Rights .and. Duties .. of Man 
(@.B,Pl\1V00 Tue SeconclSpecial Inter-American Conference {Rio deJaneiro),in 1965 
amended the Commission's statute. The amendments were in the form of additions and 
----· .. "- .,__ . - ri~-·· ··--. ··-"-- _, - ·- -- ,.,, .. ··----" ·-~""f'"-·-<--- ---~·>; ,_, ,._ -. 
c~~g~s intended to make the statute stronger and as effectiye as .. possiple in assisting 
th~ Commission to perform its functions. The 1960 statute was amended as follows: 
•.it authorised the Commission to pay "particular attention to the observance of the 
I human rights referred to in articles 1, 2, 3, 4, 17, 25, and 26 of the American 
I 
I Declaration of 1948; 
\ •.it authorised the Commission to examine communications sent to it and any other 
\ 
l 
!information available to address the government of any member state "for information 
l 
j 
fdeemed pertinent, and to make recommendations to it, in order to bring about more 
~ 
}effective observance of fundamental human rights". 101 
98 Ibid. 
99 Annual Report of the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (1990-1991) OAE/SER L/11 79 
rev 1 Doc 12 at 6. 
100 Ibid. 
101 Ibid. 
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~~!1-!~:r"'"_<lt the. Third.S.p~gjll,l J1iter-American Conference (Buenos .Aires) 1967, the 
PrQto..c_oloLAmen9ment Jo .. the Ch~er of the OAS was signed. The protocol added 
.--· ' • ' ,_.. • ,__ ·' > _, --·,. 
j_~pouan112roYisiQl'.l§ ,!()~!he ChaJ1e.r, 1:hat. gp_JJgey11ed the G9i;runission in particular and 
human rights in genernl, thereby establishing a quasi..,conventional structure on the 
S!;1-bj~ct matt~r. QgJhe.one hand, the ggmmission be.came one of the organs through 
~!J.il'..~_.fu~ ()rg':lll:isatio11acgomplishys its purpose (article 51.e of the"Charter); on the 
other hand, the Commission was instructed to continue to .monitor the observance. of 
""""'--><-~~- "' ···-·''"""· • "'"' __ ,__ ' • - ' • - ' - - - " .. ·-· ' - - - - -- -- " -
ht~_'!!l pghts U!ltil the .American Convention on Hµmag filghts adopted in 1969 .. entered 
into force_ (article 150, transitory). 102 .On .22 Nov~mb.er, J969,_Jhe Inter-:American 
Sp~~~l~_~ed Conference on Human Rights convoked by tpe Council of .the OAS (San 
Jose, Costa Rica), approve,d tlie American Conventi9n on Hµman Rights,wbic}i entered 
ig!g_Jgrce ... '"011 rn Jµly 1978, when Grenada deposite<l the eleventh.instrument .of 
:ratification. 103 
.At.its ninthregylar session (La Paz, Bolivia) 1979, the General Assem1Jly .of the OAS 
~..PrQTI:_<:l _ Jhe. G0Il_lll:l!ssj9n'§_ ll~~--§!~TI1!e.: J~Ii:i.9les. 6 and .. .8 ... .were. later. amended at_ fue 
~-ses.siou of the Commission as "an organpfJheOAS. created.Jo prom9te 
t!1e-9llse.ITarr<?e..'1fid ~efenceof human righJs and to serve as consultative organ~ofthe 
9rgauisJ;1ti_Q!U1!:Jhismll,t!~r" .104 Hm:n_an rights were. defmed as the rights set. forth.in the 
American Convention.on.Human.Rights, for .the.states.parties. thereta, .. .and.as the..rights 
§et forthjn_Jhe.Amerisaa-Declaration,_focthe .other . .members..$.tates .. 105 As wifu.-~-­
pre_~i®Ls.tatute,. .. membership-of the Commission, defmed .in articl~ 2,. continued. to be_._ 
ss_yen. The Coronrission'.s.func.tions and. powers with respect Jo_ all. members_ st1;1tes of 
the QAS are.spelled o\ltin article 18 of tl:ie Statute; those it h_;1$ _withrespect to the staJes 
parties JQJ:li_~_.Afileric<nl Conyention are enumerated in article 19. Its powers in relation .. 
-
tQ..~~!?-~! ~.~~!~~ thaJ ar.e J)ot yet parties to the ConY.e11!ion are setforth in article 20. 
102 Id at 7. 
103 Ibid. 
104 Ibid. 
105 Ibid. 
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1:4:1:3 Africa 
The origin of the African Charter can be traced back to 1961 when African NGOs and 
practising lawyers meeting at a conference in Lagos, Nigeria, recommended the 
establishment of the rule of 11:).w in African countries.106 A consciousness founding 
campaign followed, which involved the heads of state of the OAU. As a result of 
effective lobbying by NGOs, more conferences were organised. 
At the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government meeting in Monrovia, 
Liberia, during July, 1979, President Leopold Senghor of Senegal moved a motion 
supported by The Gambia, that a group of highly qualified experts should be called 
upon to prepare a preliminary draft of an African Charter on Human and Peoples' 
Rights. 107 The motion is commonly referred to as "Resolution 115 (XVI) of the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government at its 16th Ordinary Session held in 
Monrovia, Liberia, from 17-20 July 1979 on the preparation of a preliminary draft of an 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights providing, inter alia, for the 
establishment ofbodies to promote and protect human and peoples' rights". 108 
The drafters of the African Charter faced some ideological challenges. Even though 
there is a reference to the Charter of the OAU, the latter does not consecrate the rights 
of Africans as individuals. Instead, the integri)y-ofthe state and the inviolability of its 
frontiers are strongly reaffirmed. The priority of African politicians was to strengthen 
the new-born states, not to emphasise the rights of the individual. Their most important 
challenge was to convince the international community to accept that a specific African 
concept of human rights exists, without questioning the principle of universalism. 
106 Ke'ba Mbaye note 3 above at 11. 
107 OAU Doc Decision 115 (XVI) REV 1 AHG/115 (XVI) 1979. 
108 OAU Doc CAB/LEG/67/5. 
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The initiative of the OAU to create the African Charter effectively broke almost twenty 
years of embarrassing silence on, first, the disgraceful abuses of human rights on the 
continent, and secondly, the pressing need to match words with action in the creation of 
an institution to promote and protect human rights in Africa. It also to a certain extent, 
emasculated the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states 
enshrined in article III(2) of the OAU Charter. By adopting the Charter, the OAU 
member states had "acknowledged the need for comprehensive institutionalised 
machinery to give effect to the firm attachment to the promotion of respect for, and 
protection of [internationally recognised norms of] human rights" .109 
Jhe contrast between the promi:t?:~E.!rolt;: th,aJ:.~~~-~.Y~l!J9-fu~.gQaL0Ltb~prntectiQ!1AnQ__ 
promotion of human ~-~-j_i;i_west~m._:eurQP_~~!? a lesser extent, th,_~_"fr.l!.~~=-
--- -----,~-, .. .,.,..~,_.,,,, ___ ,~-·~-,.· ·~·-~~_,,,.,,.,.,........, ... --
~rican P~!iti£'!1.~Y~lem..,(i.e ... the.£ounciLoJEYIQQe.a.nciJhe .. OAS. resp.ectiY.ely),J!L 
their ve~nc~P..tio_g;_a.nd its Jllnm.stJ~_QWP!~!e._}!~&!<?£!}n .!!!~-~~e._5~Lt!i~ .Q~:t!? i~. :".~!Y .... 
illustrative of _th~...differenLcir.cums.tances..in .... which~.lhe~rights.s)!Stems .. wenl. 
_f~[!!!ed anstt.h~~Jf~~!S_J:}f those.circ:umstm:ic~s QJltheir-performances..fil.the.protectim;i. Qf 
human rights. 
~o~tion o[!h~.~o~_cil Q[Efil.QPe .. WC!SJ;l, major.step in.the. Jong quest.fur.E.w:~mean 
µnity that had heen.pur.suedJltJ.eJtst §ince .tb~nineteenth .. centucy~. In th.e .. ~~e.QLWorl~L 
W ¥..l~Q JindjJ:s .. Nazi .and .. Eascist .atrocities, and.the~rise_of_Smd.e.Ls.ty.11.( nlgUneS.. in 
~¥J~11LEY!Ql?~\Ye_sielll_~9p¥an-!e.~ciern. fel! .that greater.regionaLu.nit.}! .. ~andJ:egiqp.J!l 
protection and pr.QIDQ.ti.oILofindiYidualJihercy.wei:einterconnected-means of proteciing 
t~ir li]ieral:.d~mog!!!i~_8-()(;_l~ti_es:.. 
~ainimpetus-for-the.crn_<!t!cm of the OAS was the d.0minant politic.al economic 
_®dideillogicaJ role oLthe~United.State£.lllld its decisionJa.shield. the heniisJ?h.~rnJr.QID 
_!Q~o!~gi~'!~ ~~_p()l~!i~~Linil!!~nce. thatit considered inimical. US political hegemony 
.. llllJ.St..be co:nsidernd. an-.importaptJ.i1ctQLin . the. place of. human rights in the Inter-
.American system although, ironically, ... the US has not ratified. the American. 
Cony~ntion. . ..
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Like the CounciLoLEurope,_JheJ1AU was 9.reated in. an a!!~DlPLtQ..fil.QIDQt~ gr~ 
regional integrati<:m..---IIGwe¥0r,within--ihi.s--hroad-,,goaLo:L.continentaL.u.n.ify, .. the._mosL-
imPJmanL .... elemenL:w..a~ .... !h~----9.2~QI4ill.~~9!l~Qf_effort~~«l ..... bring -~1?2.!:!! ___ ~~Et:P!e!~. 
decolonisation 2f!Q~. £Q!!t!l1~!l!JmclJ~:LcQlUbat apartheid. in. South.Afric~The .. pr.o.tection 
,_............--... ,......_"_._~~~""""'' 
-~~J!J.gjy!duaLrights-.wasneve.:c.a. priority.for the .. OAU. Thus._it.~~--~2L~!H_tP.e 
.~sbcj:ee11thy~l!LQfjt~--~:Xi§te11c.~.thatthe.OAU.fonualJx .. ;:i._d.dressedjts~lf.to. .. the .. s.ubj.ecLDf 
~um~_tights __ .Q:rP!ection. within member stl;l!e§: .. lJllli~~-Jh~~--<;~o.Ync.il .of Europe.,..Jhe 
Q~Y's.scope is limited by "strict ~erence~'Jp_the_concepLofnon.,,interference .. inthe 
~h~r"states....Ihe_OAU..can.neitbex.c.ompeLmembe'-states.,,to,.adhere. 
!o_j!s .. d.ecisi~.:w:hich .. are .m~re_recommendatiollSy .. neF--impese--any.sanctions..agamst 
errantmemhets,u.suchas.suspensionor .. expu.lsion. 
1:4:2 
CQ.nlQm:'!tiye.s.tudies .. 0£.norms..,aru.LmechanismsJ'oi-the--pro~o£human_right~_is. a 
r.ecently develo~e~_!!bject in interna.tionallaw:. Studies carried out in this area include 
universal as well as regional systems. Concerning the latter, examination concentrates 
particularly on the three systems functioning to date, which were established 
respectively by the European Convention of 1950 (for Europe), the American 
Convention of 1969 (for America), and the African Charter of 1981 (for Africa). 
Each of t];?.~~1!!~~.rngi.<:?!l~UY~J~m~ Jia.~ ;:i C9nm:ii~siQn, HoweY..et:,_..unlike,.the.AtheI: .. twQ, 
ili~ African sy~.i!<l~_s .. noLhaY.e a co~ lt is also jmportant to mention.Jn~. 
restructuri11g.of..th~.&YLQ~;:J.ll institutional system. fQUQ:vy:ingJh~ AdQP-tioll of.ProtocoL 
"'-..o. ~·.,n• -••'" .-~ ' • • '"' ·~ . ._. ., '"' 
'ti<l.J1.g,U224..111 
109 EG Bello The Afri,can Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A legal analysis vol 4 (1985) 9 27. 
110 The OAU Assembly of Heads of State and Government in a resolution AHG/230/Res (XXX) of 
1994 requested the Secretary-General to convene a meeting of government experts to draft a Protocol 
to the African Charter relating to the Establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' 
Rights. The Protocol was adopted unanimously by the QUA on 9 June 1998 in Ouagadougou, Burkina 
Faso, and has been signed by thirty states. · · 
111 The protocol will have to be ratified by all the state parties to the Convention for it to come into force , 
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1:4:2:1 The Commissions 
The Commissions shall be examined under the headings Organisation, Competence and 
Procedure. 
1:4:2:2 
TJl~_Jhr_ee.~GomII1i§§lQl1S are .. cQip.pQ§e!i. Qf in<!ependent exl'ert_s, vv:h()i:;~ nllJilhei:s a,nd 
~§_yary it1.e.ach. case. While. th<L~mop.eaa.Commission ..... has a_numher: .. of 
~.2!l1illls§IQners eqge;1l Jg the .. state . parties,112 Jbe Inter:~American"'Commission ... has 
seven, 
113 
and the African Commission .. eleven. 114 In the COJ:!!PJ>SlliQ!l of .~'lQ.1L9fJbe 
1'4.--.--~..._ .• ,,~--·-·--<>-·• ____ ....... ~--·"''''-"'"'"' ,., 
CQmmi~si.2P.~.2_g_Q __ §t<;tte.11arty ... can haY.e ... llloreJhan.on~natiooaLas.JnembeLOf .. an)'. .. afJh~ 
Qnnmissfon.s.~:=.J:Imvever,. while .. the European .... and Americatl-.GGnventions.authoris.e 
!!J.at a..memb.el:.c.an.he. ekc1edli:ama.non.state:PatlJ'JQJ~irr~Jill~£tJy.~;u;gnv.entions. the. 
4~£~ __ gh:'1.:l}er provides in Article .. 3 l thatJhememb.ers .. of.the. CommissioR. shalLbe 
EQmposed.oL':Afti<;@personalities .. af the .. highesl.reputation,_morality._._::, .a.rulM!£l~ .... 
33 provid~.~Jl!<!tJlieY ~'.sha.ll l>e ele9te.d.by .. secreLballo.Lh}c.the .. Assembl~ .. oLHea~ls ,o{ 
---- -- ,__ 
State . and _G:Qxemment .. of the .. OAU-from a list -of persons neminatoo~-h¥~the~Stat~ 
~UQ,J~.J::hai.:t~r" .116 Article 34 emphasises tl11.tt~ ''t}ie_ c~ci~c11.tt~s must have the 
~~!!<:)gality ofo11~_o(fu~ States Parties to the presentCharter". 
Members of the European Commission are elected by the Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe for a period of six years and are eligible for re-election 
indefinitely. Those of the Inter-American Commission, like their African counterparts, 
are elected by the General Assembly of the Organisation of American States and the 
Organisation of African Unity, respectively, but u.Illike their African colleagues who 
are elected for a period of six years and can be re-elected indefinitely, their term is for 
112 Ank:uma note 5 above at 15. 
113 Ibid. 
114 Ibid. 
115 Articles 37(2) and 32 of the American Convention and the African Charter respectively. 
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four years renewable only once. 117 
1:4:2:3 Competence 
The competences of the Commissions differ in their various functions of promotion of, 
advice on and protection of human rights. 
The promotional function is provided in the American Convention and the African 
Charter, but not in the European Convention. Article 41 of the American Convention 
provides that "the principal function of the Commission shall be to promote respect for 
and defence of human rights" notably through studies, developing human rights 
awareness and requesting governments of members state to supply it with information 
on the measures adopted by them in matters of human rights. The African Charter for 
its part, provides that the Commission should collect documents, undertake studies and 
research, and assist in the formulation of principles and rules aimed at solving legal 
problems relating to human and peoples' rights upon which African governments may 
base their legislation. These functions can be performed in co-operation with other 
African and international institutions concerned with the promotion and protection of 
human and peoples' rights.118 
With regard to the advisory or interpretative function, the European Commission again 
lacks this function. The American Commission, provides in its article 41 paragraph ( e) 
that Member States of the Organisation of American States can request advice from the 
Commission through the General Secretariat of the OAS "on matters related to human 
rights" and, the Commission will respond " ... within the limits of its possibilities to 
provide those states with the advisory services they request". The African Charter 
provides in its article 45 paragraph 3 that the Commission shall, among other functions, 
" ... interpret all the provisions of the present Charter at the request of a state party, an 
116 Article 31 of the African Charter. 
117 Article 37(1) of the American Convention. 
!' \ 
118 4-5'" i I J Article~)) of the African Charter. 
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institution of the OAU or an African Organisation recognised by the OAU".119 
Evidently, the advisory services envisaged in the Inter-American and African systems 
have an indisputably political and moral weight but lack legal force. 
Finally, all three Commissions perform protective functions. They are competent to 
receive communications from states as well as from individuals. 
In the European system, a communication addressed by a state party against another 
state party is automatically (ipso jure) received by the Commission.120 All that is 
required is that the two states must have ratified the Convention. This procedure is 
similar to that of the African system, but unlike the European system, the African 
Charter gives the states two options: (a) to settle the matter between or amongst 
themselves (as the case may be) without referring it to the Commission, and to refer it 
to the Commission only when they cannot reach an amicable settlement, or (b ), to refer 
the matter directly to the Commission. 121 
Unlike the European and African systems, in the Inter American system, the submission 
of a communication to the Commission by a state is subject to the prior acceptance by 
the state party filing the complaint, of the competence of the Commission to receive 
communications against it. 122 
The right of an individual whose rights have been violated to seek recourse from the 
Commission is guaranteed in the European and Anierican Conventions. In the African 
Charter, this right ensues from a dynamic or teleological interpretation of article 56 of 
the Charter concerning the admissibility of "other communications". The African 
Commission is competent to receive and consider communications from individuals 
119 Id article 45(3). 
120 Article 25 of the Convention; the communication is first sent to the Secretary General of the Council 
of Europe before being forwarded to the Commission. The Convention does not state why it is necessary 
for the Secretary-General of the Council of Europe to be seized of the communication. 
121 Articles 47-49 of the African Charter. 
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from states party to the Charter, without their prior acceptance of the competence of the 
Commission. 
On the other hand, the European Convention requires that a declaration be made by 
states party to the convention recognising the competence of the Commission to receive 
individual communications.123 It is worth mentioning, however, that this condition will 
disappear with the entry into force of Protocol 11 which institutes the obligatory 
jurisdiction of the European Court ( thus there will be no Commission) for all 
communications - interstate as well as individual. However, this will come into force 
only after all the members of the Council of Europe have ratified the Protocol. 
As to who can submit a communication before each of the Commissions, the American 
Convention provides in its article 44 that all persons or group of persons, NGOs entities 
legally recognised in one or many member states of the OAS can submit a 
communication to the Commission.124 The African Charter is more generous by 
introducing an actio popularis approach to give the right of submission to the "whole 
world". This contrasts sharply with the European system where only the victim is 
entitled to approach the Commission (article 25 of the Convention) or the court (article 
34 of Protocol 11). 
1:4:2:4 The Procedure 
In all the systems, for a communication to be declared admissible, it must satisfy certain 
conditions, notably: the applicant must have exhausted all local remedies in settling the 
matter (that is, if they exist and are effective and not unduly prolonged);125 the 
communication must be submitted within a certain period after the exhaustion of local 
remedies ( 6 months in the European and American systems, while the African Charter 
122 Article 45 of the American Convention. 
123 Article 25 of the European Convention. 
l2A Article 44 of the American Convention. 
125 Articles 26, 46(a) and 56(5) of the European Convention, The American Convention and the African 
Charter respectively. 
44 
talks of a reasonable time);126 the _matter must not have been settled by another 
international human rights body (article 27,lb (Europe), 47d (America) and 56(7) 
(Africa); the communication must not be manifestly ill-founded or abusive or 
l:" 
incompatible with the Convention, ( article 27,2, (Europe), 47c (America) and 56 (3) 
(Africa)). 
The European system provides for a preliminary examination of a communication by 
the Commission. In this way, when the conditions described above have not been met, 
the communication is declared inadmissible. In principle, the procedure of the Inter-
American Commission is similar to that of the European Commission, except that 
unlike the European Commission, the former, in practice, proceeds with examination on 
admissibility and on the merits simultaneously, save in cases where it is called upon to 
render protective measures. It is by declining to decide on admissibility that the 
Commissio~;~:;:~~tend its powers to the examination of individual communications. 
The Africanl\for its part does not expressly provide for any preliminary examination of 
communications, but this power ensues implicitly from article 55(1), by virtue of which 
the Secretary of the Commission prepares 
" ... before each session .... a list of the communications other than those of States Parties ... and 
transmit them to the Members of the Commission, who shall indicate which communications 
should be considered by the Commission" .127 
Where a communication is declared admissible, the European Commission places itself 
at the disposal of the parties with a view to securing an amicable settlement. 
If this is achieved, the Commission prepares a report indicating briefly the facts and the 
solutions, and transmits it to the Committee of Ministers and the Secretary to the 
Council of Europe for publication.128 The Inter-American Convention provides for a 
similar procedure. Its article 48(f) provides that: 
" The Commission shall place itself at the disposal of the parties concerned with a view to 
reaching a friendly settlement of the matter on the basis of respect for the human rights 
recognised in the Convention". 
126 Articles 26, 46(b) and 56(6) of the European Convention, The American Convention and the African 
Charter respectively. 
127 African Charter article 55(1 ). 
128 Article 28(2) of the European Convention. 
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In case of a friendly settlement, it then prepares a report on the facts and the solution 
obtained which it transmits to the Secretary General of the OAS for publication; a copy 
is also sent to the complainant and to the state party(s) concerned, and the states party to 
the Convention. 129 
The requirement of a friendly settlement is also provided for in the African Charter, but 
unlike the other two treaties, the Charter reserves this procedure to interstate 
communications. Thus, article 52 of the African Charter stipulates that: 
"After having obtained from the States concerned and from other sources all the information it 
deems necessary and after having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution 
based on the respect of human and peoples' rights, the Commission shall prepare, ... a report to 
the States concerned and communicated to the Assembly of Heads of State and Government". 
It is noteworthy here that in practice, the Commission has extended the possibility of 
securing a friendly settlement even with regard to "other communications" .130 
When a communication has been declared admissible, to proceed with examination on 
the merits (substantive issues), the European Commission receives comments and 
arguments from representatives of the parties, so as to establish the facts. 131 Unlike the 
European Commission, the Inter-American Commission has very broad powers with 
regard individual communications. This power however varies, depending on the nature 
of the violation. 132 Thus, in cases of massive human rights violations, the Commission 
does not limit itself to the examination of individual communications, it also examines 
all the situations that reveal massive human rights violations perpetrated in the country 
(geographic approach), or in a specific domain (thematic approach). Moreover, the 
Commission can also be seized proprio motu or ex-officio in such situations. It has 
done this on many occasions, notably, during the massive human rights violations 
under the regime of Salvador Allende in Chile, or during the confiscation of 
129 Article 49 of the American Convention. 
130 See Communications 11188, 16/88, 17/88, 18/88, 44/90, 62/91, 67/91and138/94. 
131 Article 28( 1) of the European Convention. 
132 J Kokott "The protection of fundamental rights under German and International law" (1996) Revue 
Africaine de Droit Internationale et Compare at 390-394. 
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newspapers m Peru under the reign of Velasco Alvarez.133 The Inter-American 
Commission also has the power to undertake on-site missions to member states. 134 
These powers, especially the latter, make it very different from the other two in terms of 
competence. 
The approach of the African Commission is similar to that of the Inter-American 
Commission. In principle, the African Commission can examine a communication only 
when it reveals the existence of a series of serious or massive violations of human and 
peoples' rights.135 In such a case, the Commission can bring this to the attention of the 
Assembly of Heads of State of the OAU, which may, in its turn, request the 
Commission to undertake an in-depth study of the situation, and submit a report on the 
facts and make recommendations. 136 In practice, however, the Commission examines 
communications even if they reveal the violation of a single provision of the Charter. If 
a communication satisfies the conditions laid down under article 56, it need not reveal 
serious or massive violations as required by article 58(1 ). Thus as Professor Oji 
Umozirike explains: "The wrongful detention of citizen A cannot be regarded as 
massive and serious in the strict language of the Charter but offends modem notions of 
human rights" .137 The African Commission also undertakes on-site missions to member 
states and has adopted resolutions in the areas of human rights protection and 
promotion, powers not expressly conferred on it by the Charter. 
At the end of the examination, the European Commission prepares a report describing 
the facts and giving its opinion on whether there has been a violation of the Convention 
133 M Mubiala" Mecanisme regionaux de protection des droits de l'homme" in (1996) Journal of African 
Society of International and Comparative law at 47. 
134 See P Nikken, Le systeme interamericaine des droits de l'homme (1990) at 104-105 for visits 
undertaken to the Dominican Republic (1965 and 1966), Chile (1974), Argentine (1979), and more 
recently, Haiti (1994 and 1995). 
. u\ 
135 Article 58 of the African Charter 
136 Article 53 of the African Charter. 
137 Oji Omozurike "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: An Introduction" (1991) 1 
Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights at 11. 
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by the state. The report is transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. If in three months 
following the transmission of the report, the European Court of Human Rights is not 
seized, the Committee of Ministers will confirm or reject the Commission's 
recommendations. This is then communicated to the state concerned, which, in case of 
condemnation, must indicate measures taken or to be taken to remedy the situation. The 
Inter-American Commission has greater powers in this regard, for, in terms of its article 
50(3), it can decide on the publication of the report by a majority vote of its members; it 
can also make recommendations to the State party directly, prescribing a time limit 
within which it must take steps to remedy the situation.138 
The powers of the African Commission in this regard are very limited. In terms of 
article 59, the Commission is barred from publishing its reports suo moto. Article 59(1) 
stipulates that: 
"All measures taken within the prov1s10n of the present Charter shall remain 
confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and Government shall 
otherwise decide". 
And as Commissioner Atsu Kofi Amega points out, 
"The question that has always preoccupied the Commission is that of knowing the fate 
of these reports, questions left to the competence and conscience of the Heads of State 
and Government". 139 
1 :4:3 Recent developments in the European and African systems 
The European mechanism for human rights protection has been restructured by the 
adoption in 1994 of Protocol No 11, African states have also adopted a Protocol to the 
African Charter relating to the establishment of an African Court on Human and 
Peoples' Rights. 
1:4:3:1 The Reform introduced by Protocol No 11 
Protocol No 11 to the European Convention establishes a permanent European Court of 
Human Rights. As under the present system, the new article 34 of the protocol 
138 See note 8~ above at 105-113. 
139 African Centre for Democracy and Human Rights Studies, "The preliminary draft of the African 
Human Rights Court" (1997) 7: 1 Jan-March African Human Rights Newsletter at 1. 
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stipulates that both states and individuals will be able to lodge applications with the 
court. The new court will assume the role played by the present Commission and Court. 
This is aimed at accelerating the procedure. The court becomes the sole organ to 
receive, sieve, examine and pass judgement on all applications, be they interstate or 
individual. 
In the case of individual applications, the registrar of the single court will liaise with the 
applicants in an attempt to eliminate the more doubtful applications at an early stage. 
Regarding its organisation, the new court will continue with as many judges as there are 
states party to the Convention. With the disappearance of the Commission the Court is 
seized directly by the states (article. 33) and individuals (article. 34). To fulfil its task, 
the court will be subdivided into: 
• a committee of three judges; 
• chambers of seven judges (there will be about five chambers); and 
• a Grand Chamber of seventeen judges (article 27). 
The protocol has also made some significant innovations to the European human rights 
protection system. Unlike in the present system, the new system allows the court to 
include more than one judge from the same state, elected by the Parliamentary 
Assembly of the Council. The members of the court will be elected for a period of six 
years instead of nine as under the present system, they will also be required to retire at 
the age of seventy. 
When a communication is submitted to the court, it will be examined by a committee of 
three judges, one of whom will be the judge rapporteur, with due regard to the 
conditions laid down under the new article 35. The committee will then decide on the 
admissibility or otherwise of the communication. 
Its decision is final. If unanimity cannot be achieved, or where the judge rapporteur 
feels that the application cannot be declared inadmissible, the application will be 
transmitted to a chamber. 
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Chambers composed of seven judges will determine both the admissibility and merits 
of the applications and there will be a hearing before the chambers. The chamber may at 
any stage in the proceedings, put itself at the disposal of the parties in order to facilitate 
an amicable settlement. Where a matter raises a serious question on the interpretation of 
the Convention, or where the Chamber's decision on the matter would contradict an 
earlier decision taken by the court, the chamber can surrender its jurisdiction on the 
matter in favour of the Grand Chamber of seventeen judges (article 30). 
Within three months of the delivery of the judgment by the Chamber, the parties to a 
case can request that the case be referred to the Grand Chamber. In case of such an 
appeal, a panel of five judges of the Grand Chambers shall evaluate the requests and 
accept them only if the case raises a serious question affecting the interpretation or 
application of the Convention or its protocols, or a serious issue of general importance 
(article 43). If the panel accepts the appeal, the Grand Chamber will decide the case by 
means of a judgment. When considering such appeals, "no judge from the chamber 
which rendered the judgement shall sit in the Grand Chamber", except the President of 
that Chamber in which the original hearing took place and the national judge who sat in 
respect of the party(s) concerned. This means that fifteen of the seventeen judges of the 
Grand Camber will not be familiar with the facts of the case and it would be likely that 
a completely new hearing (including oral presentations) would be necessary (article 27). 
1:4:3:2 The establishment of an African Court on Human and Peoples' 
Rights 
The major difference between the African Charter and its two counterparts, the 
European Convention and the American Convention, is that, the former does not 
provide for a human rights court. When it is in dispute concerning the violation of 
human and peoples' rights under either articles 48, 49 or 55 of the Charter, the African 
Commission prepares in either case a report which is transmitted to the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government. The question which arises over the fate of the reports 
clearly raises the issue of the effectiveness of the African Commission. 
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This question has been there since the establishment of the Commission, until finally, 
Resolution AHG Res 230 (:XXX), adopted during the OAU Assembly summit in 
Tunisia in June 1994, mandated the Secretary General of the OAU to convene a 
meeting of government experts to brainstorm, in consultation with the African 
r . - - -, 
Commission, )ways an~ means of enhancing the effectiveness of the Commission, 
~ --
especially with regard to the creation of the African Court of Human and Peoples' 
Rights. The establishment of a court comes against the backdrop of criticisms about the 
"non-acceptability" of the Commission's recommendations, and the lack of mandate of 
the Commission which does not have the powers of a human rights court under the 
Charter. 
In terms of the article 5(1) of the Protocol, the court can only take up matters from the 
following: parties: the plaintiff state, the respondent state, a state whose citizen is a 
victim and the Commission itself. When a state party has an interest, it may submit a 
request to the court to be permitted to join (article 5.2). In terms of article 5(3), the court 
may permit NGOs, with observer status before the Commission and individuals to 
institute cases directly before it, in accordance with article 34(6) of the Protocol which 
provides that 
"At the time of the ratification of this Protocol or any time thereafter, the state shall make a 
declaration accepting the competence of the Court to receive cases under article 5(3) of this 
Protocol. The Court shall not receive any petition under article 5(3) involving a state which has 
not make such a declaration" 
The court's authority covers all disputes relating to the interpretation and application of 
the Charter, the protocol, and all human rights instruments ratified by the state (article 
3(1). Although the persons cited in paragraph 5(1) of the protocol are empowered to 
refer cases to the court, they can only do so after a report or decision by the 
Commission on the case. Matters brought before the court are "appeals" for the reversal 
of the decision or report of the Commission. What is therefore submitted to the court is 
not the case itself as heard by the Commission, but rather, the decision or report of the 
Commission on the case. 
51 
Even with the introduction of a court, the Commission still remains the preliminary 
body for the settlement of disputes between states, and between individuals and a state. 
In a nutshell, the Commission serves as an organ of investigation to assist in the court's 
judgment on the case. 
The Protocol empowers the court to grant compensation or reparation (article 27 .1 ). The 
members of the Commission have always been divided on this issue due to the fact that 
it is not provided for in the Charter. In the matter of Louis Mekongo against Cameroon, 
Communication 59/91, for instance, the Commission having acknowledged the rights 
of the complainant to be indemnified could not itself make a pronouncement on the 
principle of indemnities or their amount; it therefore referred the petition to the 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government so that this body could request the state 
of Cameroon to take up the matter with the competent national court of law. 
The Protocol will come into force thirty days after fifteen instruments of ratification or 
accession have been deposited. 
In a world where globalisation, democracy and human rights have become the 
watchwords, the creation of a human rights court in Africa is very desirable. Apart from 
the reasons given on the ineffectiveness of the Commission and the over-cautiousness 
of the OAU Assembly, the existence of a court in Africa would go a long way in 
striking a balance in the area of human rights with its counterparts in Europe and 
America. It will, moreover, significantly signal the integration of the continent into the 
contemporary democratic era. It must, however be cautioned that the establishment of a 
human rights court will not in itself solve the serious human rights problems in Africa. 
Numerous obstacles, including finance, independence, political will, and above all else 
implementation of the court's decisions, still block the way to any effective realisation 
of human rights on the African continent. 
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SECTION TWO 
2:0 The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) and the protection of human 
rights in Africa 
2:1 Introduction 
The Organisation of African Unity (OAU) is a comprehensive inter-governmental 
organisation embracing all aspects of inter-state relations.1 It is made up of fifty-three 
independent African states2 and stands out as the largest regional (continental) 
organisation. The primary task of the organisation is to furnish the mechanism for 
resolving African problems by Africans in an African forum free from outside influence 
and pressure. 3 With more than three decades having passed since most African 
countries achieved independence, and with the OAU itself reaching its 35th 
anniversary,4 it is an appropriate time to assess the background to, and contributions of 
the OAU to the promotion and protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in 
Africa. 
2:2 Formation of the OAU 
The OAU is ~e l?~~~~l_<?~~~~~~-gf.Jlle §efil"~h .. Joca_Pan:-Afric.an_organisatiorLth.at_ 
spanned sixty-three years and involv_ed.JtLleas.tJiY:e.J>.an:-Afric.ai1Cm1[ere11~~§ 1'~~~ep 
]_900 and 1963. In 1897, D_r_wgJ?_!!J~Qi~_gpine.dthatllifth~.N~o£s.:~:'~~~-!o_b~J!.f8,£!Q! .. 
_i!1 the world's histocy, it ~Qlll<LJJ~~2.~.&ll-~-£a.n:NegrQ movein.~!1!"·5 The creat!Q_J;!_Qf 
.!bis Pan Negro mo\lement in-Amca, .. the..OAU, .. w.asjnitially_<!~lt;!Y~9J2yth~emerg~n9e 
<?£_two camps of African.n1lJ:i9.DJ!!i§ts: .. the. radicals .andJhy. ~Q!l§en'JltiYe.S .. 11.QlI!lJ~ly 
christenE'.Q.Jhe_Cas.ablan~~La,rtQ !lie Mon.rqvia groups.6 
--
1 B Andemicael The OAU and the UN(1976) at 11. 
2 Morocco suspended its membership of the OAU in 19f4 when the Sahawari Arab Democratic Republic 
was recognised by the OAU. 
3 AW Chanda "The Organisation of African Unity: an appraisal" (1989-92) 21-24 Zambia Law Journal 
at 1. 
4 The OAU celebrated its 35th anniversary on 25 May 1998. 
5 VJ Ngoh "The OAU Charter: On the eve of the third millennium" 1996 African Star at 13. 
~ s~ of t~~~JggicaLdifferenc.es be~een the two gr():µp_§._the_,quest.foi:AfricatL 
ynity overcame all _gdd2_l!!l<LP112~.M~y !2?~·. th~_2E~-~~~tjg~_QfAfri~anJJ.njty .was 
b.pm in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia,..with..Emps:rnrJiaile §.~l~is,_s,~ .. ~ the. fir~t .chairmanrand 
.&;ldis Ah~dquarters.? The founding fathers of the OAU at the time opted 
for a diluted internationalism in preference to a Pan-African super-state. The formation 
of the OAU represented a giant step in Africa's quest for unity, and accelerated the 
struggle against colonialism and apartheid. 
However, complete.J.lnityjnJ.h.e . .s..ense.QL~GQ!lQmic...aruipglitical integration QfAfric.w~ 
countries (as envisaged J?LQLK!V.Jill1~ _Nknuna)8 .. has .. oot.pro:v-ed.Jeasil?l~ ~Y~!l .. ~tl~r 
thif!Y::~~ars. 9 Eti90llQ1l~LQOSJacles..staruLin the way of "compkte,,Afric;,an .unity~ 
Firstly, the size o£ the Afric.aJ:l._cQlltirumL.~h~mt 11 OOQQQQ J:•ql!are .mil~) •. is.~an..,. 
igt_E~djme11t.1Q._unicy ... coll§idering the . fact that Africa .11~ . v:ery .pooL transport and 
GQ!!lill.W!i£atj.Q!L. .. facilities, Secpndly, Africa is a continent of great diversity vis-ii-vi~ 
l~;!&.e.~~~religion andJr::1ditions. These factors act as a barrier to any mea,ningfuLco-
operation Ihe Anglo.pho~.i:auco.phohe .. diridais.a.glaring.example,.where. eacQ. cWTIP 
cOIU.Pe!e§ x~Jher .. than..c.u.,.op.erates .. with the .other in all aspects of inter-state relations. 
Thir4~Jh~ Afu9~ .. C.Q.loni.aLheritage s.erves .. as a major barrier to unity. Jt is a.factJ4at 
Euroill'.~J.~.~~~s divided Africa into arbitr~ and. art.ificial political entities .:whi~b 
~_,g~!y_~oreQ.!i:!J2.~l and.religious. boundari~s..:.B9~?.U.:ht, therefore, there a.re Tutsis. in 
the. Democr.atic.Repuhlic.o.:fCongo.(formerly Zaire),1.0 Rwanda,.Burundi, Uganda~ a,nd 
Housas iJ1Northern..Came.rn.QJ1<!119:Nig~ria.Jh~se. ar!ifl~i1;1l b°'undarieshaye_i;~.s11lt~di,n 
§Qlle tribes or .. :religio:usgroup&becoming a 'minority' ip some coyptries and a twget(Qr 
discrimination 3.!!_d_mm:gi:oalis<ttioll.PY the .. majority or .the.central.ggvernment}n ~ost 
6 Ibid. 
7 Ibid. 
8 The first President of independent Ghana, who had advocated a "United States of Africa" similar to the 
United States of America. 
9 Chanda note 3 above at 16. 
10 The name was changed to Democratic Republic of Congo when the rebels, led by Laurent Desire 
Kabila, overthrew Mobutu's government. It is also worth mentioning that the original name of the country 
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cases, these IJ!i112ritr_ Cll!~Lmarginalised .. groups .rise. against. the. centraL.government,. 
llSlliilly thr.Q:uglu;iviLw.ar .. or..terr.ori.st .. attacks~.The"'Banyamul&:ng_~dIµts.i .m!n9rjty l. in 
Eastern Zaire ~hQ_!og! .. l1P arms in J.996,_ and t()ppk~d th~ .Mobutu regime inJ997 serve 
.asax~~~nt.~~rnm~. !he.European.powers .. alsp .ilJl!l!~ted intQ .AfrlQa.,.Jlieir .. different 
1tolitic.a.Land.govenmwnlJr~itjq~.-and .. systems.and.established.different econwnic_tie.s 
~ tra9~ .. i:t!Y~§!I!lent..p.attem~ which ... today,. Joe example, ... Jink. ihtl . .fonner_ . Erench 
£Qlofil~s with the._ErevclL~C.QPamY- and.the.Eranc .. ,zcme . .Finally, African,_ sta,tes .an~ 
P()!ellJ:liil~gQµomic riva,ls. Jn their. desire.to .industrialise, they impose ·tariffs ... and other 
!!2!!::1@f(Q_<yij~rs. QU.goods.froni other Afric;a.I! c;ountries.so as to encourage and protect 
~iruiustries. .. and.also rnis~u~venue. 11 
In view of these obstacles, the prospects of a political and economic association along 
the lines of the European Union (EU) will remain a dream for a long time to come. 
Even though the 3 June 1991 OAU summit conference in Abuja-Nigeria adopted the 
treaty establishing the African Economic Community (AEC), it is not envisaged that 
the AEC will become operational in the near future. In terms of article 6 of the treaty, 
the Community shall be established in six gradual stages of varying duration over a 
period of thirty-four years. 12 Thus, it is quite clearly an institution for the future. For the 
moment, in spite of the incessant bickering among themselves, African countries accept 
the need for a loose alliance in the form of the OAU. 
Founded amidst the wave of de-colonisation sweepmg across Africa, the OAU 
members were concerned above all with "safeguarding their own sovereignty and 
territorial integrity and opposing the remaining relics of colonisation on the African 
continent" .13 The protection of human rights was secondary, as they contended that it 
was only when the people are free from colonial bondage that they can fully enjoy their 
rights. But as shall be seen later, the violations of human rights in some regimes after 
under colonial rule was Congo and in 1975 this was changed to Zaire by President Mobutu. 
11 Chanda note 3 above at 2. 
12 Chris M Peter "The proposed African Court of Justice" 1993 East African Journal of Peace and 
Human Rights 117 at 132 
13 Clement Nwankwo "The OAU and Human Rights" (1993) 4/3 Journal of Democracy at 50 . 
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independence were so senous as "to shock the conscience of mankind" .14 As the 
principles and purposes set forth in the OAU Charter clearly show, co-operation for the 
sake of African independence was the dominant theme. Not surprising, therefore, 
"the OAU has succeeded only in those areas in which there has been a broad consensus among 
its members, such as, the liberation of the African continent from colonialism and the 
dismantling of apartheid" .15 
2:3 Purposes and institutional structure of the OAU 
2:3:1 Introduction 
Article 11(1) of the OAU Charter mandates the organisation to seek 
" ... to promote the unity and solidarity of the African states; to coordinate and intensify their 
cooperation and efforts to achieve a better life for the peoples of Africa; to eradicate all forms of 
colonialism from Africa; and to promote international cooperation having due regard to the 
Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights". 16 
Based on the principles of "sovereign equality of all Member States",:17 .. [and] "non-
interference in the internal affairs of States", 18 it is clear that the OAU falls far short of 
the organic federal union for which Nkrumah had argued. It is a loose organisation for 
cooperation with no supranational element. The intended scope of activity is very wide, 
embracing political and diplomatic cooperation; economic cooperation, including 
transport and communications; health, sanitation and nutritional cooperation; and 
scientific and technical co-operation for defence and security. 
14 See Bello Emmanuel for the atrocities perpetrated by the regimes of Obote and Amin in Uganda, 
Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea, Jean-Bedel Bokassa in Central Africa Republic. 
15 Chanda note 3 above at 1. 
16 OAU Charter article II. 
17 Id article IIl(l ). 
18 Id article III(2). 
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To meet these goals, the OAU has institutional structures, namely: the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government, the Council of Ministers, the General Secretariat and 
the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 19 Article XX of the Charter 
also empowers the Assembly to establish such specialised commissions as it may deem 
necessary, including inter alia; an Economic and Social Commission; Educational, 
Scientific, Cultural and Health Commission; and the Defence Commission. 
To fully appreciate how the OAU has performed since its creation in 1963 in the area of 
human rights protection, it would be appropriate to examine the role assigned by the 
(OAU) Charter of 1963 to each of the above organs, and how each was structured to 
deal with the problem of human rights on the continent. 
2:3:2 The Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
This body is the supreme political organ in the OAU structure. It is charged with 
discussing matters of common concern to Africa with a view to co-ordinating and 
harmonising the general policies of the organisation. It may, in addition, review the 
structure, functions and acts of all the organs and specialised agencies which may be 
created in accordance with the Charter. It has the power to choose the Administrative 
Secretary General, and his or her assistants and staff; to establish specialised 
commissions; to approve amendments to the Charter; and to decide questions which 
may arise concerning the interpretation of the Charter.20 
It is a plenary body on which each state has one vote and which meets annually. 
Extraordinary sessions may be called with the approval of two-thirds of the members of 
the organisation. Its resolutions are adopted by a two-third majority, except on 
questions of procedure which require a simple majority. Apart from resolutions or 
decisions having an internal effect, such as the adoption of the budget or the 
appointment of committees, the Assembly's decisions are in effect no more than 
19 Id article VIL 
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recommendations to member states. This is exemplified by the emphasis placed by the 
Charter on the sovereignty of members states and the fact that the Charter does not 
establish an organ vested with disciplinary powers to enforce compliance with the OAU 
resolutions. Moreover, the Charter does not provide for suspension and/or expulsion of 
members who do not comply with its resolutions and decisions, as is the case with the 
Statute of the Council ofEurope.21 
With this weakness, coupled with the fact that the Charter places no emphasis on the 
issue of human rights as do its European and American counterparts, the member states 
of the OAU were left unchecked. There was no legal base generated from the Charter 
from which the Assembly could condemn or sanction any member state. As will be 
illustrated below, there was absolute adherence to the principle ofnon-interference.22 
2:3:3 The Council of Ministers 
This organ comprises foreign ministers or such other ministers as are designated by the 
governments of members states. It meets twice a year or in extraordinary session.23 It 
usually meets immediately before the Assembly summit and is entrusted with the 
responsibility of preparing conferences of the Assembly.24 It also implements the 
decisions of the Assembly and has a general responsibility for co-ordinating inter-
African co-operation. It considers and approves the regulations of specialised 
commissions and the budget of the organisation. The rules of procedure of the Council 
adopted in August 1963, provide that meetings are held in private but also allow for the 
Council to decide by simple majority on public meetings. Unlike the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe, the Council of Ministers of the OAU has very 
20 Id article VIII. 
21 Statute of the Council of Europe article 8. 
22 The indifference manifested by the OAU in the face of gross human rights violations perpetrated by its 
members, such as Uganda under Amin, Equatorial Guinea under Nguema, etc. is a glaring example. 
23 OAU Charter article XII(2). 
24 Id article VIII. 
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limited powers. While the former can approve and supervise the execution of decisions 
from the European Commission and Court of Human Rights, the latter bears little or no 
relation with the African Commission. 
2:3:4 The General Secretariat 
This body is headed by an Administrative Secretary-General appointed by the 
Assembly.25 It is a central and permanent organ of the organisation charged with the 
duty of carrying out the functions assigned to it by the OAU Charter, other treaties and 
agreements and by regulations made pursuant to the Charter. The Secretary-General is 
assisted by one or more Assistant Secretary-Generals. The Charter of the OAU provides 
in article XVIII(l) that in the performance of their duties, the Secretary-General and the 
staff shall not seek or receive instructions from any government or other authority 
external to the organisation. In addition, each member state undertakes to respect the 
exclusive character of the responsibility of the Secretary-General and staff and not to 
seek to influence them in the discharge of their duties.26 
Article XVIII of the OAU Charter is virtually identical to article 100 of the UN Charter 
and attempts to ensure the complete independence of the staff. The OAU Protocol on 
Privileges and Immunities adopted in 1964 also closely follows the 1946 Convention 
on Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations. 
Unlike the Secretary-General of the UN, the OAU Secretary-General does not enjoy 
independent political powers. This is also evident from the fact that he has no express 
right of participation in meetings of the Assembly, the Council or the specialised 
commissions, unless their own rules of procedure so provide. It is worth noting that the 
African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights expressly gives the Secretary-General of 
the OAU the power to attend the Commission's meetings.27 
25 Id article XVI. 
26 Id article XVII. 
27 African Charter article 42(5) 
59 
2:3:5 Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration28 
The creation of a separate principal institution for the peaceful settlement of disputes is 
indicative of the desire to treat inter-African disputes as exclusively African and to 
exclude, as far as possible, the overriding authority of the Security Council of the UN. 
Article XIX of the OAU Charter envisages a separate treaty establishing the 
Commission, and it was not until 1964 that the separate protocol on Mediation, 
Conciliation and Arbitration was approved by the Assembly as an integral part of the 
Charter.29 The Commission is essentially a panel of twenty-one members elected by the 
Assembly, of whom only three members,30 the President and two Vice-Presidents, are 
full-time, and constitute the bureau of the Commission. Members, who must have 
recognised professional qualification,31 serve for a term of five years, and are eligible 
for re-election.32 They enjoy security of tenure and can only be removed from office by 
the decision of two-thirds of the Assembly on grounds of inability to perform or of 
proven misconduct. 33 
The duty of the Commission is to facilitate the peaceful settlement of disputes among 
member states. The jurisdiction of the Commission is restricted to disputes between 
states for example, territorial claims, wars, expulsions etc etera. and the bureau has the 
responsibility of consulting the parties as regards the appropriate mode of settling the 
disputes. Disputes may be referred to the Commission jointly by the parties concerned, 
by the party to the dispute, by the Council of Ministers or by the Assembly.34 If one of 
28 The creation of the Mechanism for Prevention, Resolution and Management of Conflicts will go a long 
way to supplement the efforts of this Commission. 
29 See L Sohn, Basic Documents of African Regional Organisations 2 (1971) at 12 for the entire 
Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration. 
30 Protocol of the Commission of Mediation, Conciliation and Arbitration article. II 
31 Id article 11(3). 
32 Id article III. 
33 Id article IV. 
34 Id article XII. 
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the parties refuses to submit to the jurisdiction of the Commission, the bureau must 
refer the matter to the Council of Ministers for consideration.35 Parties to a conflict may 
choose any of three ways of settling their disputes: mediation, conciliation and 
arbitration. 36 
2:3:5:1 Mediation 
When a dispute between members states is referred to the Commission for mediation, 
the President, with the consent of the parties, appoints one or more members of the 
Commission to mediate the dispute.37 The role of the mediator(s) is confined to 
reconciling the claims of the parties. 
2:3:5:2 Conciliation 
Where a request for the settlement of a dispute by conciliation is made, the President, 
with the consent of the parties, establishes a Board of Conciliators of whom three must 
by appointed by him from among members of the Commission, and one each by the 
parties.38 The function of the Board is to clarify the issues in dispute and to endeavour 
to bring about an agreement between the parties upon mutually accepted norms. 
The Board may undertake any inquiry or hear any person capable of giving relevant 
information concerning the dispute. 
35 Id article XIII(2). 
36 Id article XIX. 
37 Id article XX. 
38 Id article XXIII. 
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2:3:5:3 Arbitration 
Where arbitration is resorted to by the parties, an arbitral tribunal consisting of five 
members is established.39 Under article XXIX, a compromis has to be concluded by the 
parties, specifying an undertaking by them to go to arbitration and accepting the 
decision of the tribunal as legally binding. The compromis may also specify the law to 
be applied by the tribunal and the power, if the parties so agree, to adjudicate ex aequo 
et bono. The Commission appears to have been little used and arbitration not at all. 
"The member states have shown a marked preference for political settlement as 
opposed to the more formal, expert and quasi-judicial techniques available in the 
Commission".40 It could also be that member states lack confidence in the Commission. 
Thus, the Somalia-Kenya and Somalia-Ethiopia disputes, the Algeria-Morocco dispute, 
the Ivory Coast-Guinea dispute, the Cameroon-Nigeria disputes have been dealt with 
outside of the Commission.41 
2:4 Specialised Commissions 
Article XX of the OAU Charter authorises the Assembly of the organisation to establish 
a number of specialised commissions. In this regard, the following commissions have 
been established: Economic and Social Commission; Scientific, Technical and 
Research Commission; Health, Sanitation and Nutrition Commission. To these, the 
Assembly in 1964 added the Commission of Jurists and the Commission for Transport 
and Communications. In 1966, the Assembly reduced the number of commissions to 
three because of duplication of competence and activities both between the specialised 
comm1ss1ons themselves and the UN bodies active in Africa. However, ad hoc 
comm1ss1ons can be established, and in 1965, a Commission on Refugees was 
39 Id article XXVII. 
40 This Commission is hardly used by the OAU as neither the adversaries nor the OAU have been 
inclined to use it. Instead they prefer more flexible ad hoc bodies and statesmen. Also see Chanda note 3 
above at 15. 
41 Ibid. 
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established. 42 
The above-named organs are entrusted with the responsibility of ensuring a better life 
for the African peoples. One can argue that the reference to the UN Charter and the 
UDHR in the preamble of the OAU Charter of 1963, the establishment of 
Commissions, and the struggle for the liberation of Africa demonstrate the commitment 
of African leaders., to human rights. It has always been argued that the people of Africa 
cannot enjoy their human rights while still under colonial bondage, thus the reason for 
giving priority to the liberation of the continent from colonialism. 
When compared to the founding documents of other regional formations like the 
Council of Europe or the OAS, the OAU Charter makes very little reference to human 
rights and no mention is made of democracy. Despite the endorsement of the principles 
enshrined in the Universal Declaration in the preamble to the Charter, the focus of the 
organisation remained decidedly elsewhere throughout the first sixteen years of its 
existence.43 The institutional arrangement of the OAU did not provide for any body 
specifically designed to deal with the question of human rights within member states. In 
the words of Mr. William Hhara, 
" ... what we are looking at [today] is the world of civil and sometimes ethnic conflicts in which 
there is massive human sufferings, enormous movement of people, and very often, terrible 
violations of human rights. These are multi-dimensional human situations within the boundaries 
of states which the OAU was not quite specifically set up to deal with".44 
The principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of member states provided in 
article 111(2) is largely responsible for the woes that many African countries faced and 
some are still experiencing. 45 
42 In February 1964, the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos set up a ten member Commission 
to deal with the problem of refugees in Africa. 
43 Clement Nwankwo note 13 above at 50. 
44 
"Peace Keeping in Africa" Report on the Pretoria Seminar - South Africa 1995, ACCORD at 18. 
45 VJ Njoh note 5 above at 13. 
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As has been pointed out, in spite of the invocation of the Charter of the UN and the 
UDHR, and the importance of freedom, equality, justice and dignity of the African 
peoples, the promotion and protection of human rights was not set as one of the goals of 
the OAU and no organ was created for that purpose. The main aims of the OAU Charter 
as envisaged by its founders, were to complete the process of decolonisation; combat 
apartheid in South Africa; prevent extra-regional foreign interference - particularly by 
the major powers - and promote stability and greater co-operation among African states. 
Admittedly, the eradication of colonialism and the attainment of self-rule is a condition 
sine qua non for the full realisation and/or enjoyment of human rights. Colonial 
domination inherently denies the claims of equality, human dignity and self-
determination of all peoples. Insofar as the OAU has worked for the complete de-
colonisation of Africa and led the international campaign against apartheid in South 
Africa, it has played an important role in the promotion of human rights in Africa. 
However, as the post-colonial history of Africa, and of other regions has shown, the 
problem of human rights is not resolved by the mere acquisition of political 
independence. In many independent African states, constitutional governments have 
been overthrown, opponents imprisoned or banished and in some extreme cases, 
physically eliminated.46 It is significant to note that the overwhelming majority of 
refugees in Africa have fled independent states for political reasons. In the socio-
economic realm, extreme inequalities with regard to access to material and other 
resources remain a fundamental problem and are the sources of a good deal of the 
political instability that currently afflicts the continent. 
A development which might have been used to create a human rights protection 
mechanism within the OAU was the addition at the summit conference in Cairo in 1964 
of the Commission of African Jurists to the Specialised Commission.47 In terms of 
46 The elimination of political opponents extra-judicially was very common in the regimes ofBokassa 
and Amin. 
47 Edward Kannyo "The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and Political 
Background" in Claude E Welch Jr. & Ronald Meltzer (eds) Human rights and Development in Africa 
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article 1 of the Commission's Statute, its purposes were, inter alia; 
• to promote and develop understanding among African jurists; 
• to consider legal problems of common interest and those which may be referred to it 
by any member of the OAU; 
• to encourage the study of African law, especially African customary law; and 
• to consider and study international law in its relation to the problems of the African 
states. 
This Commission did not last long, for when the organisation approved the 
reorganisation and reduction of the Specialised Commissions in 1968, the Commission 
of Jurists was dropped as an OAU organ.48 
Until 1981 therefore, the OAU had neither any Charter provision or any organ to deal 
with human rights within member states. This shortcoming was exacerbated by the 
strict observance of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of states, a 
principle which was, and is still, constantly being used and abused by African dictators 
to prevent the OAU from dealing with charges of human rights violations in member 
states. 
2:5 The Principle of non-interference and the protection of human rights 
within the OAU 
The traditional principle of domestic jurisdiction, as discussed earlier, allows a state to 
deal with anything within its territory in the way it sees fit. This principle prevents 
states from interfering with what is seen as falling essentially within the domestic 
jurisdiction of another state. This is a basic principle in inter-state relations, which aims 
to replace might with right. Inter-governmental organisations such as the League of 
Nations and the United Nations enshrine this principle in the basic documents that bind 
the countries (in this case, the Covenant and the Charter respectively). However, in 
spite of the inclusion of this principle in most treaties governing inter-state relations, 
applications vary from absolute to relative adherence, depending on the states involved. 
1984 at 131. 
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The Organisation of African Unity, unlike tbe UN, incorporated this principle in its 
1963 Charter without reservation. While the UN Charter provides that " ... this principle 
shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII",49 the 
OAU Charter states categorically in its article 111(2) that the member states solemnly 
affirm and declare their adherence to the " ... non-interference in the internal affairs of 
states". This, coupled with the fact that the OAU did not provide any organ to oversee 
the activities of its members with regard to the treatment of their nationals, gave lee-
way for varied interpretations of this principle. In most of the · cases, a strict 
interpretation has been adopted. The following examples will illustrate how the OAU 
and its member states adopted the principle of non-interference to the letter, and how 
they have gradually moved from strict adherence to the principle to partial acceptance 
of international norms. 
Soon after the formation of the OAU, in December 1963, Burundi protested to the 
organisation about the widespread killing of the Tutsi ethnic minority in neighbouring 
Rwanda.so Nearly ten years later, in 1972, it was the turn of the Rwandese leaders to 
protest the massacre of Hutus in Burundi following the abortive uprising in May 1972 
in which up to 80 000 Hutus were killed by government forces.s1 At the OAU Council 
of Ministers meeting held in Rabat, Morocco in June, Rwanda raised the issue of the 
massacre but the OAU failed to take action.s2 In October 1972, Rwanda decided to raise 
the Burundi massacre again, this time outside the OAU, using the UN General 
Assembly. In his address to the Assembly, the Rwandese Foreign Minister, Augustin 
Munyaniza, said of his country's policy that 
48 Ibid. 
" ... just as it condemns apartheid ... [it] has equally no fear in denouncing racism wherever it is 
practised, even if it is exercised by blacks over other blacks, as is being done in that country of 
Black Africa where an ethnic minority is in the process of exterminating, in the name of racism, 
another ethnic group which is nonetheless in the majority". 53 
49 UN Charter article 2(7). 
so Kannyo note 47 above at 132. 
SI Ibid. 
sz Ibid. 
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He caustically suggested that it would be desirable if international jurists could succeed 
in defining what were the domestic affairs of another country so as not to encourage 
indifference by some parties to 
" situations that violated the right to life of all human beings. The case of Burundi where more 
than 200,000 innocent victims have just been massacred, and the cases of the Middle East and 
South Africa would serve as examples to be used in such a study". 
This address was followed by a sharp response from the Burundi delegation. The 
Burundi Minister of Foreign Affairs chided Rwanda for not having confined its raising 
of the matter to the African arena and for interference in Burundi's internal affairs.54 
During the course of the 1973 OAU Summit Conference in Addis Ababa, Milton 
Obote, then in exile in Tanzania, circulated a letter to all African leaders in which he 
accused ldi Amin of committing atrocities in Uganda. The OAU ignored the letter and· 
failed to act. 55 
The successful invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops and a substantial number of 
armed Ugandan exiles in 1979 was the turning point in inter-African relations, at least, 
as far as human rights within member states are concerned. At the beginning of 1979, 
President Nyerere openly hosted a meeting of Ugandan political exiles in Tanzania. 
This move was unprecedented in the history of inter-African relations. Here was a 
member state of the OAU hosting a meeting of a group plotting the overthrow of the 
government of another member state - a direct violation of article ill(2) of the Charter. 
During the course of the Tanzania-Uganda war, Presidents Numeiry of Sudan, chairman 
of the OAU, General Olusegun Obasango56 of Nigeria, and William Tolbert of Liberia 
tried, without success, to mediate in bringing the war to an end. 57 President Nyerere 
insisted that the OAU had to condemn Amin for aggression before he could consider 
any peace proposals, a demand which the organisation refused to meet, as President 
Numeiry, the then chairman, pointed out that the OAU was not in the business of 
53 UN Doc A/PV 2054/ 1973. 
54 UN Doc A/PV 2055/1973. 
55 Kannyo note 47 above at 144. 
56 Former President of the Federal Republic ofNigeria. 
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condemning fellow member states. 58 The overthrow of the Amin regime with the help l 
\ 
of Tanzanian troops gave rise to a heated debate at the July 1979 OAU Summit ' 
Conference held in Monrovia, with the heads of state who attempted to mediate being ; 
especially critical. President Numeiry accused President Nyerere of having violated the ·, 
principle of non-interference and the respect for territorial integrity of other member . 
states. President Obassango, on his part, condemned the· precedent that would be set by · 
the Tanzanian action, and President Sekou Toure of Guinea pointed out that "the OAU 
was not a tribunal which would sit in judgement on any member state's internal 
affairs. "59 
In October 1991, the Secretary-General of the OAU dispatched a five-member team to 
observe the presidential and legislative elections in Zambia. Upon arrival, the team met 
with resident African diplomats to explain the purpose of its mission. Several of the 
diplomats responded antagonistically doubting the propriety of sending an observer 
mission to a "sovereign African state" and "worrying that the Zambia precedent would 
require similar monitoring in all future Africa elections. "60 The team answered by 
noting that it had been invited by Zambia's President, Dr Kenneth Kaunda, a founding 
father of the OAU. In November 1995, when the Nigerian government executed nine 
minority human rights activists, including the playwright Kenule Beeso Saro-Wiwa 
(Ken Saro-Wiwa), South African President, Nelson Mandela, took a tough stance 
against Nigeria. Even after Nigeria had been suspended from the Commonwealth for its 
action, he continued calling for economic sanctions against the country. The South 
African Ambassador to Nigeria was briefly recalled, and Nigeria decided to withdraw 
from the South African-sponsored Four Nation Football tournament that took place in 
South Africa in December 1995. Relations between the two countries became strained 
to the extent that Nigeria decided to pull out of the prestigious African Nations Cup 
competition hosted by South Africa in 1996. Nigeria accused Nelson Mandela and 
57 Kannyo note 47 above at 145. 
58 Ibid. (emphasis added). 
59 Ibid. 
60 Larry Garba "The OAU and Elections" (1993) 4:3 Journal of Democracy 55. 
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South Africa of interference in its internal affairs. Regrettably, very few African states 
were bold enough to condemn Nigeria, while the OAU failed to issue any statement on 
the matter. 
The principle of non-interference and its unwarranted use by member states 
notwithstanding, the OAU and some of its members did either directly or indirectly, 
interfere in the "internal affairs" of other member states. There has always been 
occasional attempts within the OAU forums to challenge the legitimacy of governments 
which came to power through violence. 
The issue was first raised in connection with the assassination of President Sylvanus 
Olympio of Togo by mutinous troops in January 1963. The Ghanaian government was 
blamed for the assassination by a number of African leaders who were opposed to 
President Nkrumah's policies.61 As a result of their opposition, Togo was not 
represented at the founding conference of the OAU in May 1963. Such was the strength 
of feeling generated by the Olympio assassination that the "unreserved condemnation in 
all its forms, of potential assassination as well as subversive activities on the part of 
neighbouring states or another state"62 was inserted in the OAU Charter as one of the 
principles of the organisation. 
The overthrow of President Nkrumah by the Ghanaian military in 1966 led to 
determined attempts to deny the successor regime legitimacy within the OAU. At the 
sixth meeting of the Council of Ministers held in March 1966 in Addis Ababa, so many 
delegations withdrew in protest of the presence of the delegation representing the new 
military regime, that the meeting came to a hasty end.63 A similar situation arose 
following the overthrow of the government of President Milton Obote of Uganda in 
January 1971. The Council of Ministers' meeting that took place in February of the 
same year was forced into a difficult situation when the deposed President sent a 
61 Kannyo note 47 above at 134 
62 OAU Charter article III(5) 
63 Kannyo note 47 above at 134. 
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delegation to challenge that of the military government. Rather than choosing between 
the two delegations, the meeting decided to avoid the issue and adjourned sine die. 64 
The decision by the OAU to hold its 1975 summit conference in Kampala, Uganda, 
gave rise to strong protest from Tanzania, Mozambique, Zambia and Botswana which 
pointed to the atrocities which had been and were still being committed by the Amin 
regime. The thrust of their argument was that it was wrong for African leaders to 
condemn human rights violations in southern Africa and yet remain silent about abuses 
within member states of the OAU.65 In response to the OAU's decision to go ahead with 
the Kampala conference, Tanzania, Zambia and Botswana boycotted the meeting, while 
Mozambique's delegation was led by low-ranking officials rather than President Samora 
Machel. 
Following the 1978 overthrow of the Comoros President, Ali Sollih, by a force of fifty 
mercenaries led by Gilbert Bourgeaud (usually known by his alias, Bob Denard), the 
Comorian delegation representing the successor regime was expelled from the OAU 
Council of Ministers meeting in Khartoum, Sudan.66 The role played by the mercenaries 
in the overthrow, and the presence of Denard, a notorious mercenary and veteran of 
several African conflicts, as part of the delegation, was considered the ultimate insult to 
Africans leaders. In April 1980, President William Tolbert of Liberia was assassinated 
in a coup d'etat. Ten days later, thirteen former ministers and high ranking officials in 
the deposed regime were publicly executed by firing squad.67 This action prompted the 
OAU Council of Ministers which was meeting in Lagos, Nigeria to appeal to the new 
Liberian leader, Samuel Doe, to restrain such excesses. The message by the ministers 
affirmed " ... the right of any member state to change its government in any way it sees 
fit". However, the ministers called for an exercise of restraint " ... on purely 
64 Ibid. 
65 Collin Legun (ed) African Contemporary Records 1975-1976 at C22-C24. 
66 Kannyo note 47 above at 134. 
67 Id at 135. 
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humanitarian grounds and [in] respect for the principles of human rights".68 
The OAU has also been involved in domestic conflicts and matters of an humanitarian 
nature. The most notable attempts to settle what were essentially domestic conflicts 
include: the Congo (Zaire) crisis in 1964-1965; (and the 1996-1997 crisis that 
threatened to destabilise the Great Lakes Region and the whole of Central Africa); the 
Nigerian civil war (1967-1970); the Angolan civil war (1975-1976); the Chad conflict; 
the Burundi crisis (1995-1996) and the Congo-Brazzaville civil war of 1997, to name 
but a few. The record of the organisation in this regard has, however, not been 
outstanding. Almost all the internal conflicts were terminated with the military victory 
of one of the protagonists; while in other cases, success has been achieved only by 
informal ~d hoc committees and individual heads of state acting as intermediaries. On 
the humanitarian front, attempts have been made by the OAU from time to time to 
become involved in domestic conflicts even in the face of a limited threat of extra-
regional intervention and regional instability. 
Political analysts have, however, contended that the crisis in the OAU following the 
overthrow of Nkrumah and Obote was essentially due to partisan political factors. 
Opposition to successor regimes came from governments which had been very friendly 
with the deposed leaders or which disliked the ideological leanings of the successor 
regimes, and no issues of human rights or humanitarian concern were involved. 
African leaders have long now taken refuge behind article 111(2) to violate the rights of 
their citizens; but as the world approaches the new millennium where respect for 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and the ideals of democracy will capture the 
centre stage of the comity of nations, the OAU will find it more and more difficult to 
maintain this article if it intends to have any credibility in the twenty-first century• 
world. Respect for [states'] fundamental sovereignty and integrity is crucial to any, 
inter-governmental progress. However, the time for absolute and exclusive sovereignty • 
has passed; its theory was never matched by reality. It is the task of leaders today to 
understand this and to find a balance between the needs of internal good governance, 
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[human rights] and the requirements of an even more interdependent world. 69 
States which deride what they deem to be unwarranted intervention or interference in 
their internal affairs, generally do so by invoking the concept of state sovereignty by 
which they claim to have the right independently to administer affairs which fall 
essentially within their jurisdiction. When governments argue that human rights issues 
are matters falling essentially within their state jurisdiction, they all too often quote 
article 2(7) of the UN Charter in support. However, it is apparent that in so doing, they 
conveniently close their eyes to the article's proviso which circumscribes the prohibition 
on the United Nations from intervention in domestic jurisdiction of states. 70 
For article 2(7) provides in part that " ... but this principle shall not prejudice the 
application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII"; and Chapter VII deals with 
"Action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of 
aggression". These measures ate applied to maintain or restore international peace and 
security and may or may not involve the use of armed force, e.g., the complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and means of communication (as was the case with 
apartheid South Africa) or, if these prove to be inadequate, the taking of action by air, 
sea or land forces, as is the case of Iraq. It is argued that violations of human rights in 
any state can, potentially, endanger international peace and security and can, justifiably, 
be the basis of international action, as evidenced recently in Haiti, Bosnia, Sierra Leone, 
the concept of domestic jurisdiction of states notwithstanding. 
From the above analysis, the following conclusions can be drawn: human rights issues 
cannot be deemed to be matters which fall "essentially within the domestic jurisdiction 
of any state", and international action in respect of such matters cannot justifiably be 
seen as an affront to state sovereignty or independence. Of significance is the fact that 
even states which are not members of the UN, ipso facto, pre-empt such international 
68 African Research Bulletin (1980) at 5649A. 
69 Report of the Secretary of UN para 17 1992 UNDP 1 Pub 1247. 
70 KA Acheampong "Our Common Morality Under Siege: The Rwanda Genocide and the Concept of the 
Universality of Human Rights" Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
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action as the UN has vested itself with the power to ensure compliance, by all states, · 
with the UN Charter's principles for purposes of maintaining international peace and 
security. Article 2(6) of the UN Charter states that: "The organisation shall ensure that 
states which are not members of the United Nations act in accordance with these 
principles so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and 
security". The international viewpoint as to the non-absoluteness of sovereignty and the 
universality of human rights has provided the justification for the intervention or 
interference, by the United Nations, in the affairs of individual states. Such 
interventions have on the basis of article 41 of the UN Charter and a host of UN 
resolutions largely employed measures not involving the use of armed force with the 
aim of ensuring peaceful settlement of international disputes. 71 
As discussed above, all matters of human rights are of international concern and no 
nation, group of nations, or a continental organisation such as the OAU can, therefore, 
be seen or heard to claim that such matters fall solely within its, or their domestic 
jurisdiction. Thus the concept of universality of human rights which can be invoked by 
all human beings in defence of their own human rights or those of other human beings 
has become deeply rooted. By such an invocation, the international community is called 
upon to take all necessary action, including, where necessary, armed force as provided 
for by article 42 of the United Nations Charter, to help restore the enjoyment of such 
human rights to those who have been deprived of them and so save them from the 
indignity and denial of human worth occasioned by these human rights violations. The 
taking of action, armed force included, to either maintain or restore international peace 
and security which we contend, is always threatened by violations of human rights, is 
warranted if potential violators of human rights are to perceive the United Nations as 
having any resolve to halt or pre-empt human rights abuses. 
(1994) at 29. 
71 Some of these are the following: the 1975 Resolution on Peaceful and Neighbourly Relations Among 
States; the 1970 Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and 
Cooperation Among States in Accordance with the UN Charter; the 1982 Manila Declaration on the 
Peaceful Settlement of International Disputes. 
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The OAU and its members resolved in the preamble of the OAU Charter of 1963 to 
adhere to the principles of the United Nations Charter. This means that its principles 
must conform to those of the latter, and where these appear to be in conflict, the 
principles of the UN should prevail. It is common knowledge that article 111(2) of the 
OAU Charter was a deliberate attempt by its member states to 
"maintain an indifferent attitude to the suppression of human rights in the independent African 
states, by duly emphasising the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member 
states at the expense of certain principles, particularly the customary principles of respect for 
human rights".72 
But as the United Nations continues to emphasise the interrelationship between 
universal human rights and international peace and security, the principle of non-
interference firmly defended by African states will become redundant, at least as far as 
human rights are concerned. And as the world inches into the twenty-first century, 
African states cannot but follow the internationally recognised standards. 
Apart from the requirements contained in article 2(7) of the UN Charter, the rigid 
position held by most African states with regard the principle of non-interference is 
gradually giving way, considering the fact that since 1963 when the OAU Charter was 
signed, many African states have entered bilateral and multilateral treaties that require 
them either individually or collectively to surrender part of their sovereignty to 
international scrutiny. Some of these treaties are between African states themselves, 
such as the Southern African Development Community (SADC), while others are 
between African States and countries from other regions, such as the UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights, and usually provide for the promotion and protection of 
human rights among the state parties. By signing these treaties, these states are 
precluded by two important principles, namely; the principles of estoppel and pacta 
sunt servanda, from invoking their domestic jurisdiction or legislation in the treatment 
of their citizens. 
72 Oji Omuzurike "The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter" 1978 African Affairs 78 at 903. 
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Professor Schwarzenberger defines the principle of estoppel as a " doctrine according to 
which a subject of international law is precluded from denying the truth of a statement 
made earlier by a duly authorised representative or the existence of a fact in which such 
representative has by word or conduct led others to believe". 73 Professor Ian Brownlie 
says that the principle of estoppel "undoubtedly has a place in international law and it 
has played a significant role in territorial disputes which have come before international 
tribunal".74 In the Temple of Preah Vihar case, 75 the ICJ came to the conclusion that the 
attitude of Thailand showed that she had acquiesced or recognised the disputed frontier 
line between her and Cambodia in the area of the Temple; "that marked on the map 
drawn up by the Mixed Delimitation Commission set up by the treaty of 1904".76 Lord 
McNair advances the view in the case of Eastern Greenland that bilateral and 
multilateral treaties are binding agreements when accepted (with ratification through the 
proper channels) and that in that particular case, "Norway reaffirmed that she 
recognised the whole of Greenland as Danish; and thereby she has debarred herself ... in 
consequence from proceeding to occupy any part of it". 77 
This discussion would support the presumption and the rule of evidence that "a person 
[or state] cannot deny the existence of a particular state of affairs which he has himself 
brought about, and on the basis of which another person has acted". 
As far as the maxim pacta sunt servanda is concerned, it may also be invoked against 
the actions of African states party to the African Charter or any other international 
human rights instrument, if such actions are judged by other states parties, to be 
73 G Schwazenberger, A manual of International Law ( 1960) at 683. 
74 See "The Validity of Treaties" Collected Courses, Academy of International Law 1971, vol III P 348. 
75 See ICJ Reports 1962 at 6. 
76 Ian Brownlie Principles of Public International Law (1973) at 164. But TO Elias says that the 
International Law Commission "noted that in municipal systems of law this principle had its own 
particular manifestations reflecting technical features of the principle in municipal law might not 
necessarily be appropriate for the application of the principle in international law. For this reason, it 
preferred to avoid the use of such municipal terms as estoppel". 
77 Id at 165. 
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inconsistent with the obligations assumed under these instruments, especially those 
directly related to the provisions of human rights that impose external constraints on 
internal affairs of the state involved. 
Apart from the principle of non-interference, article llI(3) of the OAU Charter serves 
as a further hindrance to the full promotion, protection and enjoyment of human rights 
in Africa and is a source of numerous inter-state conflicts. This article provides for the 
" ... respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of each state and for its 
inalienable right to independent existence". The casual and haphazard delimitation of 
African boundaries following the Berlin Conference of 1884-1885 lies at the root of 
almost all the conflicts in Africa. Although the Charter does not expressly spell out the 
inviolability of colonial boundaries inherited at independence, a subsequent decision of 
the OAU laid down that the borders inherited at independence should be maintained 
and respected.78 This facilitated the proliferation of new states and lessened the chance 
of a united Africa. Following a proposal from Tanzania at the 1964 OAU conference in 
Cairo, the Assembly adopted a resolution which, inter a/ia, provided that the Heads of 
State and Government "solemnly declare that all members states pledge themselves to 
respect the borders existing on their achievement of national independence". 80 By 
confirming colonial boundaries therefore, the OAU, ipso facto, adopted and confirmed 
undemarcated and disputed borders which are sources of conflicts, genocide and human 
rights violations in Africa today. 
78 OAU Doc AHG/Res 16(1) 1964. Also see Chris M Peter note 12 above at 125. 
79 Morocco and Somalia entered reservations to this resolution because of their respective claims in the 
former Spanish Sahara and the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. 
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SECTION THREE 
3:0 The African Charter and Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
3:1 Introduction 
The decision of the Eighteenth Ordinary Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
of the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) which met in Nairobi, Kenya from 24 to 
28 June 1981 to adopt an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights1 is an historic 
development that created conditions for a regional mechanism to promote and protect 
the fundamental rights and freedoms of over 500 million people in Africa. The Charter, 
also referred to as the Banjul Charter,2 is the third regional human rights instrument in 
the world, alongside the European and American Conventions. 
The decision of the OAU to create a human rights system is particularly significant 
because it indicates that African leaders for the first time recognised that human rights 
violations in African states are a matter of concern for the international community. 
Until 1981, the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of member states 
which is set out in article 111(2) of the OAU Charter, had been constantly used, 
expressly or implicitly, to prevent the organisation from dealing with situations within 
members states which threatened or actually involved grave violations of human rights.3 
Moreover, jealous defence of national sovereignty had not only until then hindered 
OAU efforts to protect human rights, but had also obstructed the process of greater 
African regional integration.4 
1 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights entered into force on 21October1986. To date, 52 
of the 53 OAU member states have ratified the Charter, the exception being Eritrea. 
2 The Headquarters of the African Commission is in Banjul and the final draft of the Charter was 
done in Banjul, The Gambia. 
3 Oji Umozurike" The Domestic Jurisdiction Clause in the OAU Charter" 1978 African Affairs 78 at 
197. 
4 Edward Kannyo "The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Genesis and Political 
Background" in Claude E Welch JR. And Ronald Meltzer (eds) Human Rights and Development in 
Africa 1984 at 128. 
The question one may wish to ask is: after eighteen years of existence, why did the 
OAU decide to include the protection of human rights within member states as one of 
its goals? 
3:2 The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights 
3:2:1 Factors leading to the adoption of the Charter 
The conceptualisation and eventual adoption of the African Charter was neither an 
accident of history nor an act of sudden enlightenment on the part of African states. 
Rather, its conception was made imperative by a confluence of domestic and 
international geopolitical realities. In the course of the eighteen. years that had elapsed 
between the formation of the OAU and the 1981 summit conference in Kenya, the 
organisation had on various occasions been confronted with political problems, some of 
them amounting to crises.5 Many of these problems had direct or indirect human rights 
or humanitarian implications. With each crisis, the OAU was looked to both within and 
outside of Africa to demonstrate its credibility. In some of these crises, the organisation 
recorded success but in others it failed. 
For instance, in November 1966 at its third ordinary session, the Assembly of Heads of 
State and Government of the OAU meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, Liberia, Egypt 
and the host country, Ethiopia were mandated to solve the Guinea hostage crisis. These 
three countries succeeded in securing the release of the hostages. At the same summit, 
Zaire was mandated to reconcile Rwanda and Burundi. President Mubuto of Zaire 
succeeded in reconciling the two countries.6 At almost all the meetings of the Council 
of Ministers and the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, topical 
issues affecting the continent and within members states were on the agenda. For 
example, at the 1966 Heads of State Summit in Ethiopia, issues discussed included, 
inter alia, Rhodesia, the Rwanda and Burundi conflict and an Inter-African Force;7 and 
5 The Biafran Civil War; the Congo (Zaire) crisis; the Rhodesia crisis and refugee problems. 
6 
. Edward Kannyo" The OAU and Human Rights" in Yassin El Ayouty (ed) The OAU After Twenty 
Years (1982) at 366. 
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at its second extraordinary session held in Lagos, Nigeria, from 28 to 29 April 1980, the 
Heads of State discussed amongst other issues; economic co-operation, Liberia and 
Chad. 8 It was therefore natural that when African leaders felt the need to create a 
regional mechanism for the promotion and protection of human rights, the OAU was 
regarded as the appropriate organ. 
Political developments in Africa cannot, however, be examined in isolation from 
international politics. The adoption of the Charter was a combination of factors arising 
from intra-African and international developments. 
3:2:1:1 Intra-African developments 
An analysis of events leading to the creation of the African Charter will reveal that the 
Charter has had a lengthy and difficult period of gestation. The idea was first mooted in 
Lagos, Nigeria in 1961 but found no concrete expression for almost twenty years. 
Within this period, several developments occurred in Africa necessitating the 
establishment of a regional human rights system for the continent. 
The principal intra-African factors leading to the adoption of the African Charter in 
1981 include: 
• the gradual acceptance of the OAU by African leaders as the proper forum for the 
resolution of African conflicts; 
• the embarrassment caused for the OAU and African leaders in general by the 
atrocities of the Amin, Bokassa and Nguema regimes in Uganda, the former 
Central African Empire and Equatorial Guinea respectively; and 
• The invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops. 
7 Id at 370. 
8 Id at 375. 
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3:2:1:2 The gradual acceptance of the OAU by African leaders 
Since its creation, the OAU has on occasioruintervened in crisis involving its members. 
These crises range from liberation,9 humanitarian10 to border disputes. 11 There have 
also been attempts within the OAU to challenge the legitimacy of governments which 
came to power through violence. 12 
When the OAU was formed in 1963, there were only thirty-two independent African 
states. The organisation immediately established a nine-member Liberation 
Committee13 to accelerate the liberation of the rest of Africa from colonial rule. The 
Liberation Committee played an important role in co-ordinating the efforts of the 
various nationalist movements in their struggle for independence. In the words of 
President Robert Mugabe of Zimbabwe: 
"The OAU created a liberation committee in 1963 to assist those countries which were still 
under colonial rule to become free. The OAU did not look askance at the armed revolutionary 
struggle. The liberation committee based in Dar-Es-Salaam was charged with the task of 
organising help o( all kinds including arms and fmancial support and channelling it to the 
guerrilla movements". 14 
9 The OAU was actively involved in the liberation struggle of those countries that were still under 
colonial rule or white minority rule, for example, Rhodesia, Angola, Namibia and South Africa. 
10 Member states of the OAU adopted an "open door policy" to refugees and granted refuge to those 
fighting the colonialists. 
11 The OAU succeeded in solving the border disputes between: Guinea and Senegal (1972); Mali and 
Upper Volta (1975); Tunisia and Libya (1980); and Ethiopia and Sudan (1977). 
12 Uganda in 1971 was refused participation at the Council of Ministers meeting and the Assembly of 
Heads of State and Government meeting in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, following Amin's overthrow of 
Obote; while in 1978, the Council of Ministers' meeting in Tripoli, Libya, expelled the Comoros 
delegation from the meeting in reaction to the coup that had taken place in that country. 
13 This Committee was dissolved by the OAU Heads of State and Government Summit (1993) in Tunis, 
Tunisia, during its Thirtieth Ordinary Session by resolution AHG\ Resolution 228 (XXX). 
14 (1984) September-October African Report September at 83. 
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A special fund managed by the committee and contributed to by the OAU members 
greatly assisted the liberation movements. The OAU also contributed to the liberation 
struggle by soliciting non-African support. Because Africa was able to present a united 
front on the need for decolonisation and the eradication of apartheid in South Africa, the 
world community was sympathetic and offered concrete support. Through the United 
Nations, the OAU mobilised the world community to impose mandatory economic and 
military sanctions against the "rebel regime" of Ian Smith's unilateral declaration of 
independence (UDI), in the former Southern Rhodesia. In the case of South Africa, the 
OAU's diplomatic efforts were highly successful. Before the reforms introduced by 
President FW De Klerk in 1989/1990, the OAU had managed to have South Africa 
suspended or expelled from numerous international bodies such as the UN General 
Assembly, UNESCO, ILO, FIFA and the International Olympics Movement. The OAU 
was also partially successful in lobbying for the imposition of economic sanctions 
against South Africa. Until the early 1990s, these efforts left South Africa virtually 
isolated from the world community. 
Since 1963, the OAU has been faced with several conflicts involving its members. 
These disputes fall into two major categories: those between states, and domestic 
disputes. The OAU's role in resolving problems arising from purely internal conflicts 
has been largely constrained by the reluctance of governments facing internal rebellion 
to permit international intervention. However, since most African countries have 
boundaries that cut across ethnic lines and as any major internal conflict is bound to 
cause an outflow of refugees and political exiles, a domestic conflict inevitably creates 
tension between neighbouring states. The most serious internal conflicts the OAU has 
faced are those in Burundi, Congo (Zaire), Ethiopia, Nigeria, Rwanda, Somalia and 
Sudan.15 The effectiveness of the OAU in dealing with intra-African disputes can be 
assessed by distinguishing between two types of settlement: normalisation of relations; 
and complete settlement of dispute. 
15 AW Chanda "The Organisation of African Unity: An Appraisal" (1989-1992) 21-24 Zambia Law 
Journal at 14. 
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The organisation's main success has been in relation to the former, where it has been 
able to act as an effective instrument for reducing inter-state tension without necessarily 
resolving the problems that caused the tension. Such was the case in the Ogaden Region 
border dispute between Somalia and Ethiopia in 1964. As the tension was only reduced, 
it flared up again in 1976.16 
The OAU has also used other methods for resolving conflicts such as: establishment or 
reinforcement of norms for inter-state relations17 vis-a-vis specific problems; appeals to 
adversaries for a cease-fire and to seek negotiations, bilateral or with the aid of a 
mediator; and the establishment of the Commission on Mediation, Conciliation and 
Arbitration, 18 or the designation of an individual or ad hoc mediator. The organisation 
has relied heavily on flexible, ad hoc bodies of varying sizes, levels of national 
representation and scope of responsibilities. The most successful have been those made 
up of heads of state : for example, the ad hoc Committee on the Congo (Zaire) 
Mercenary Problem, which comprised ten heads of state. The inclusion of heads of state 
in the mediating bodies created to resolve the underlying cause of crises has tended to 
enhance the prospects of success. The designation of an individual head of state by the 
OAU as the sole intermediary in a dispute has been one of the most successful methods 
of conflict resolution. For example, former Zambian President, Kenneth Kaunda, was 
instrumental in solving the crisis between Somalia and Kenya in 1967; the ending of the 
Algeria-Morocco war was as a result of mediation by the late Emperor Haile Selaisie of 
Ethiopia; and the late President William Tolbert of Liberia was instrumental in 
reconciling Guinea and Ivory Coast on the one hand and Senegal on the other in 1971.19 
16
· From Human Wrongs to Human Rights Part IV Centre for Human Rights Pretoria (1995) 
at 382. 
17 
.See Declaration on the Code of Conduct for Inter-African Relations No AHG!Decl 2 (XXX) of 1994. 
18 The Commission has never been used as neither the adversaries nor the OAU deliberative organs has 
been inclined to use it 
19 See note 16 above at 380. 
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The success achieved by individual statesmen may be credited to the general African 
tradition of respecting the wisdom of the elders and men of distinction. 
"The inclination to appoint an individual statesman to mediate in a dispute emanates from the 
character of inter-African disputes which have always been considered as being primarily 
political and, therefore needing political rather than legal solutions''. 20 
Although not entirely absent from concern for regional stability, humanitarian 
considerations have been more clearly apparent in the attitude of the OAU with regard 
to the position of refugees than in its attitude towards any other African problem. The 
problem of refugees has confronted the organisation since its creation. In the early 
1960s, thousands of Tutsis fleeing the sporadic warfare that followed the revolution in 
Rwanda, entered the neighbouring states of Burundi, Tanzania, Uganda and Zaire. They 
created problems of security, relief and provision of shelter in these states. So, soon 
after the formation of the OAU, the host states asked the organisation to address the 
problem.21 
In February 1964, the OAU Council of Ministers meeting in Lagos set up a ten-nation 
ad hoc commission to deal with the problem of refugees.22 The commission was 
mandated to examine the problem of refugees in Africa and make appropriate 
recommendations for solutions; and to find ways and means of maintaining refugees in 
the countries of asylum. The commission later drew up a draft on all aspects of the 
problem of refugees in Africa and a decision was also made to set up a refugee bureau 
in the OAU Secretariat. 
The UNHCR, the Dag Hammersjold Foundation, and the OAU convened an 
international conference on the legal, economic and social aspects of African refugees 
in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia in October 1967.23 In 1968, the OAU set up a bureau for the 
placement and education of refugees which was integrated into the General Secretariat 
in June 1974. The efforts of the OAU to deal with the refugee problem took an 
2
° Chanda note 15 above at 16. 
21 Edward Kannyo note 4 above at 137. 
22 Ibid. 
23 Ibid. 
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important step forward when the OAU Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of 
Refugees in Africa was signed on 6 September 1969 as a supplement to and regional 
adaptation of the UN Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees (1951).24 
Despite all these measures, the number of refugees in the continent has continued to 
grow, and it is estimated that Africa harbours half of the world's refugees. In response 
to the growing number of refugees, the UNHCR and other UN agencies in collaboration 
with the OAU, organised the International Conference on the Assistance to Refugees in 
Africa (ICARA) in Geneva in April 1981.25 The ninety countries which participated in 
the conference pledged a total of $560 million26 to support refugee programmes in 
Africa. 
"The work of the OAU in the sphere of refugee relief is significant because it involves an 
expansion of the role of the organisation into an area that impinges on domestic jurisdiction. It is 
also an area that is directly related to the protection of human rights".27 
With the above-mentioned achievements and commitment by the OAU, African leaders 
had, by the end of the 1970s, come to accept the organisation as the natural agency to 
deal with political, humanitarian and other issues on the continent. Consequently, when 
the time came for the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights to be adopted, the 
OAU was seen as the appropriate organ to which to turn . 
3:2:1:3 Embarrassment caused to the OAU and African leaders by Amin, 
Bokassa and Nguema 
Large-scale killings of political opponents, suspected opponents and others by the 
regimes of ldi Amin in Uganda ( 1971-1979), Marcias Nguema in Equatorial Guinea 
(1968 - 1979), and Jean-Bedel Bokassa in Central Africa Republic ( 1966 - 1979), were 
almost certainly the most important factors in the final decision of the OAU to move 
24 Ibid. 
25 Kannyo note 4 above at 138. 
26 Ibid. 
27 Ibid. 
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toward creating a human rights protection mechanism for Africa. The transgressions of 
these three regimes in particular and of other dictatorial regimes in Africa, caused 
revulsion both in and outside of Africa, and threatened to damage the image and 
reputation of the OAU. For instance, the organisation was put in an embarrassing 
position when Idi Amin became chairman in 1975. "He combined brutal methods of 
government in Uganda with a flamboyant and provocative style in international 
affairs".28 His violent attack on Zionism and Israel during his address to the UN General 
Assembly in 1975 prompted the US Chief Delegate, Daniel Patrick Moynihan, to 
lambaste him and the OAU, claiming " .. .it is no accident, I fear, that this racist 
murderer ... is the Head of the Organisation of African Unity ... ".29 
At the 1977 annual Commonwealth Conference in London, which Uganda did not 
attend, Uganda's human rights violations were discussed. In the final communique, the 
conference declared: 
"Cognisant of the accumulated evidence of sustained disregard for the sanctity of human life 
and of massive violation of basic human rights in Uganda, it was the overwhelming view of the 
Commonwealth leaders that these excesses were so gross as to warrant the world's concern and 
to evoke condemnation by Heads of Government in strong and unequivocal terms. Mindful that 
the people of Uganda were within the fraternity of Commonwealth fellowship, Heads of 
Government looked to the day when the people of Uganda would once more fully enjoy their 
basic human rights which now were being so cruelly denied".30 
In Central African Republic, self -styled Emperor Bokassa combined harsh repression 
of political opposition with bizarre megalomaniacal extravagance; while in Equatorial 
Guinea, throughout his eleven years in power, Marcias Nguema presided over one of 
the most brutal regimes that Africa has seen. Large numbers of people were either 
killed or driven into exile. 
28 Id at 142. 
29 Facts of File 1975 739 Dl - D3. 
3
° Kannyo note 4 above at 143 .. 
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These regimes created problems for the OAU and African leaders in general by 
exposing them to the charge of using a "double standard" in their condemnation of 
apartheid in South Africa while remaining silent about atrocities by other African 
regimes.31 
3:2:1:4 The impact of the Tanzanian invasion of Uganda (1978-1979) 
In spite of the international outcry, the OAU had not until 1979 formally taken up the 
problem of human rights violations in Central African (Empire) Republic, Equatorial 
Guinea or Uganda. However, the successful invasion of Uganda by Tanzanian troops 
and armed Ugandan exiles which led to the downfall of Amin was to ensure discussion 
of the subject at the 1979 OAU summit conference in Monrovia, Liberia. 
Even though Tanzania was strenuously condemned by some African leaders for 
violating article 111(2) and (3) of the OAU Charter, President Nyerere drew considerable 
sympathy from several African leaders and the international community who were 
appalled by Amin's human rights record and OAU indifference. Newly installed 
President of Uganda, Godfrey Binaisa, vigorously defended Nyerere and going against 
OAU practice, also launched a strong attack on the regimes ofBokassa and Nguema for 
their human rights violations.32 
It was against this background the President of Senegal, Leopold Senghor, decided to 
introduce a draft resolution that had been handed to him by a group of African jurists, 
calling for the establishment of an African Human Rights Convention. The Assembly 
decided to include the phrase "peoples rights"33 to the draft and adopted a resolution 
31 Laurie S. Wiseberg, 'Human Rights in Africa: Toward the Defmition of the Problem of Double 
Standards' (1976) 6:4 Issues,; also see African Contemporary Record 1975 - 1976 
C22 for Tanzania's response to the holding ofthe1975 OAU Heads of State summit in Kampala, Uganda. 
The Tanzanian government warned in a statement released in dar- es- salamjust before the conference 
that Africa was 'in danger of becoming unique in its refusal to protest about the crimes committed against 
Africans, provided such acts are done by African leaders and Governments'. 
32 
.Kannyo note 4 above at 146. 
33 Kebe Mb'aye Keynote address, "Introduction to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights" 
Report on a Conference held from 2-4 December 1985 convened by ICJ in Geneva (1986) at 19-20. 
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calling upon the Secretary-General to organise 
"as soon as possible, in an African capital, a restricted meeting of highly qualified experts to 
prepare a preliminary draft on an African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, providing 
among other things for the establishment of organs to promote and protect human rights". 34 
To a large extent, the resolution can be seen as a means to end the controversy 
provoked by the violent changes in Uganda in 1979; but it could also be seen as an 
attempt to forestall similar controversies in the future and at the same time redeem the 
image of the OAU by showing that it was not after all indifferent to human rights 
violations within member states. 
Between 1979 and 1981, the OAU organised three meetings to draft the proposed 
Human Rights Charter. The first was in Dakar, Senegal, from 25 November - 2 
December 1979 for African Legal Experts to draft the African Charter on Human and 
Peoples' Rights; it was followed by the Conference of Ministers of Justice and Legal 
Experts to consider the draft Charter, which was held in Banjul, The Gambia, in June 
1980, and culminated in the Second Conference of Ministers of Justice to finish the 
consideration of the draft African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which was 
held in Banjul, The Gambia, in January 1981.35 After the second consideration of the 
draft, the Charter was termed the Banjul Charter. 
3:2:2 International developments 
There are basically two extra-African influences that contributed to the creation of an 
African human rights mechanism: the role the UN played in encouraging the formation 
of regional human rights bodies, and the central role that US President, Jimmy Carter, 
gave to the subject of human rights in his foreign policy. Since the mid-1960s, the UN 
has encouraged the creation of regional human rights commissions in those areas 
where they did not exist.36 These efforts resulted in the organisation of human rights 
34 OAU Doc AHG\ Dec 115 (XXI), reproduced in UN Doc A\34\552. 
35 Victor Dankwa "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Hopes and Fears" in The African 
Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: Development, Context and Significance African Law Association 
(1991) at 8. 
87 
conferences in Africa and have kept the subject of human rights alive in the minds of 
the leaders, intellectuals, legal practitioners and other people of Africa. 
Even though the OAU was not directly involved in the efforts of the United Nations to 
create a regional human rights body in Africa, some of its members were. During the 
twenty-third session of the UN Commission on Human Rights in March 1967, Nigeria, 
a prominent member of the OAU, introduced a resolution, co-sponsored by the Congo 
(Zaire), Senegal and Tanzania, asking the UN to consider establishing regional human 
rights commissions for regions lacking them.37 
Following the adoption of this proposal, the UN Commission set up an ad hoc study 
group38 of eleven members to look into the possibilities. In its report, the group 
expressed general agreement that the initiative for setting up regional human rights 
commissions should be taken by states in these regions. 39 
At the twenty-fourth session of the commission, a Nigerian resolution (cosponsored by 
Austria) was adopted, requesting the UN Secretary-General to transmit the report to 
member states and regional inter-governmental organisations; and also to consider the 
possibility of arranging suitable regional seminars in the field of human rights. The first 
UN seminar on human rights in Africa was held in Cairo, Egypt, in September 1969.40 
Among the conclusions of the meeting, the participants called on the member states of 
36 
.Kannyo note 4 above at 164. 
37 UN Doc E\CN\L940 Draft Recommendation II Report of the Twenty-third session of the UN 
Commission on Human Rights (E\4322) 109-25. 
38 AH Robertson & JG Merrils Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of 
International Protection of Human Rights (1989) at 202. 
39 UN Doc E\CN4\966 Report of the UN ad hoc study group established under Resolution 6 (XXIII) of 
the Commission on Human Rights. 
40 Ibid. Also see UN Doc ST\TAO\HR 38 1969; (1969) II Human Rights Law Journal,.692 - 702 for a 
report on the proceedings of the Seminar. 
88 
the OAU to consider appropriate steps, including the convening of a preparatory 
committee, with a view to establishing a regional commission on human rights for 
Africa. 
In the ten year period following the Cairo Seminar, a number of other meetings were 
held in various African states under the aegis of the UN.41 At many of these 
conferences, the desirability of establishing an African Human Rights Commission or 
some similar body was expressed. The second UN sponsored seminar devoted to the 
question of establishing an African Regional Human Rights Commission was convened 
in Monrovia, Liberia in September 1979. The seminar took place after the OAU had 
passed a resolution in July 1979 authorising its Secretary-General to facilitate the 
establishment of an African human rights body. The UN seminar therefore took 
advantage of the momentum generated by the OAU resolution to help in the search for 
a structure for the proposed mechanism. One of the conclusions of the UN seminar was 
that it would be desirable to establish an African Commission on Human Rights as soon 
as possible. 
Between the 1961 Lagos Conference and the 1979 Monrovia Conferences, increased 
international attention to the subject of human rights violations had been reflected in 
international political developments, the media and academic circles. Beyond the 
human rights related activities of states in international institutions, many states have 
chosen to make human rights a concern in their bilateral and multilateral foreign policy. 
Much of the surge of interest in human rights in the last decades can be traced to the 
catalysing effect of President Carter's 1977-1981 efforts to make international human 
rights an objective of US foreign policy. In the mid-1970s, a combination of domestic 
and international factors gave impetus to new thinking within the US foreign policy 
establishment. Following the debacle of the Vietnam War, increased debate over US 
support for the creation of a physical apparatus for repression in Latin America, and the 
41 After the 1969 Cairo Seminar, other conferences focused on the establishment of a human rights body in Africa. They included inter a/ia: the Conference of African 
Jurists on the African Legal Process and the Individual held in Addis Ababa in April 1971; the Seminar on the Study of New Ways and Means for Promoting Human 
Rights with Special Attention to the Problems and Needs of Africa; and the Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions of Human Rights with specific 
reference to Africa held in September 1979 ... 
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domestic crises that led to the collapse of the Nixon presidency, it became necessary to 
rethink US foreign policy. These developments, in conjunction with the cold war, led 
Congress and the Carter administration to give unprecedented prominence to human 
rights rhetoric within US foreign policy. To give effect to the rhetoric, administration 
policy-makers would, through relevant legislation, ostensibly link aid to a recipient's 
human rights record. In these conditions, it became politically expedient for African 
countries to adopt the rhetoric. 
But the duplicity and politicisation of the rhetoric was manifest in US policy toward 
friends and foes. While the administration vilified Soviet bloc countries for human 
rights violations, it closed its eyes to abuses elsewhere and continued to provide 
military and economic assistance to the Shar's Iran and Mobutu's Zaire, among many 
other strategically or economically prized clients. 
In the late seventies, the United States "lost" Nicaragua and Iran as a result of its 
support for repressive rulers who alienated virtually their entire population and 
provoked popular revolutions. A few years earlier, Angola was "lost" because of the 
colonial policy and human rights abuses of the US-backed Portuguese regime. The US, 
has also lost other strategically located countries, such as the Philippines, largely as a 
result of a misguided subordination of human rights concerns in preference for 
geographic spheres of influence. The fear of losing even more territories led the US to 
reconsider its foreign policy with regard to the protection of human rights. Difficult 
decisions had to be made about the weight to be given to human rights as well as other 
foreign policy goals, and at least rough rules for trade-offs and loans needed to be 
formulated to regulate US foreign policy. This reformulation of bilateral and multi-
lateral relations marked a turning point in US foreign policy with regard to human 
rights protection. It also sent a signal to African dictators that friendly relations with the 
US, and the acquisition of financial aid would henceforth be based on a sound human 
rights record. 
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Further, the Carter administration's serious attention to economic and social rights, 
even if it was ultimately subordinate to a concern for civil and political rights, greatly 
contributed to the international perception of its policy as genuinely concerned with 
human rights, and not just a rhetoric for cold war or neo-colonialism.42 Such an 
international perception was almost the necessary condition - although by no means a 
sufficient condition - for an effective international human rights policy. It, to some 
extent, won the confidence and co-operation of socialist countries, African countries, 
human rights advocates and other categories of human rights personalities and 
institutions. 
Politicians, journalists, academics and others in various parts of the world paid greater 
attention to the problem of human rights violations, especially in Africa. The activities 
of Amnesty International, the International Commission of Jurists and other 
international non-governmental organisations influenced the global human rights 
climate in the late 1970s. 
42 It should be noted that previous regimes had concentrated on recognising only civil and political rights, and considered economic and social rights not 
being truly human rights. This must have cast doubts on t the US notion of the universality of human rights, especially from socialist and Third World 
countries, which give preference to the latter rights. 
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3:3 Analysis of the Charter 
3:3:1 The Preamble 
To draft a human rights instrument for atheists, animists, Christians, Hindus, Jews, 
Muslims; a continent of over fifty countries and islands; with capitalists, socialists, 
Marxist-Leninists, military, one-party and democratic regimes was not an enviable task. 
The difficulties that faced the draftsmen were exacerbated when they had to take into 
account both international human rights standards and "the virtues of African historical 
tradition and the values of African civilisation" .43 The stated objective of the drafters 
was to prepare an African Charter on Human Rights that was based on African legal 
philosophy and was responsive to African needs. The Charter was to reflect the history, 
values, traditions and economic development of the continent.44 This approach is not 
unique to Africa. Western conceptions of human rights are a result of European 
historical experience. This point of continental peculiarity was emphasised by President 
Leopold Senghor of Senegal when he informed the experts meeting in Dakar to draft 
the Charter that: 
"Europe and America have construed their system of rights and liberties with reference to a 
common civilisation to respective peoples and to some specific aspirations. It is not for us 
Africans to copy them or to seek originality for originality's sake. It is for us to manifest both 
imagination and skill. Those of our traditions that are beautiful and positive may inspire us. You 
should therefore constantly keep in mind our values and the real needs of Africa".45 
The President also cautioned the experts not to produce a Charter on the "African man"; 
"humankind is one and indivisible and the basic needs of [human beings] are similar 
everywhere" .46 
43 Preamble of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights paragraph 4. 
44 Evelyn A Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedure. 
(1996) at 6. 
45 Ibid. 
46 Ibid. 
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The desire for originality and to produce a charter to cater for "African needs" justified 
the drafters' departure from the models created by the European Convention for the 
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ( the European Convention) 
and the American Convention on Human Rights (the American Convention). In 
addition, the draftsmen rejected the Charter format proposed at the UN sponsored 
Monrovia Seminar on the Establishment of Regional Commissions on Human Rights 
with Specific Reference to Africa held in September 1979.47 The UN seminar had set 
out its proposed standards in two articles: articles 2 and 3. 
Article 2 provides: 
"The Commission shall be guided by the international law of human rights, including the 
provisions of specific African instruments on human rights which may be concluded, such as a 
declaration, a charter or a convention, the provisions of the UN Charter, the Charter of the OAU, 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights ... ".48 
while article 3 states that: 
"The Commission shall also have regard to other international conventions, whether general or 
particular establishing rules expressly recognised by the state members of the OA U; to African 
practices consistent with international human rights standards evidencing customs generally 
accepted as law; and to the general principles of law recognized by African nations, judicial 
decisions and the teachings of authoritative authors as subsidiary means for the determination 
for the rules oflaw". 49 
The proposal of the UN Monrovia seminar simply set out applicable standards as 
embodied in other international covenants and declarations and was seen as a "means" -
oriented document, that is, it focused on form rather than substance. The Banjul Charter 
(Dakar Draft) on the other hand, catalogues specific rights to be protected and is seen as 
an "ends" -oriented document, focusing on substance rather that form. The Monrovia 
experts had decided not to prepare a distinct set of rights for Africa. 50 Most of their 
efforts were devoted to suggesting operating procedures for a proposed African regional 
47 GG Ramcharan 'Travaux Preparatoires of the African Commission on Human Rights', (1992) 3:7 
Human Rights Law Journal. Also see 310 - 312 for the fifteen Articles drawn by the Momovia experts, 
assembled under UN auspices. 
48 Ibid. 
49 Ibid. 
50 Ibid. 
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comm1ss1on on human rights modelled in some measure on the Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights. The draftsmen recommended that existing international 
documents serve as standards for promoting and protecting human rights in Africa.51 
But the experts at Dakar, assembled under OAU auspices, opted for a type of document 
differing dramatically from that of the Monrovia experts, assembled under UN 
auspices. 
The preamble of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights is very different 
from the preambles of other regional conventions for the protection of human rights. It 
indicates that the Charter draws its inspiration from the OAU Charter, which stipulates 
that "freedom, equality, justice and dignity are essential objectives for the achievement 
of the legitimate aspirations of the African peoples". 52 The preamble also recognises 
"that fundamental human rights stem from the attributes of human beings which justifies 
their protection ... , that the reality and respect of peoples' rights should necessarily guarantee 
human rights ... " and that "the enjoyment of rights and freedoms also implies the 
performance of duties on the part of everyone". 53 
One respect in which the Banjul Charter differs from its American and European 
counterparts is its reliance on principles primarily African in nature. The concept of 
duty embodied in the Charter is different from that contained in the American and 
European Conventions. In the latter regional human rights instruments, the "concept of 
duties" refers only to the obligation of a state toward its citizens or toward citizens of 
another state within its jurisdiction. Occasionally, obscure references are made to the 
individual's responsibility to the community. The American Convention does mention 
in article 32, the individual's responsibility to his or her family, community and 
mankind, while the Universal Declaration54 also provides in article 29(1) that 
"everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full development of 
his or her personality is possible". However, neither the European Convention, the 
American Convention, nor the Universal Declaration mentions such an obligation by 
51 Ibid. 
52 Preamble ofOAU Charter paragraph 3. 
53 Id note 43 paragraph 6. 
54 UN GA Res 217 (III) A 1948. 
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the individual to the state. 
The African Charter imposes an obligation upon the individual not only toward other 
individuals, but also towards the state of which he is a citizen. In addition, the preamble 
stresses the importance of economic, social and cultural rights as a pre-requisite to the 
full enjoyment of human rights. 
"It is henceforth essential to pay particular attention to the right to development and that civil 
and political rights cannot be dissociated from economic, social and cultural rights in their 
conception as well as universality, and that the satisfaction of economic, social and cultural 
rights is a guarantee for the enjoyment of civil and political rights". 55 
In summation, the preamble to the African Charter could be seen as a guide for the 
significant themes that run throughout the Charter. First, the Charter relies heavily on 
African documents and traditions rather than United Nations declarations or 
conventions. Second, while individuals enjoy certain rights under the Charter, they are 
obliged to fulfil certain duties toward other individuals and toward the state of their 
citizenship. Third, economic, social and cultural development is a top priority. Finally, 
the Charter incorporates in one document the three generations of human rights, 
namely, civil and political rights (first generation), economic, social and cultural rights 
(second generation), and solidarity or group rights (third generation). And as the 
Assistant Secretary-General of the OAU puts it, 
" ... the cultural character of Africa and the African Charter revolve around the Charter of the 
OAU .... A significant triptique which expresses our will to ensure the liberation of our 
continent, the development of man and all his faculties, as well as the establishment of a society 
that takes into account our cultural values and traditions". 56 
3:3:2 Content of the Charter 
The African Charter is divided into three parts, comprising its substantive and 
procedural aspects as well as the general provisions. Part one sets out the substantive 
aspects of rights and duties in two chapters. Chapter one sets out the rights to be 
protected under the Charter, while chapter two sets out the duties of the individual 
towards "his family and society, the state and other legally recognised communities and 
55 Preamble to African Charter paragraph 8. 
56 Wolfgang Benedek & Wolfgang Heinz (eds) "The place of human rights in the regional political 
systems" in Regional systems of human rights in Africa, America and Europe (1992) at 23. 
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the international community". 57 
Part two covers the procedural aspects, including the establishment and organisation of 
the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights. Chapter one calls for the 
establishment of the African Commission and lays down the structure of the 
Commission in detail. Chapter two details the functions of the Commission, while 
chapter three deals with the procedure of the Commission. Chapter four of part two 
indicates the applicable principles by which the Commission will secure the protection 
of human rights in Africa. Finally, part three of the Charter consists of general 
principles especially as regards commencement, ratification, special protocols and 
amendments. 
A significant feature which emerges from article 1 of the Charter is that it permits its 
members only to recognise the rights, freedoms and duties contained in the Charter and 
to undertake to make them effective by law. A distinctive feature of that clause is the 
failure to include the words "guarantee" and "ensure". The earlier Dakar draft 
required that states: "shall recognise and shall guarantee the rights and freedoms stated 
in the present Convention (sic) and shall undertake to adopt in accordance with their 
constitutional provisions, legislative and other measures to ensure their protection".58 
The elimination of the vital words "guarantee" and "ensure" from the final text 
deprives the Charter of its force and has prompted some human rights commentators to 
argue that the Charter was intended to be non-binding on member states. It has also 
been argued that these words were dropped in order to make the Charter more 
acceptable to those governments concerned about the effects of a human rights 
covenant on national sovereignty.59 
57 African Charter article 27 (1). 
58 Dakar Draft of the African Charter article 1; see also OAU Doc CAB/ LEG/ 67/3/ Rev 1 (1979). 
59 Richard Gittleman; "The Banjul Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A Legal Analysis" in CE 
Welch Jr and RI Mertzer Human Rights and Development in Africa (1984) at 156. 
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The Charter incorporates a mixture of qualified and unqualified civil and political rights 
in articles 2 to 13. The unqualified rights include , inter a/ia; the inviolability of the 
human person (article 4), the right to human dignity (article 5), the right to a fair trial 
and equality before the law (article 7). The libertarian essence of other rights is 
substantially diluted by the presence of claw-back clauses. Those affected include: the 
right to personal liberty (article 6), freedom of expression (article 9), the right to free 
association (article 10), freedom of conscience and religion (article 8), freedom of 
assembly and movement (articles 11 and 12), and the right to participate in the 
government of one's country (article 13). 
The effect of the claw-back clauses is to subject the enjoyment of the affected basic 
rights to national law without specifying the circumstances which would legitimate 
national restrictions. Thus, as Professor Umozurike60 has explained: 
"These latter rights may be derogated from ... by law or be exercised in accordance with the law 
of the land. The standard for such law is unfortunately not stated, there is no requirement that 
the law must be reasonably justifiable in a democratic society. These civil and political rights 
require that governments interfere as little as possible with the freedom and liberty of 
individuals".61 
The Charter contains no specific prov1s1on entitling a state to derogate from its 
obligation as is the case with the American and European Conventions. Derogation 
clauses limit a state's conduct in at least two important ways. Firstly, they limit the 
circumstances in which derogation may occur. For example, under the European 
Convention, derogation may occur only "in time of war or other public emergency 
threatening the life of the nation". 62 Second, derogation clauses define rights that are 
non-derogable and must be respected even when derogation is permitted.63 The effect of 
derogation clauses, therefore, is to define carefully the limits of a state's behaviour 
toward its nationals during times of national emergency - a time when states are 
60 Chairman of the African Commission from 1989 to 1991. 
61 Oji Omuzurike; " The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: An Introduction" in ( 1991) 1 
Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (1991) at 5. See also Communications 
147/95 and 149/96. 
62 European Convention on Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms article 15(1). 
97 
presumed to be more prone to violate human rights. 
While derogation clauses permit the suspension of previously granted rights, claw-back 
clauses restrict rights ab initio. As a result, claw-back clauses tend to be less precise 
than derogation clauses in that the restrictions they permit are almost totally 
discretionary. The granted right(s) may be restricted by local law or the existence of a 
national emergency, two very vague and broad standards. By virtue of these standards, 
claw-back clauses do not provide the control over state behaviour that derogation 
clauses provide. For instance, under article 6 of the African Charter, "every individual 
shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person". Furthermore, "no one 
may be arbitrarily arrested or detained". Yet the Charter qualifies these guarantees with 
a claw-back clause: "No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and 
conditions previously laid down by law".64 The Charter, however, contains no definition 
of these "reasons and conditions". 
The American Convention which is closely paralleled by the African Charter, lays out 
additional procedural safeguards to ensure that the right to liberty is not a mere "paper" 
right. For instance, the Convention provides that a detained person be brought promptly 
before a judge;65 that he be entitled to a fair trial within a reasonable time or be 
released.66 The European Convention goes even further by providing for comprehensive 
protection of individual liberty in that no one shall be deprived of his liberty except in 
certain situations. The Convention also sets out procedural safeguards by requiring the 
accused to be promptly informed of the reason for his arrest in a language he 
understands;67 and also allows the victims of any violations of its provisions the right to 
compensation.68 Thus, by providing comprehensive procedural safeguards regarding the 
63 Id articles 2, 3, 4(1) and 7. 
64 African Charter Article 6. 
65 American Convention on Human Rights Article 7(5). 
66 Ibid. 
67 European Convention article 6 (3) (a). 
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right to liberty, both the American and the European Conventions seek to provide 
external restraint upon government power. In the light of these safeguards, the African 
Charter is woefully deficient with regard to the right to liberty. 
Articles 14 to 17 of the African Charter incorporate economic, social and cultural rights 
- the second generation rights. The Charter sets out the rights to property and to work 
under equitable and satisfactory conditions, including equal pay for equal work, in 
articles 14 and 15 respectively. The right to well-being both physical and mental, and 
the right to enlightenment, that is, education, cultural life, moral and traditional values, 
are covered in articles 16 and 17. 
This is a notable deviation from the European and the Inter-American systems. As 
regards second-generation rights, the fundamental difference between the African 
Charter on the one hand, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights and the European Convention on the other, is that while these rights 
may be progressively achieved69 under the Covenant and are included in a separate 
European instrument, the European Social Charter,70 the African Charter provides for 
their immediate implementation alongside first-generation rights. Though the second 
generation rights are indivisible, interdependent and interrelated, and make the first 
more meaningful, their effective and consequential implementation requires positive 
action on the part of the government. 
A comparison between the provts1ons of the African Charter and those of the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights however indicates that 
the latter deals more extensively with these rights and they are better defined and 
elaborated than in the former. The right to education, for example, which appears in 
68 Id Article 5(5). 
69 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966) article 2(1). 
70 Signed in Turin 18 October 1961; entered into force in February 1965. It is also worth noting that the 
European concern about economic and social development expressed itself in the creation of the 
European Communities: i.e., the European Coal and Steel Community in 1951, European Atomic Energy 
Community in 1957 and the European Economic Community in 1957, rather than in a concept of 
economic rights as human rights to be secured under the European Convention. Also see article 26 of the 
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article 17(1) of the Charter simply states "Every individual shall have the right to 
education". Article 13 of the Covenant covers this right in more than three hundred and 
fifty words. Some commentators have argued that the reason for not elaborating on 
these rights is that "the intention of the framers was simply to emphasise the importance 
of economic and social rights, especially their close relationship with civil and political 
rights".71 Since many African states were already parties to the Covenant on Economic 
and Social Rights, an exhaustive treatment of these rights at regional level was not 
considered necessary. 72 
The African Charter is the first regional human rights instrument to incorporate the 
controversial third-generation rights which are not vested in individuals but in groups. 
These rights include: equality of all persons (article 19), the right to self-determination 
(article 20), sovereignty over group wealth and natural resources - including the right to 
dispose of the same (article 21), the right to development (article 22), the right to 
national and international peace and security ( article 23), and the right to a generally 
satisfactory environment favourable to development (article 24). 
Articles 25 and 26 impose duties on the states to promote and ensure through "teaching, 
education and publication ... the rights and freedoms ... " and also to "guarantee the 
independence of the courts ... ".73 The state also has the duty· under article 18(2) to assist 
the family which is the "custodian of morals and traditional values recognised by the 
community". 74 
American Convention, and article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention. 
71 AH Robertson & JG Merrils Human Rights in the World: An Introduction to the Study of International 
Protection of Human Rights (1989) at 211. 
72 Ibid. 
73 African Charter articles 25 and 26. 
74 Id article 18. 
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The list of duties contained in articles 27 to 29 has given rise to the question of whether 
they impose legally binding obligations upon the individual and to what extent these 
duties are enforceable. Answers to some of these questions can be very illuminating: for 
example, can an individual be prosecuted because he or she has not placed his or her 
physical and intellectual abilities at the service of his or her community as required by 
article 19(2)? Given that an individual cannot be arraigned before the Commission, and 
many states have not incorporated the Charter into domestic law, how does the 
Commission seek to enforce such duties? 
Some duties nonetheless appear to be enforceable and an individual who fails in his or 
her duty would be answerable under municipal law. Enforceable duties would appear to 
be: the duty under article 28 to respect other individuals without discrimination; the 
duty under article 29(1) to maintain one's parents in case of need; the duty under article 
29(3) not to compromise the security of the state; the duty to contribute to the defence 
of one's country; and the duty to pay taxes under article 29 (5 and 6). Other duties such 
as those involving the harmonious development of the family; preservation and 
strengthening of positive African values; and promotion and achievement of African 
unity, place a moral rather than a legal obligation upon the individual. It may well be 
that the concept of duty in the African Charter as a whole serves as a "code of conduct 
for good citizenship" for the African peoples. 
In its attempt to incorporate all three generations of human rights in a single document, 
the African Charter omitted some of the basic rights and paid lip-service to others. 
There is no right to privacy, no express right to form trade unions, the right to 
participate in government is silent on the question of regular and free periodic elections 
by secret ballot, there is no freedom from forced labour, no specific requirement that 
there should be full consent between the spouses during marriage and its dissolution. 
The rights to rest, leisure and social welfare, home and to correspondence are also 
omitted. 
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The foregoing reveals that the African Charter did not result from a free floating, 
jurisprudential exercise and exchange between jurists. At the end of the day it was the 
outcome of hard diplomatic bargaining, bringing together people from a distinctly 
Franco-legal tradition and an Anglo-American one, each with very different African 
customary traditions; and a very significant Moslem bloc within those to be affected by 
the Charter. 
Unlike in the other regional systems where discussion was focused on human rights per 
se, the drafters of the African Charter were preoccupied with several issues:, 
colonialism, sovereignty. non-alignment, neo-colonialism, Zionism, solidarity, etc 
etera. This was exacerbated by the divergent views held by the different ideological, 
religious and political leanings of the legal experts. For instance, countries like 
Mozambique, Zambia and other socialist states insisted on the inclusion of economic 
and social rights in the Charter; the Muslim bloc relied heavily on the Koran for the 
protection of civil liberties. The civil law and common law had to be blended with the 
practice of Shari'a to produce a document that would be acceptable to all. Inevitably, the 
final text of the Charter had to accommodate the concerns of all. It had to leave the 
clauses sufficiently open-ended to allow for a domestic application which would cater 
for the diversity of the member states. As the father of the African Charter, Justice 
Keba M'baye75 recalled, "it was the best that could be achieved at the time".76 
75 Legal Resources Foundation, Zimbabwe Bill of Rights Conference Report (1994) at 26. 
76 Ibid. 
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3:4 The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
3:4:1 Introduction 
The implementation of the rights and :freedoms enshrined in the African Charter on 
Human and Peoples' Rights is entrusted to the African Commission which by virtue of 
article 30 of the Charter is established within the OAU and mandated to "promote 
human and peoples' rights and ensure their protection in Africa". 77 
This chapter endeavours to discuss the African mechanism for the protection of human 
rights - the African Commission - on the basis both of its practice and procedures, in the 
light of the practice and experiences of other regional human rights bodies, and the 
"concept of human rights" in Africa. The chapter also highlights some of the constraints 
faced by the Commission, their causes and how they affect the activities of the 
Commission, especially in the implementation of the rights enshrined in the Charter. 
3:4:2 Composition of the Commission 
Article 31 of the Charter provides that the Commission is made up of eleven Africans 
known for their "high morality, impartiality and competence in matters of human 
rights; particular consideration being given to persons having legal training".78 The 
requirement of legal experience seems desirable in view of the fact the Commission's 
mandate also requires it to interpret legal treaties. To date,79 all those who have been 
appointed to the Commission have been persons from a legal background, although 
some of the Commissioners come with political80 and diplomatic81 backgrounds as well. 
77 African Charter article 30. 
78 Id Article 31. 
79 At the last OAU Heads of State Summit held in Harare, Zimbabwe, in June 1997, a South African 
clergyman (but also a lawyer) Dr Rev Nyameko Barney Pityana, was elected member of the 
Commission. 
80 Ministers and Attorney-Generals. 
81 Ambassadors. 
103 
The size of the Commission is relatively small in comparison with the size of the OAU 
( 53 member states) and in view of its very broad mandate. 
The European Commission on Human Rights has a number of Commissioners equal to 
the number of High Contracting Parties to the European Convention;82 similarly, the 
UN Human Rights Committee has a larger complement of eighteen members. 83 Like 
the African Commission, the Inter-American Commission is small having only seven 
members.84 However, unlike the African Commission, the European Commission, the 
Inter-American Commission and the Human Rights Committee can and do entrust the 
bulk of their work to their Secretariats. 85 The Human Rights Committee, for instance, 
has a Working Group on Communications, Rapporteurs on Communications and 
Rapporteurs to follow up on its views. The Working Group and Rapporteurs on 
communications study the communications and make recommendations to the 
Committee, which in almost all cases, adopts them. 86 
One other important issue regarding the composition of the African Commission is the 
question of geographical representation. Even though the Charter is silent on the matter, 
international practice requires that appointment to international and/or regional 
organisations would give consideration to this concept. The stipulation in article 32 of 
the Charter87 that the Commission shall not include more than one national of a single 
state shows a desire to achieve an equitable geographical balance. 
82 Ankumah note 44 above at 16. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Tom Zwart The Admissibility of Human Rights Petitions: The Case Law of the European Commission 
on Human Rights and the Human Rights Committee (1994) at 10. 
87 
"The Commission shall not include more that one national of the same State", Article 32, African 
Charter. 
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A comparative analysis of the three commissions therefore will reveal that they all 
comprise independent experts. In their composition, no state party can have more than 
one national as a member of any of the Commissions. However, while the European 
and American Conventions allow the appointment of a member to the commission from 
a non party state; the African Charter provides in its article 31 that the members of the 
Commission "shall be composed of African personalities of the highest reputation, 
morality ... ", and article 33 provides that they shall be elected by secret ballot by the 
Assembly of Heads of State from a list of persons nominated by the states party to the 
Charter. Article 34 further states that" ... the candidates must have the nationality of one 
of the States Parties to the present Charter". 
Members of the European Commission are elected by the Committee of Ministers for a 
period of six years and are eligible for re-election indefinitely; those of the Inter-
American Commission, like their African counterparts, are elected by the General 
Assembly of the Organisation of American States, but unlike their African colleagues 
who are elected for a period of six years and can be re-elected indefinitely, their term is 
four years, renewable only once. 
Balancing the Commission with members from the different political regions of Africa 
has been a major concern. This balance should not, however, be limited to geographical 
location. In a continent with different traditions, cultures, legal systems and different 
colonial legacies, the question of balancing the Commission cannot be over-
emphasised. Therefore, equitable balance should also reflect equitable representation of 
commissioners from Anglophone, Francophone, Lusophone and Arabic countries. 
Serious consideration should also be given to the different legal systems. 
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The initial composition of the Commission88 reflected the importance which the OAU 
attaches to the question of equitable balance. However, with the replacement of 
commissioners, this balance has been distorted. 89 
88 The initial composition was as follows: 
1. Professor Isaac Nguema, Chairman, (Gabon), a University law lecturer; 
2. Mr. C.L.C. Mubanga Chipoya, (Zambia), Civil Servant; 
3. Dr. Ibrahim Badawi El Sheikh,Vice-Chairman, (Egypt's Ambassador to Zimbabwe); 
4. Mr. Justice Kisanga, (Tanzania), Judge of the Supreme Court of Tanzania; 
5. Mr. M.D. Mokama, (Botswana), Attorney-General; 
6. Mr. Y Ndiaye, (Senegal), Judge of the Supreme Court; 
7. Mr. Alioum B Beye, (Mali), secretary-general, African Development Bank; 
8. Mr. A. M. Behedra, (Libya), private legal practitioner; 
9. Mr. S. Janneh, (The Gambia), private legal practitioner; 
10. Mr. Alexis Gabou, (Congo), Minister of Interior; 
11. Mr. Grace Ibingira (Uganda), Businessman 
89 The present composition of the Commission is as follows: 
1. Professor Issac Nguema, (Gabon), university law professor; 
2. Professor E.V.O.Dankwa, (Ghana), university law professor; 
3. Dr. Nyameko Pityana, (South Africa), Reverend & President of the National Human Rights Commission 
4. Ambassador Ibrahim EL Sheikh Badawi, (Egypt), Ambassador to the Netherlands 
5. Mr. Youssoupha Ndaiye, Chairman (Senegal), President of the Constitutional Council of Senegal 
6. Mr. AtsuKoffiAmega, (Togo); President of the Constitutional Council of Togo. 
7. Mr. Mohammed Hatem Ben Salem, (Tunisia), his country's Ambassador to Senegal; 
8. Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, (Mali), UN Special Envoy to Angola; 
9. Mr. Kamel Rezzag-Bara,(Algeria), President ofObservatoire Algerien des Droits de l'Homme. 
10. Dr. Vera Duarte Martins, Vice-Chairperson (Cape Verde Island), Judge of the Supreme Court. 
11. Madam Julienne Ondzeil-Gnelenga, ( Congo), Barrister. 
Record of Election of Members of the Commission since 1987: 
July 1989 Elections 
The term of office of members elected in July 1987 for 2 years had expired in July 1989. The following members were re-
elected: 
Amb. Ibrahim B. EL-Sheikh, Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye, Prof. Isaac Nguema and Mr. SB Semega Janneh for a six year 
term 
Mr. Grace Stuart Ibingira of Uganda who had been elected in 1987 for four years resigned in 1989 and Prof. UO 
Umozurike from Nigeria was elected in July 1989 to replace him for the remainder of his term. 
The term of office of three Members of the Commission elected in July 1987 for four years terminated in July 19'> I. In June 
1991, the following members were re-elected: 
Justice Habesh Kisanga, Mr. Mubanga Chipoya, and Prof. UO Umozurike for a period of six years. 
Mr. Mubanga Chipoya of Zambia died in December 1991 and in the election held in July 1992, Ambassador Hatem Ben 
Salem of Tunisia was elected for the remaining term of five years. 
The term of office of four members elected in 1987 for six years, namely, Mr. Ali Mahmoud Buhedma, Mr. Alexis Gabou, 
Mr. MD Mokama and Mr. Youssoupha Ndiaye, expired in June 1993. In the election of June 1993 to fill the four vacant 
posts the following were elected members for six years: 
- Mr. Youssoupha Ndiaye 
- Mr. Atsu Koffi Amega 
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The issue of equitable representation had been noted even in the Draft Monrovia 
Proposal for the Setting-up of an African Commission on Human Rights produced by 
the UN Experts to the 1979 Monrovia seminar. Article 7(2) provides that, "In the 
election of the Commissioners, consideration shall be given to equitable geographical 
distribution of membership and to the representation of the different legal systems in 
Africa".90 
Like many international institutions, the representation of women on the African 
Commission is largely disproportionate. Established in 1987, the first female 
commissioner was elected only six years later91 and the second in 1995,92 and this was 
due to pressure from NGOs and other women's groups. For instance, at the tenth 
ordinary session of the Commission held in October 1991, Professor SBO Gutto of the 
International Commission of Jurists lamented that: 
"Since the establishment of the African Commission and up to the present, there has been no 
direct involvement of women in the work of the Commission. The present membership of the 
Commission has no woman. It is apparent that the Commission's work in areas of promotion, 
investigation and protection is minimised by this glaring exclusion of those who constitute more 
than 50% of the African population".93 
Critics of the Commission and other human rights advocates have also challenged the 
composition of the Commission on the compatibility of the professions of some 
commissioners vis-a-vis their commissionership. Since its establishment in 1987, the 
- Prof. EVO Dankwa 
- Dr. Vera Valentino Duarte M. 
The term of office of four members elected in 1989 expired in June 1995. In June 1995, the following members were elected 
- Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye 
- Prof. Isaac Nguema 
- Mrs. Julienne Ondziel 
- Mr. Kamel Rezzag-Bara 
The term of office of three members expired in June 1997, and in the last election, the following 
members were elected. Ambassador Ben Salem (re-elected), Dr. Badawi and Dr. Pityana from 
Tunisia, Egypt and South Africa respectively. 
90 Ramcharan note 47 at 311. 
91 Cape Verde's Vera Duarte Martins. 
92 Congo's Julienne Ondzeil- Gnelenga. 
93 Ankumah note 44 above at 16. 
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Commission has been served by Attorney-Generals, ambassadors, ministers, judges, 
court advocates and university lecturers. The nomination of persons holding 
government office as commissioners has seriously undermined the independence and 
credibility of the Commission. The government function and the function of the 
Commission could be a source of conflict of interest in the ability of the commissioners 
to function as independent experts. 
It is not entirely true, however, to think that a commissioner who holds a government 
position would not take a decision against his or her government. The point, however, is 
that it is very doubtful in an Africa where leaders have die-hard associates, whether the 
public would be confident that individual commissioners are able to render decisions 
which would be adverse to their states. The Commission should therefore not only 
assert itself as being independent but should also be perceived by the public as an 
independent body. Or in other words, justice should not only be done but it should be 
seen to be done. It is worth noting that as a mark of the independent nature of the 
Commission, its headquarters are in The Gambia, rather than Ethiopia, the seat of the 
OAU. 94 
Concerns regarding the independence of the Commission with regard to the profession 
of commissioners were also discussed at the UN Monrovia seminar, and article 5(2) of 
the Draft Monrovia Proposal states that; "Membership of the Commission shall be 
incompatible with membership of a government or of the Diplomatic Corps".95 
It should be noted that the proposals contained in the Monrovia draft were to be 
presented by the OAU Chairman, the late William Tolbert, to the next summit of the 
OAU Heads of State and Government, but this could not be done as he and his Minister 
of Justice who was the Chairman of the Seminar, were killed after the 1980 coup d'etat 
94 It is also believed that the other reason why The Gambia was chosen as the Commission's 
headquarters was because the country enjoyed a reputation for having a 'democratic ' and tolerant 
government. In July 1994, a coup in the country interrupted almost 30 years of civilian rule. The African 
Commission expressed great concern about the political changes and considered moving its headquarters 
from The Gambia. The Commission decided that it would not hold its sessions in The Gambia while the 
country continues to be ruled by a military government. 
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in Liberia. As such it was never thoroughly considered by the OAU experts. This may 
partly explain why most of the provisions were not incorporated into the final text of 
the Banjul Charter. 
3:4:3 Mandate of the Commission 
The African Commission's four-fold functions can be summarised as: promotion, 
protection, interpretation and any other task entrusted to it by the OAU Heads of State 
and Government. 
3:4:3:1 Promotional activities 
The promotion of human rights is a condition sine qua non for the respect, recognition 
and protection of these rights. "If people are not aware of their rights, they cannot 
ensure their protection".96 The promotional function is provided in the American 
Convention and the African Charter, but is lacking in the European Convention. 
Article 41 of the American Convention provides that "the principal function of the 
Commission shall be to promote respect for and defence of human rights" notably 
through studies, developing human rights awareness and by requesting governments of 
member states to supply it with information on the measures adopted by them in 
matters of human rights. The African Charter for its part, provides that the Commission 
should collect documents, undertake studies and research, and assist in the formulation 
of principles and rules aimed at solving legal problems relating to human and peoples' 
rights upon which African governments may base their legislation. These functions can 
be performed in co-operation with other African and international institutions 
concerned with the promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights. 
95 Ramcharan note 47 above at 309. 
96 Ankumah note 44 above at 21. 
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Article 45(1) of the Charter mandates the Commission to set up a documentation centre 
and undertake studies and research in the field of human and peoples' rights, organise 
seminars and conferences, disseminate information, and encourage national and local 
institutions concerned with human and peoples' rights. At its third ordinary session in 
April 1988, the Commission drew up a comprehensive Programme of Action. This 
programme focused on the following: 
i) Actions in the area of information, sensitisation and reflection ;97 including: 
• introduction of periodic radio and television programmes on human and peoples' 
rights; 
• teachings on human and peoples' rights; 
• publication of the African Charter in local vemaculars.98 
ii) Actions in the field of training and research on human and peoples' rights including 
the formation of recommendations on the establishment of national or sub-regional 
committees on human and peoples' rights.99 
iii) Quasi-legislative action aimed at the introduction of the African Charter or some 
provisions thereof into the legal systems of states party to the Charter: all with a 
view to ensuring some degree of harmonisation of the concept and application of 
human rights throughout the continent.100 
The Commission has also granted observer status to more than two hundred African 
and foreign NGOs involved in the promotion and protection of human rights in Africa. 
These NGOs participate in the public sessions of the Commission and are permitted to 
suggest agenda items for any session. This also enables the NGOs to obtain informed 
97 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Documentation No 1 First - Second - Third 
Activity Reports (1987-1999) at 27. 
98 Ibid. 
99 Ibid. 
ioo Ibid. 
110 
knowledge about the Commission and its activities so that they can disseminate factual 
information. To ensure that these organisations are actually promoting human rights, 
they are required to submit a detailed activity report in the area of human rights after 
every two years after having obtained observer status.101 
The eleven commissioners of the Commission have also been allocated states falling 
within the geographic region of which they are nationals or in which they reside for 
promotional activities. 102 The commissioners are required to carry out promotional 
activities between sessions in countries allocated to them. During each session, they are 
expected to present a report on their inter-session promotional activities. 
Commissioners are expected to visit human rights organisations, universities and other 
institutions in the countries allocated to them during which they are required to give 
lectures on the African Charter, African human rights issues, and the work of the 
African Commission. 
101 Fifth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights 
ACHPR/Xl/AN RPT/5/REV 2 (1991-1992) at 7. 
102 The current distribution is as follows: 
Mr. Youssoupha Ndiaye Senegal, Niger, Guinea, The Gambia, 
Dr. Vera Valentino Duarte-Martins Cape Verde, Mozambique, Guinea Bissau and Sao 
Tome and Principe 
Prof. Isaac Nguema Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Democratic Republic of 
Congo, Burkina Faso, Congo-Brazzaville 
Prof. E.V.O. Dankwa Ghana, Sierra Leone, Kenya, Uganda, 
Mr. Atsu-Kofi Amega Togo, Central African Republic, Benin, Cameroon 
Mr. Kamel Rezzag-Bara Algeria, Comoros, Saharawi Arab Democratic 
Republic, Mauritania, Chad 
Dr. Ibrahim Ali Badawi Egypt, Tanzania, Ethiopia, Eritrea, Sudan 
Dr. Mohamed Hatem Ben Salem Tunisia, Libya, Djibouti, Mali, Liberia 
Mr. Alioune Blondin Beye Cote d'Ivoire, Angola 
Mrs. Julienne Ondziel Gnelenga Burundi, Rwanda, Mauritius, Seychelles, 
Madagascar 
Dr. Nyameko Barney Pityana South Africa, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Malawi, 
Botswana, Namibia, Lesotho, Swaziland, Nigeria. 
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The main purpose of promotional activities is sensitisation of the public to human rights 
issues in an effort to enhance respect and recognition for the rights set forth in the 
Charter. 
3:4:3:2 Protective activities 
Whereas a broad mandate is conferred upon the Commission in relation to its 
promotional functions, its protective mandate is somewhat restricted. Article 45(2) of 
the Charter simply mandates the Commission to: "ensure the protection of human and 
peoples' rights under conditions laid down by the present Charter" .103 These 
"conditions" could be taken to be the procedure of the Commission contained in articles 
46 to 62, including of course, the Commission's Rules of Procedure.104 Thus, to fulfil 
the task entrusted to it under article 45(2) of the Charter, the Commission has been 
empowered (a) to consider interstate communications or complaints, (b) to receive 
other communications from individuals or NGOs, and c) to examine state reports 
submitted in conformity with article 62105 of the Charter. 
It should be mentioned here that this latter task is not expressly conferred on the 
Commission by the Charter, so in 1988, at its third ordinary session, the Commission 
requested the Assembly of Heads of State and Government of the OAU, to confer this 
task on it. In a recommendation at its third ordinary session in 1988, the Commission 
noted that 
"considering that the Charter does not stipulate to which authority or body the periodic report 
should be directed, . . . Considering that the Charter has not specifically entrusted to the 
Commission the responsibility to consider the periodic reports on human rights, ... Considering 
further that it is difficult to see which other organ of the OAU could accomplish this task, ... 
recommends that the Heads of State and Government mandate the General Secretariat to 
receive106 the said reports and communicate them to the Commission without delay ... 
103 African Charter article 45(2). 
104 The first Rules of Procedure were adopted in February 1988 and were revised in October 1995. 
105 This article imposes an obligation on all state parties to the Charter to "report on the legislative or 
other measures taken with a view to given effect to the rights and freedoms recognised in the Charter ... " 
every two years from the date at which the Charter came into force. 
106 It should be noted that in practice, these reports are sent directly to the Secretariat of the Commission 
and not the OAU. 
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Specifically entrust it with the task of examining the periodic reports submitted by the States 
Parties pursuant to Article 62 ... ".107 
One of the major similarities in the three major regional human rights instruments in the 
world can be found in the competence of the Commissions in their protective functions. 
The three organs are competent to receive communications from states as well as from 
individuals, NGOs and groups. In spite these similarities, the African system displays 
some unique features which merit attention at this juncture. 
3:4:3:2:1 Inter-state communications under the African Charter 
This procedure is provided for in articles 41 through 54 of the Charter. Under the 
procedure, two options are available to state parties: a state party which has reasonable 
ground to believe that another state party to the Charter has breached any of the 
provisions in the Charter, may write to the respondent state regarding the matter and a 
copy of the allegation is sent to the Secretary-General of the OAU and another to the 
Chairman of the Commission. 108 The respondent state has up to three months to respond 
to the allegations.109 If the matter is not satisfactorily resolved between the two states, 
either state can submit the matter to the Commission.110 Alternatively, any state party to 
the Charter which has good reason to believe that another state party has violated any 
provision(s) in the Charter can ignore the first option and complain directly to the 
Chairman of the Commission.111 
107 Ankumah not 44 above at 28. 
108 African Charter article 47. 
109 Ibid. 
110 Id article 48. 
111 Id article 49. 
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The Commission can use the wide powers vested in it under article 46 "to resort to any 
appropriate method of investigation ; it may hear from the Secretary General of the 
OAU or any other person capable of enlightening it".112 In both circumstances, the 
ultimate goal of the Commission should be to reach an amicable solution. 
Regarding the admissibility of a communication from one state party against another, 
article 50 requires that the Commission shall "only deal with a matter submitted to it 
after making sure that all local remedies ... have been exhausted, unless it is obvious ... 
that the procedure ... would be unduly prolonged" .113 
After having tried all appropriate means to reach an amicable solution without success, 
the Commission is obliged under article 52 to prepare a report of its findings for the 
states concerned and communicate it to the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. The report may be accompanied by recommendations. 114 
To date, the Commission has not receive any complaint from any state party alleging 
that another state party has violated any provision in the Charter.115 This is hardly 
strange, inter-state complaint procedures are seldom used (just as in the European and 
Inter-American systems) as a mechanism for human rights protection. 
112 Id article 46. 
113 Id article 50. 
114 Id article 53. 
115 In 1997, Sudan brought an action against Ethiopia, claiming that the latter's invasion ofKurmuk and 
Gissan (border towns in Sudan- near Ethiopia), violated not only the OAU Charter but was characterised 
by killings and torture of civilians. The Commission took no action claiming Ethiopia fl not a party to the 
Charter. It is however unclear whether the Commission would have done anything even if Ethiopia had 
been a party to the Charter, because the Charter seems to be referring to violations committed within 
one's territory and not violations committed during an act of war. 
114 
3:4:3:2:2 Other Communications 
Articles 55 to 58 of the Charter deal with "other communications" providing for the 
submission of complaints to the Commission by individuals, groups and NGOs, both 
local and international. Such communications are to be considered by the Commission 
if a simple majority of its members so decide.116 Article 56 of the Charter stipulates the 
admissibility criteria to be applied to individual and similar communications as follows: 
• the communication should indicate the author(s) even if the latter requests 
anonymity; 117 
• the communication should be compatible with the Charter of the OAU or with the 
present Charter; 118 
• the communication is not written in disparaging or insulting language directed 
against the state concerned and its institutions119 or to the OAU; 
• the communication is not based exclusively on news disseminated through the mass 
media· 120 
' 
• the communication IS sent after exhausting local remedies, if any, unless it IS 
obvious that this procedure is unduly prolonged;121 
116 African Charter article 55(2). 
117 On all but one of the communications submitted to the Commission so far, none of the 
complainants have requested anonymity. 
118 See Communications 57/91and1/88, where failure to prove a_prima facie violation renders the 
communication inadmissible; an allegation in a general manner is not enough, Communication 63/92. 
119 See Communication 65/92 where the communication was declared inadmissible for using words such 
as "regime of torturers" and "a government of barbarism". 
120 In Communication 149/96, the government of the Republic of the Gambia alleged that the 
communication should be declared inadmissible because it is based exclusively on news disseminated 
through the mass media. The Commission however ignored this argument and declared the 
communication admissible. 
121 See Communications 43/90 and 45/90 where non-exhaustion oflocal remedies renders 
communication inadmissible; but see Communication 59/91 where the communication was declared 
admissible where appeal had been pending before the courts for twelve years. This was considered to be 
unduly prolonged. Communications can also be declared admissible without the exhaustion oflocal 
remedy if the remedies is at the discretion of the executive or if the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts 
have been ousted by a decree or through the establishment of a special tribunal, see Communications 
60/91, 64/92, 68/92 and 78/92. 
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• the communication should be submitted to the Commission within a reasonable 
period from the time local remedies have been exhausted or from the date the 
Commission is seized of the matter; and 
• the communication does not deal with cases which have been settled by these states 
involved in accordance with the principles of the Charter of the UN122 or the Charter 
of the OAU or the provisions of the present Charter. 
In most respects, these conditions follow the usual pattern in other regional and global 
human rights instruments. 123 An unusual condition however is that contained in article 
56(4) that communications should not be based exclusively on news disseminated 
through the mass media. It is particularly odd that a communication ?an be disqualified 
on this ground in view of the fact that the media is often the sole and main source of 
information regarding human rights abuses. This proviso seems to have been designed 
to limit the opportunities for an actio popularis suggested by article 55, a condition 
which if other evidence is hard to find, may be regrettable. 124 
Unlike in other regional bodies where the complainant must be, or be related to, the 
victim, in the African Charter, there is no requirement restricting who may file a 
communication. Thus, a communication may be submitted on behalf of a victim by 
some person or organisation who does not even know125 or has never seen or met the 
victim.126 It is also worth noting that unlike the European Commission where 
122 See Communication 15/88 where the UN Human Rights Committee had decided the case in favour 
of the victim and he submitted the same communication to the Commission. It was declared inadmissible. 
However, the submission of a complaint to an NGO or an Inter - Governmental Organisation such as the 
EEC does not render a communication inadmissible, Communication-59/91; but a communication 
already being examined under Rule 1503 of the UN does, Communication 69/92. 'The purpose is to 
avoid usurpation of the jurisdiction of the bodies who may provide a solution or relevant information'. 
123 See article 5(2) of the First Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights; article 46(1) of the Inter-American Convention, and article 27(1) of the European Convention. 
124 The Commission seems to have ignored this condition in its consideration of admissibility of 
Communication 149/96, but adopted it in Communication 162/97 when it declared the latter 
communication inadmissible. 
125 See Communications 99/93, 100/93 and 39/90. 
126 See Communications 27/89, 48/91and 56/91. 
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acceptance of the right to individual petition is optional, 127 the competence of the 
African Commission with regard to "other communications" is mandatory, as soon as a 
state ratifies the Charter. 
Prior to the Commission's consideration of a communication, article 57 requires that 
the communication be brought to the attention of the state concerned by the Chairman 
of the Commission. This is logical to give the state the opportunity to respond to the 
allegations, and to seek ways of settling the matter amicably. This provision has 
constantly been abused by state parties, and the Commission also has given it a narrow 
interpretation.128 Consideration of cases was deffered to wait for the reaction of states to 
complaints lodged against them. Most of these reactions never came. Most of the states 
usually claim that they never received letters from the Commission or that they were 
received late. 129 
At its .pth Ordinary session, however, the Commission decided that it would proceed 
with the consideration of a complaint if after five months the state had not responded. 
Although provision 1s made for individual complaint to be considered by the 
Commission, the Charter does not empower the Commission to take any action on 
individual cases, except on special cases which "reveal the existence of a series of 
serious or massive violations". 130 In such cases, the attention of the Assembly of Heads 
of State and Government may be drawn to the violations. The Assembly may then 
127 See article 25 of the European Convention. One of the most important innovations in Protocol 11 to 
the European Convention, is the abolition of the optional character of the present right to individual 
petition. Under the protocol, the right of individual petition and the competence of the court will 
automatically apply to all participating states. 
128 The Commission used to postpone cases indefinitely to wait for governments' responses, which in 
most cases never came. See Communications 25/89, 47/90 and 100/93 where the government of former 
Zaire "deliberately" ignored the letters from the Commission but the latter kept on writing. 
129 See Communication 25/89 where after four notifications from the Secretariat of the Commission to 
Zaire sirice 1989, the Miriistry of Justice replied and claimed, irI 1993, that none of the letters had been 
received. Subsequent letters also elicited no response and irI 1996 the Commission resolved to go ahead 
and consider the case on the merit without a response. The Commission had also wanted to send a Fact 
Findirig Mission to Zaire, but the government failed to respond to the request. 
130 African Charter article 58(1). 
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request an in-depth study of the situation. 131 The victims of the violations have to await 
the outcome of the study, if and when it is ordered. The African situation contrasts 
sharply with the American Convention which in terms article 41(t) mandates the latter 
to take action in petitions and other communications pursuant to its authority. 132 
3:4:3:2:3 State Reports 
Article 62 of the Charter imposes an obligation upon each state party "to submit every 
two years ... a report on the legislative or other measures taken with the view to giving 
effect to the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed by the present Charter".133 
The reporting procedure of the Charter closely follows that of the UN Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights. 134 
It seeks to establish dialogue with state parties and help them to completely fulfil their 
obligations. The examinations have always been a forum for wide-reaching discussions 
that give valuable indications of how the Commission interprets certain provisions of 
the Charter. Subjects such as peoples' rights, traditional cultural practices and the 
implementation of economic, social and cultural rights have been taken up. 
131 Id article 58(2). 
132 Human Rights in International Law Council of Europe Press (1992) at 311. 
133 African Charter article 62. 
134 The examination begins with the state representative delivering an overview of the report. One 
Conunissioner, the Special Rapporteur, is assigned to study the report in depth and prepare questions 
which are then put to the representative to open the discussion. In practice, these questions are prepared 
by the Secretariat and sent to the rapporteur six weeks in advance so that he can study them and make 
additions if need be. After the questions of the rapporteur, the floor is opened for questions from all the 
Conunissioners. The representative answers as many of these questions as possible and where he fails to 
give convincing answers, the Conunission requests that he send them to its Secretariat in writing. The 
rapporteur then summarises and concludes. 
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Since the Charter entered into force in October 1986, the first reports were due in 
1988, 135 but of the 51 states that had ratified the Charter by ~~~~t:f 1997, only ~6 ~ 
have submitted their reports. The reports submitted vary in quality as well as degree of 
comprehensiveness. 
The examination of these reports is itself questionable: copies of the reports are usually 
not made available to the commissioners, let alone, to NGOs and the general public in 
advance for comments and preparations. The few available copies are usually not 
translated into the working languages137 of the Commission thus restricting debate only 
to those commissioners who understand the language in which the report is written. 138 
Apart from the quality of the reports, the review procedure adopted by the Commission 
is inadequate. Unlike the UN Human Rights Committee which spends at least 1.5 to 2 
days on the examination of a single report, 139 the African Commission spends less that 
two hours on a report. 140 
The value and objectives of the reporting system are determined by the quality of the 
oral questioning which takes place. "What is required are penetrating, detailed and 
probing questions" .141 The quality of state reports could also be significantly improved 
by the availability of reporting guidelines. 
135 Article 62 of the Charter requires that state parties submit reports every two years, from the date the 
Charter came into force. 
136 Tenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (1996/1997) 
-22-26. 
137 The working languages of the Commission are the same as those of the OAU, that is, English, French, 
and any other African language, if possible (article, XXIX of the OAU Charter). 
138 See comments made by Commissioner AB Beye during the examination of the First Periodic Report 
of The Gambia at the Commission's 12th Session, in 1992 in the Transcript produced by the Danish 
Centre for Human Rights, 'Examination of State Reports: 12'h Session, October 1992. Gambia, 
Zimbabwe and Senegal' vol 3 1995, at 30 
139 Examination of State Reports: 12'h Session, October 1992. Gambia, Zimbabwe and Senegal' at 9. 
140 Peter Takirambudde "Six Years of the African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights: An 
Assessment" {l '991) 7:2 Lesotho Law Journal at 58. 
141 Ibid. 
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The Commission has produced a set of guidelines, but in the words of Felice Gear: 
"The Commission has developed reporting guidelines amounting to some 25 pages-extensive 
and exceedingly detailed. They lack specificity about rights outlined in the Charter. They lack 
specificity about the civil and political rights. They can be more confusing than helpful" .142 
Another problem faced by the Commission with its reporting procedure is that some 
states fail to send representatives to present their reports. Even though the Charter does 
not expressly require states to send representatives for the examination of their reports, 
and the Commission's own Rules of Procedure do not make this mandatory, the 
Commission has adopted the practice of the UN Committee whereby, if the state 
representative does not appear, the report will not be considered143 because the 
importance of an exchange of views with the government representative outweighs the 
necessity of going ahead and considering the report. 144 The Commission has thus opted 
not to examine the reports of states whose representatives are not present to discuss the 
reports with the Commission. This has resulted in several reports being deferred, some 
indefinitely.145 
3:4:4 Other functions 
Apart from the mandates of promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights 
entrusted to the Commission under article 45 (1 and 2) of the Charter, article 45 (3) 
empowers the Commission to interpret the provisions of the Charter at the request of 
any state party, an institution of the OAU, or an African organisation recognised by the 
142 Ibid. It should be noted here that the Secretariat has prepared another five-page simplified guideline 
which will be submitted for adoption by the Commission. 
143 However, in the light of repeated failures by certain governments to sent representatives to explain 
their reports, the Committee has adopted a practice that after three failures by a representative to show up, 
it will go ahead with the consideration. The Commission too has taken this stand. At its 23rd ordinary 
session, the Commission decided that if after two sessions a state does not send a representative to present 
its report, it will go ahead and consider the report. 
144 Examination of State Reports, 13th Session April 1993: Nigeria-Togo vol 4 (1995) at 12. 
145 On numerous occasions, the Commission has deferred the consideration of reports to subsequent 
sessions because the states did not send their representatives. For instance, the report of Togo was 
deferred to the 13th session because there was no representative to discuss it at the 12th session; the report 
of Benin, Cape Verde and Ghana which were scheduled for examination during the 13th session were 
deferred to the 14th session; the report of Cape Verde, Benin and Mozambique scheduled for the 14th 
session were postponed to the 15th session and during the 15th session, the report of Mozambique was 
deferred to the 16th all because there were no representatives. The report of Seychelles submitted in 1993 
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OAU. To this effect, the Commission has considered and adopted with mmor 
modifications a number of resolutions submitted to it by NGOs including, Resolutions 
on human rights education;146 the military;147 and contemporary forms of slavery. The 
African Commission has also taken the initiative in interpreting some of the provisions 
of the Charter to suit internationally recognised standards.148 Through the adoption of 
resolutions, the Commission has redefined some of the provisions in the Charter.149 
To date, neither the OAU nor any state party has requested the Commission to exercise 
this function, possibly a sign that they fully understand the provisions in the Charter. 
Article 45 (4) of the Charter also suggests that the Commission should be available to 
perform any other tasks which may be entrusted to it by the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government. The Assembly as a body has not entrusted any specific task to the 
Commission. However, some organs of the OAU have sought co-operation with the 
Commission in their activities. 
There is little doubt that the promotional activities of the Commission have been 
noteworthy and commendable. In collaboration with NGOs and other institutions 
concerned with the promotion of human rights, the Commission has organised 
seminars, workshops, conferences and symposia at which relevant information has been 
has not yet been considered for the same reason. 
146 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 7'h Annual Activity Report vol 4 (1994) 
Resolution on Human Rights Education, See also, Review of the African Commission on Human and 
Peoples' Rights 206 
147 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights B'h Activity Report (1994) 
Resolution on the Military, ACHPRIRPT/8TH Annex VII Rev 1 . 
148 See Communication 101/93 where with regard to Freedom of association the Commission made a 
landmark decision stating that" ... competent authorities should not enact laws which limit the exercise 
of this freedom. The competent authorities should not override constitutional provisions or undermine 
fundamental rights guaranteed by the Constitution and International Human Rights standards". With 
these words, the Commission stated a fundamental principle which applies not only to the freedom of 
association but to all rights. 
149 See Resolution on the Right to Recourse Procedure and Fair Trial, Annex VI; and Resolution on the 
Right to Freedom of Association, Annex VII. 
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disseminated. 150 
In relation to the Commission's protective mandate, serious problems continue to exist 
as evidenced by the carnage in Rwanda, Burundi, Somalia, Nigeria, Liberia, the former 
Zaire and many other parts of Africa. These tragic events have been possible in part 
because of the ineffectiveness of the African system of human rights protection. A 
decade after ,, \its establishment, the impact of the African Commission on Human and X 
Peoples' Rights in Africa is still very limited. 
As the Commission celebrates its Tenth Anniversary in November 1997, it is still faced 
With a lot of constraints, which have to a large extent, retarded its progress and the 
protection of human rights in Africa. At this juncture, it is appropriate to consider some 
of these constraints that have hindered and continue to hinder the effectiveness of the 
African Commission in particular, and the African human rights regime in general. 
150 In October 1992, the Commission organised, in collaboration with the Raoul Wallenburg Institute in 
Sweden, a seminar on the National Implementation of the African Charter in the Internal Legal Systems 
in Africa; The Commission organised in co-operation with the Union of African Journalists, The Tunisian 
Association of Journalists and others, a seminar on the Role of the African Media in the Promotion and 
Protection of Human Rights, held in Tunis, in October 1992. 
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SECTION FOUR 
4:0 Constraints facing the African Commission 
The weakness or strength of any human rights regime revolves around its normative 
and procedural scope, its implementation machinery and the state practice of the 
relevant actors. The major constraints on the African Human Rights Commission stem 
mainly from the following factors: 
• The incoherence and ambiguity of the African Charter itself; 
• Lack of publicity and accessibility; 
• Lack of co-operation and political will; 
• Financial constraints. 
4:1 The African Charter itself 
A thorough analysis of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights reveals that 
"it is the epitome of a legal instrument which prescribes norms but whose framers 
deliberately guarantee that it is a law without teeth". 1 The Charter is often incoherent, 
ambiguous and leaves room for varied interpretations. The Charter has been described 
as a model of"lex imperfecta and simulata". 2 Lex imperfecta (imperfect law) is often a 
conscious design by politicians in response to an aggravated crisis of confidence in a 
way which seeks to reinforce belief in the lego-political system but with a built-in 
planned inefficiency. This is usually manifested in one of two ways 
" ... it may take the form of a law which is backed by an inadequate enforcement system that is 
staffed with exquisite incompetents. Though the law would have prescribed norms of behaviour, 
it would have carefully insulated certain activities from the reach of an enforcement 
mechanism .... 3 [Or] 
". . . it may be a subtle modality for restoring confidence in certain disgraced institutions or 
practices." .4 
1 Peter Takirambudde" Six years after the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: An 
assessment" ( 1991) 7 :2 Lesotho Law Journal at 39. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Ibid. 
4 Ibid. 
The ineffectiveness of the Commission, therefore, has not been entirely accidental. 
Given the origin, record and history of the OAU response in general, and its response to 
matters of human rights violations (on the continent) in particular, the ineffectiveness 
and inefficiency of the Charter and Commission respectively, "had been conscious, 
deliberate and planned". 5 
The OAU has always been very wary in matters regarding sovereignty and power, so 
what it therefore intended to achieve with the Charter was the generation of an 
innocuous instrument which would do no more than provide public catharsis. It was 
simply responding to the unprecedented moral demands of the late 1970s that 
something ought to be done about human rights in Africa. The goal of the Charter was 
not enforceability but rather to "steal the opposition's thunder". 6 
The Banjul Charter offers only general guidance as to what the African Commission 
could do and how it should conduct its business. The Commission's own Rules of 
Procedures that could have helped matters are rather vague and have not been exploited 
The Charter gives the Commission a very broad mandate under article 45 and permits 
the latter under article 60, to "draw inspiration from international law on human and 
peoples' rights ... ".7 However, article 59(1) curtails this extensive power given in article 
60 by requiring that "all measures taken within the provisions of this Charter shall 
remain confidential until such a time as the Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government shall otherwise decide". 8 
The OAU Heads of State were reluctant to grant the African Commission any 
significant role in the protection of human rights; and made sure that its activities were 
primarily promotional. The Charter, for instance, mandates the Commission to receive 
5 Ibid. 
6 /dat40. 
7 African Charter article 60. 
8 African Charter article 59(1). 
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and consider communications from individuals9 but leaves obscured what it should do 
after the consideration, leaving the determination of what should be done with its 
findings to the Assembly of Heads of State. 
Thus, although provision is made for individual complaints that human rights violations 
be considered by the Commission, article 45 does not oblige the Commission to take 
any action, such as awarding damages in individual cases. Unlike the African Charter, 
the Inter-American Commission and the European Commission not only make 
recommendations, they also award damages and compensation to victims. 
An opportunity, as well as a severe constraint was thus laid upon the Commission from 
its very inception. The African Commission does, to be sure, enjoy a significant 
freedom to manoeuvre in exercising its function of promotion of human rights in 
Africa, but is far more limited in its function of protecting these rights. 
The claw-back clauses and the absence of a derogation clause in the Charter also 
present serious limitations on the performance of the Commission. The Charter 
permits states to apply national or domestic laws, but does not specify whether such 
laws must be compatible with its provisions, international standards or be necessary in a 
democratic society. The absence of a derogation clause does not in any way check the 
excesses of states. Thus, the African Commission's ability to provide some external 
restraint in situations where governmental activity contravenes international norms is 
highly questionable. Without precise legal guidelines, the Commission will be severely 
handicapped in dealing with such situations. Most states would always justify their 
actions not in terms of the provisions of the Charter or other international treaties, but in 
terms of their domestic law. 
9 African Charter article 55(1) 
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For example, in response to a complaint by a complainant - Sir Dawda K Jawara10 - to 
the Commission alleging torture, arbitrary arrest and detention by the Gambian military 
government after the July 1994 coup, the government responded thus: 
"How do we reconcile Decrees 57 and 59 with adherence to the African Charter as it relates to 
the liberty of the individual and due process of law ? On the face , these Decrees may be found 
to be objectionable, vis-a-vis the African Charter, but their essence need to be studied and 
placed in the context of the changed circumstances in The Gambia. In fact, article 6 of the 
Charter states 'Every individual shall have the right to liberty and to the security of his person. 
No one may be deprived of his freedom except for reasons and @nditions previously laid down 
, by law ... '. I place emphasis on the underlined words" .11 
Similar references have been made by Nigeria and other states, justifying their actions.12 
The African Charter is the first human rights instrument to incorporate the three 
generations of human rights into one single document and give them the same 
importance in terms of recognition, promotion and protection, and the African 
Commission is therefore obliged to follow suit in their implementation. Considering the 
fragility of African economies, one wonders whether the incorporation of economic and 
social rights in the Charter is actually meant to be enforced by the Commission. This 
aspect in itself exposes the hypocrisy of the African leaders vis-a-vis their commitment 
to human rights protection on the continent. 
Developed countries in Western Europe and the Americas recognise the indivisibility, 
interdependence and inter-relatedness of human rights, but cautious of the difficulties 
involved in the realisation of economic, social and cultural rights, they have opted to 
include the latter rights in separate documents, 13 with a desire to "progressively and in 
pursuance to their internal legislation, and to the extent allowed by their available 
resources and taking into account the degree of their development. .. " to ensure the 
1
° Former Head of State of the Republic of The Gambia, overthrown on 22 July 1994 by the Military. 
11 See Communications 147/95 and 149/96 
12 In response to the Commission's decision on Communication 101/93, in which the Commission 
decided that "the Decree should therefore be annulled", the Nigerian Government argued that such a 
decision was an assault on its sovereignty and claimed that the Commission lacked the judicial capacity 
to do what it did. ( See African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 2nd Extraordinary Session, 
18-19 December 1995Doc11/ES/ACHPR/4.) 
13 See Additional Protocol to the American Convention on Human Rights in the Area of Economics, 
Social and Cultural Rights; The European Social Charter. 
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enjoyment of the rights recognised in the protocol.14 This pattern has also been followed 
by the drafters of the UN Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, article 2 
of which provides that " ..... with a view to achieving progressively the full realisation 
of the rights recognised in the present Covenant. .. ".15 
It is hard to believe that Africa whose economies depend largely on aid from the West 
would be able to guarantee these rights by law. Of the over 20016 communications 
addressed to the Commission under article 55, only two are related to the question of 
these latter rights (Communication 157/96 and Communication 155/96). Very few 
African states have incorporated aspects of economic and social rights into their 
constitutions or other domestic legislation. 17 
The imposition of duties upon the individual and the introduction of collective rights 
into the Charter unduly extend the scope of the African human rights regime and the 
enforcement capacities of the Commission. In terms of article 29, the individual shall 
also have the duty, inter alia, 
" 2, to serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its 
service ... ; 
6, to work to the best of his abilities and competence, and to pay taxes imposed by law in the 
interest of the society ... ; 
8, to contribute to the best of his abilities, and at all levels, to the promotion and achievement of 
African unity ... ". 18 
14 Article 1 of the Additional Protocol to the American Convention in the area of Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights. 
15 Human Rights in International Law Council of Europe Press (1992) at 18. 
16 African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, Register of Communications submitted under 
Article 55. 
17 See the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia ( 1995) No 1. Articles 41 and 42. 
Note that South Africa and Namibia have also incorporated some social rights into their Constitutions, 
e.g. the right to education. 
18African Charter article 29. 
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It has been observed that these duties are a reminder that the African concept of rights 
carries corresponding obligations.19 While the concept of duties in itself is not in 
dispute, the problem arises when it is incorporated into a human rights instrument and 
required to be enforced by law. To what extent are the duties in the African Charter 
enforceable? Aside from the issue of tax evasion which is a crime in itself, can an 
individual be prosecuted because he or she has not placed his or her physical and 
intellectual abilities at the service of the national community? Considering the fact that 
the rights and freedoms guaranteed are not absolute, are there limitations on duties?; 
Can a state derogate from its obligation because an individual failed to perform his or 
her duties recognised in the Charter ? Society itself places some moral restraint on the 
enjoyment of human rights, for instance, the duty to respect elders or one's parents, and 
the duty to take care of one's children. These are moral rather than legal obligations. 
The effect of the Charter provisions on the effectiveness of the Commission is further 
exacerbated by the existence of collective rights. While no incoherence arises directly 
from the coexistence of first and second generation rights, the incorporation of 
collective rights into the Charter lies beyond the available span of attention and 
enforcement capacity of the Commission. 
"The effect is not to strengthen the African human rights regime but rather to undermine the 
impact of the Charter and stretch the extremely scarce resources available for human rights 
[protection] in Africa". 20 
4:2. Lack of awareness and publicity 
In order for the millions of Africans whose rights are embodied in the African Charter 
to concretise them, they must be aware of the rights, of how they can seek redress if the 
rights are violated, of the role of the African Commission in this regard, and of their 
obligations. The Charter itself recognises the need for public awareness and mandates 
the Commission inter alia, to, " ... promote human and peoples' rights and in 
particular. . . organise seminars, symposia and conferences; disseminate information, 
19 Philip Amoah "The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights - An Effective Weapon for Human 
Rights?" (1992) 4 Journal of the African Society of International and Comparative Law at 227. 
20 Id at 52. 
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encourage national and local institutions concerned with human and peoples' 
rights ... ".21 To this end,· the Commission has organised several workshops and 
conferences in collaboration with other institutions. At its third ordinary session held in 
Libreville, Gabon, in April 1988, it started granting observer status to NGOs involved 
in the promotion of human rights. Articles 7522 and 7623 of its Rules of Procedure deal 
with co-operation with NGOs. 
These organisations can propose agenda items to be discussed at the Commission's 
session, they can be consulted and they can take part in deliberations at the public 
sessions of the Commission. 
However, given the widespread ignorance, illiteracy and the uncritical acceptance of 
authority in Africa, the efforts of the Commission and NGOs to create this awareness 
have been largely insignificant. Very few states, if any, have undertaken to educate their 
citizens on the rights and duties enshrined in the Charter as required under article 25.24 
The efforts of some NGOs have at times been thwarted by overzealous politicians who 
benefit from the ignorance of the citizens. 
The problem of publicity has further been compounded by the Commission's narrow 
interpretation of article 59 of the Charter. Article 59(1) provides that all measures taken 
within the provisions of the present Charter (on the procedure of the Commission) shall 
remain confidential until such time as the Assembly of Heads of State shall otherwise 
decide. Article 59(2) states that 'However, the report shall be published by the 
Chairman of the Commission upon the decision of the Assembly ... ". From the 
21 African Charter article 45(1) (a). 
22 Rule 75 - Non-governmental organisations, granted observer status by the Commission, may appoint 
authorised observers to participate in the public sessions of the Commission and of its subsidiary bodies. 
23 Rule 76 - Consultation The Commission may consult the non-governmental organisations either 
directly or through one or several committees set up for this purpose. These consultations may be held 
at the invitation of the Commission or at the request of the organisation. 
24 Article 25 of the Charter provides that "state parties ... shall have the duty to promote and ensure 
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foregoing, it would seem that it is the prerogative of the Assembly of Heads of State 
and Government to decide on or authorise the publication or otherwise of the 
Commission's reports. 
The Commission has in some instances interpreted "measures taken" to mean that it 
cannot disclose the names of states against whom complaints have been filed, it cannot 
describe the nature of the cases before it, 25 and it cannot mention the status of the cases 
pending before it. This restrictive interpretation of the confidentiality clause has been 
problematic as publicity and its resultant public shame have a major deterrent effect in 
preventing future human rights abuses. 
As a result of the restrictive interpretation of this clause, some of the commendable 
efforts of the Commission have gone unnoticed. And as Philip Amoah observes: 
"The Commission has so far tied its own hands by adopting a strict approach towards the issue 
of confidentiality. It has tended not to disclose the names of the states against whom complaints 
have been made. This rather strict adherence to the principle of confidentiality has tended to 
shield the work of the Commission from the public view and scrutiny. The end result has been 
protection of states ( rather than individuals) but exposure of the Commission to charges of 
ineffectiveness and lack of certainty, (vision initiative and vigour)26 about the end result of its 
work. Both situations undermine the confidence of the general public regarding the 
Commission's effectiveness and relevance".27 
In the words of Ellen Sirleaf, the Commission, 
"is generally unknown and invisible, it is regarded with suspicion by those who do know it, as 
seen from the eyes of a casual observer, it is not performing. I do not know of any cases that you 
(the Commission) have resolved relating to any of the major human rights problems recently 
affecting our continent". 28 
The lack of publicity, perhaps more than anything else, has led to the impression among 
potential petitioners that the African Commission is not worth approaching. Therefore, 
in spite of the massive human rights violations that characterise the continent, only a 
through teaching, education and publication the respect of the rights and freedoms .... ". 
25 Amoah note 19 above at 38. 
26 Takirambudde note 1 above at 54. 
27 Amoah note 19 above at 227. 
28 Ellen Sirleaf "African Human Rights NGOs and the African Commission"; in Report on the 
Conference on the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Fund for Peace (1991) at 27. 
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few communications are addressed to the Commission. 
It should however be noted that the Commission has over the years gradually expanded 
its interpretation of the confidentiality clause. The Commission releases documents to 
the public concerning its activities. These include, inter a/ia; its Final Communique at 
the end of each ordinary session, press releases, and its Annual Activity Reports after 
adoption by the OAU Assembly. Until 1994, the Commission published a journal 
entitled Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights, 29 which 
contained articles and information about Commission activities. The information 
contained in these documents however, does not sufficiently publicise the work of the 
Commission especially as regards its deliberations and decisions. The Commission also 
issues a report at the end of each session (Secretary Report), which contains the 
deliberations and decisions of the session, however, this report does not resolve the 
publicity issue as it is a confidential document.30 
Since 1994, some significant improvements have taken place regarding the 
Commission's treatment of confidentiality. The seventh Annual Activity Report of the 
Commission disclosed the status of cases submitted to the Commission, and in the Final 
Communique of the sixteenth session held in 1994, the Commission also published the 
status of communications, and with regard to the submission of periodic reports, the 
Final Communique called by name upon individual states who had not submitted to do 
so.31 
The major drawback of the restrictive interpretation of the confidentiality clause is that 
it deprives the Charter of much of its meaning. Firstly, "experience has shown in other 
human rights systems that publicity and its resultant shame have a major deterrent 
29 The latest edition of this publication is vol. 5 which was published in early 1995. 
30 Evelyn A Ankumah The African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights: Practice and Procedure. 
(1996) at 39. 
31 Review of the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (1994) vol 4. 
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effect in preventing future human rights abuses".32 Secondly, the Commission could 
develop an African human rights jurisprudence by publicising the manner in which it 
reaches its· decisions on admissibility and the substantive rights in the Charter. In the 
absence of such vital information, potential litigants of the African Charter cannot use 
the Commission's decisions as precedents. 
Closely linked to the problem of awareness and publicity is the problem of 
communication with the Commission. Prior to the establishment of its formal 
headquarters, the African Commission met peripatetically in the national capitals of 
OAU member states: in Addis Ababa, 2 November 1987 (ceremonial opening); Dakar, 
8 to 13 February 1988; Libreville 18 to 28 April 1988; Cairo 7 to 26 October 1988, and 
Benghazi 3 to 14 April 1989. The Secretariat of the Commission was established at its 
present location in Banjul, The Gambia, two years after the establishment of the 
Commission itself. 
The location of the headquarters of the Commission in Banjul has been identified as 
one of the most serious problems affecting it. In an Africa where communication is a 
problem, and in a Gambia. where these facilities are hard to come by, communication 
with the Commission is virtually impossible. Valuable time and scarce resources are 
spent on communications which would have been avoided had the headquarters been 
situated elsewhere. The most reliable and quickest method to communicate with the 
Commission is by fax or telex, at the same time, these seem to be the most expensive 
not only for the limping Commission, but also for those who wish to communicate with 
it. The Secretariat has restricted its fax services to those cases it terms "very urgent", 
while all other correspondence is sent by post. 
Postal services in Africa as a whole and The Gambia in particular, are very unreliable. 
Most letters posted to the Commission within Africa take on average o,f one month to 
be received. In most cases, especially on matters relating to individual or NGO 
communications, the Commission usually requests more information (in some cases 
three or four times) from the complainants in order to consider their communications. If 
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the complainant is to rely on the postal service, which is usually the case, about six 
months can be spent on exchange of correspondence alone. In such circumstances, 
before the Commission is seized of a matter, the damage, would most likely already 
have been done. 
In like manner, when the Commission responds to institutions, NGOs and individuals 
seeking information, or when the Commission sends out information, for instance, 
invitations, state reports etc etera. by post, they more often than not fail to reach their 
destination on time. Some NGOs have complained seriously about the non or late 
reception of invitations, and this has prompted one NGO leader to lament that " ... When 
one writes to the Banjul Office, one rarely gets a response and NGOs do not receive 
materials or notices of meetings sufficiently in advance".33 
Due to the heavy expenses involved in sending information to the Commission, many 
already cash-strapped African NGOs, are reluctant to take up cases of human rights 
violations to the Commission. 
The Commission is located in a country in which less than 20 of the 54 African 
countries have Embassies or High Commissions. This means that for other states access 
to information or follow-ups on the Commission's decisions are difficult and.expensive. 
For states that have diplomatic missions in The Gambia, the Commission simply 
addresses all inquires concerning them to their Missions or Embassies for onward 
transmission to the appropriate authorities. This arrangement facilitates the work of the 
Commission and is less expensive. 
Most Africans are unaware of the Commission not only because of its limited impact, 
but also because of its location. The Gambia is a small "snake-like" country, almost 
surrounded by Senegal, with just over one million inhabitants. It has one of the poorest 
economies on the continent that attempts to survive on tourism and groundnuts. Until 
July 1994 when the military seized power, the country was almost unknown. Most 
32 Ankumah note 30 above at 77. 
33 EG Bello The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights: A legal analysis vol 4 (1985) 9 24. 
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Africans do not know the address of the Commission, let alone how to address 
themselves to it. 
Another disadvantage of this location is that The Gambia has no university or other 
facilities for human rights research. The documentation centre of the Commission is 
poorly equipped as regards both materials and information. These conditions do not 
attract the most competitive and competent Africans who otherwise might seek 
employment with the African Commission. 
It should be mentioned here that at its 22nd ordinary session held in Banjul, the 
Gambia, the Commission decided that if by the next session, the host country had not 
taken positive steps to build a modem structure for the Commission, it will request the 
OAU to invite other members to bid for the hosting of the Commission. This decision 
was taken after members expressed dismay at the isolation of the Commission due to 
lack of information resulting from the location of its headquarters. They complain that 
the activities of the Commission are not known to the outside world because there are 
no modem facilities to enable the Commission sell its commodities. 
4:3. Financial constraints and secretarial problems 
The serious financial problems facing most African states have not only affected the 
OAU, but have also taken a toll on the African Commission. Despite repeated appeals 
to the Secretary-General of the OAU and to the OAU Assembly itself for more funds, 
the Commission seems to have achieved very little.34 The Assembly has authorised the 
Commission to accept donations, gifts and other contributions from other sources to 
enable it to discharge its functions.35 The European Community, the UN Centre for 
Human Rights and other Human Rights NGOs and semi-governmental bodies have 
provided and continue to provide human, material and financial assistance to keep 
operations at the Secretariat to the hearest minimum level. 
34 See Sixth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission (1992-1993) at 7 paragraph 23(a), the 
Commission stated that "In spite of serious administrative and financial shortcomings and the repeated 
requests of the Commission, no substantial measure has been taken to resolve this situation". 
35 Ibid. 
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Financial assistance from the Raoul Wallenburg Institute in Sweden, for example, has 
been used for inter-session promotional activities and funding of on-site missions.36 It 
should be noted that the OAU does not provide funds for promotional activities.37 The 
Raoul Wallenberg Institute continues to finance the promotional activities of the 
Commission, including missions undertaken by Commissioners and the publication of 
the Commission's Review. 38 
The first extraordinary session of the Commission held in 1989 was to discuss the poor 
financial state of the body.39 In spite of the concerns raised by the commissioners, and 
the continuous requests made to the OAU Secretary-General for additional funds, 
drastic cuts are still being made to the operational budget of the Commission with a 
total reduction of about 25% for the year 1993/1994 alone.40 As the table below shows, 
subvention from the OAU has been falling, leaving the Commission with no alternative 
but to look elsewhere - donor aid. 
36 Tenth Annual Activity Report of the African Commission on Human and Peoples Rights ( 1996/1997) at 
8. 
37 See note 34 above at 7 paragraph 20. 
38 Ibid. 
39 See Recommendation of the Commission AHG/165 (XXV) Annex XV. 
40 Note 34 above at 7. 
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The budget allocated by the OAU to the Commission for the 1991 to 1994 financial 
years stood as follows: 
Code Description Appropriations Actual Appropriations Increased 
1992-1993 Expenditure 1993-1994 (Decreased 
1991-1992 
100 Est. Post 85,614.00 69,336.00 101,771.00 32,435.00 
101 Post Adjust 23,942.00 12,397.00 21,182.00 8,785.00 
102 Temp.ASST. 1,000.00 1023.00 1,500.00 477.00 
103 OT Pay 250.00 276.00 250.00 -26.00 
104 Comm. 55,000.00 34000.00 33,000.00 -1,000.00 
Honorarium 
204-212 Common Staff 117,375.00 43,777.00 79,098.00 35,321.00 
Costs 
300 Official Mission 20,000.00 18,599.00 20,000.00 1,401.00 
401-406 Maint. Costs 19,000.00 13,700.00 16,500.00 2,800.00 
501-504 Communication 7,000.00 6,465.00 6,500.00 35.00 
Costs 
600-610 Supplies and 12,700.00 44,596.00 16.000.00 -28,596.00 
Services 
800 Meetings 160.000.00 188,438.00 135,000.00 -53,438.00 
TOTAL 501,881.00 432,607.00 430,801.00 -1,806.00 
.. . . Source: Seventh Annual Activity Report of the ACHPR,1994; see also Review of the African Cormmss1on on 
Human and Peoples' Rights vol 4 1994 at .156. 
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As can be seen from the table above, the basic needs of the Commission, such as 
recruitment of professional staff, establishment of a documentation centre, promotional 
activities etc etera. were not catered for. The Commission had to source elsewhere to 
carry out its activities, while continuing its plea to the OAU Secretariat.41 The budget 
for the period 1996/1997 and 1997/1998 is no different. As the table below indicates, in 
spite of the increase in the items required by the Commission, there has not been a 
corresponding increase in financial allocations. 
Approbation U.S.$ Approbation U.S.$ 
Accounts no. Titles 1996-1997 1997-1998 
SECTION I SALARIES AND WAGES 
100 Establish posts 108,000.00 109,500.00 
101 Post Adjustment Allowance 27,000.00 28.000,00 
102 Temporary Assistance 10,400.00 10.400,00 
103 Overtime Payment 400.00 400.00 
104 Commissioner's Honorarium 33,000.00 33,000.00 
TOTAL SECTION I 178,800.00 181,300.00 
SECTION II COMMON STAFF COST 
41 Since the establishment of the Commission, all its Activity Reports to the OAU Assembly have carried 
this plea, but there has still been no success. "Due to financial problems, facing the OAU, several 
projects of the Commission had to be suspended. This only made the situation of the Commission 
worse. The Commission is appealing to the OAU Secretariat to provide the Commission's Secretariat 
with the equipment it needs to carry out its functions .. " Tenth Annual Activity Report, (1996) at 7-8. 
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201 Travel on Home Leave 41,210.00 14,598.00 
202 Travel on Transfer 
203 Installation Allowance 
204 Dependency Allowance 6,400.00 6,800.00 
205 Housing Allowance 36,480.00 36,480.00 
206 O.A.U. Pension Fund 15,120.00 15,330.00 
207 O.A.U. Insurance Scheme 
208 O.A.U. Medical Scheme 5,000.00 5,000.00 
212 Education Allowance 31,250.00 31,250.00 
218 Acting Allowance 1,000.00 1,000.00 
TOTAL SECTION II 136,480.00 110,458.00 
300 Official mission 15,000.00 15,000.00 
TOTAL SECTION III 15,000.00 15,000.00 
SECTION IV RENTAL AND MAINTENANCE 
401 (i) Maintenance of vehicles 4,000.00 4,000.00 
401 (ii) Fuel Costs 5,000.00 5,000.00 
402 Maintenance of Equipment 2,000.00 2,000.00 
403 Maintenance of Premises 1,500.00 1,500.00 
404 Utilities (Electricity and Water) 5,000.00 5,000.00 
405 Alteration of Premises 
406 Insurance of Vehicles, Equipment, etc. 3,000.00 3,000.00 
TOTALSECTIONN 20.500,00 20,500.00 
SECTION V COMMUNICATION 
500 Cables 1,500.00 1,500.00 
501 Telephone Services 3,800.00 3,800.00 
502 Postage 1,000.00 1,000.00 
503 Pouches 
504 Freight 
TOTAL SECTION V 6,300.00 6,300.00 
SECTION VI SUPPLIES AND SERVICES 
MISCELLANEOUS 
600 Stationary and Office Supplies 5,000.00 5,000.00 
601 Bank Charges and Revenue Stamps 1,000.00 1,000.00 
603 Ordinary Hospitality 1,000.00 1,000.00 
604 Staff Welfare 
605 Library Books and Service 500.00 500.00 
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606 Subscription to Newspapers 500.00 500.00 
607 Other Supplies and Services 500.00 600.00 
608 Printing of Documents 5,000.00 5,000.00 
TOTAL SECTION VI 13,500.00 13,600.00 
SECTION VII CAPITAL ASSETS 
700 Land and Building 
701 Improvement to Premises 
702 Furniture and Fixtures 
703 Office Equipment 3,000.00 
704 Internal Reproduction Equipment 
705 Telecommunications Equipment 
707 Purchase of Vehicles 18,000.00 
708 Interpretation Equipment 
709 Other Equipment 
TOTAL SECTION VII 21,000 
SECTION VIII CONFERENCE AND 
MEETINGS 
800 ACHPR Meetings 180,000.00 180,000.00 
900 Joint Projects 17,000.00 15,000.00 
TOTAL SECTION VIII 197.000,00 195,000.00 
GRAND TOTAL 588,000.00 542,158.00 
.. Source: Report of the Secretary to the African Comnuss10n on Human and Peoples' Rights, subrmtted at the 
Commission's 21 51 Ordinary session held from April 15 to 24 1997. 
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Though in existence for ten years now, the Commission still lacks an efficient, effective 
and functioning Secretariat. "Since the entry into force of the African Charter, and the 
establishment of the Commission, the latter has suffered from a chronic lack of staff, 
resources and services necessary for the effective discharge of its functions".42 Until 
November 1996, the Secretariat had only one professional staff member, the Secretary 
to the Commission, and a few supporting staff.43 
In spite of the broad promotional mandate of the Commission, no documentation centre 
has been established to assist in this regard. The Secretariat also faces the lack of 
translation and related services. In the absence of such services, the Commission is 
prevented from conducting a thorough examination of states' reports submitted under 
article 62 of the Charter, and other vital documents. 
Operating with inadequate staff and devoid of equipment and financial resources, it is 
hardly surprising that several lapses appear to have occurred with regard to 
communications and interaction with NGOs; dissemination of documents; translation of 
documents; responses to requests for information; etc etera. 
Some human rights commentators have, however, retorted to the assertion that the root 
cause of the budgetary problem of the Commission is " the serious financial problems 
of the parent OAU''. Makau disagrees and claims that 
42 Ibid. 
" ... the Commission's troubles are not due to the lack of resources in Africa but to the misuse of 
those resources [and the lack of interest by states in the work of the Commission]. One is struck 
in Africa ... by the number of government dignitaries driving fancy imported cars and enjoying 
other luxuries; [the number of trips made abroad and the number of persons in each delegation]. 
If every government [in Africa] were to give up one Mercedes Benz, the Commission would be 
fully funded. So it is a matter of priorities ... ".44 
43 These include: an accountant, a bilingual secretary, a receptionist, a filing clerk, two drivers, a cleaner 
and two watchman. It is worth noting that the Danish Centre has provided funding for the recruitment of 
two lawyers, an administrator, a documentalist and a bilingual secretary. This, it is hoped will go a long 
way to strengthen the Secretariat. 
44 The lack of interest on the Commission could also be attributed to the poor showing of the 
Commission itself on the continent. It's activities are unknown and states rarely hear about the 
Commission. 
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It is worth mentioning here that the problems at the Commission's Secretariat might 
soon become a thing of the past thanks to a donation from the Danish Government 
through the Danish Centre for Human Rights, DCHR. The government has donated 
eight computers and two printers to the Secretariat, provided funds for the recruitment 
of five professional staff; two lawyers, one press officer, one administrative officer and 
one documentalist. Prior to this gesture, the Centre annually sponsored a lawyer from 
Denmark to work at the Secretariat. Since 1996, the African Society of International 
and Comparative Law has sponsored two lawyers to the Secretariat for a period of 
twelve months; and has provided computers and printers. Prior to this, the Secretariat 
had only one typewriter, one computer and one printer. It is hoped that in the near 
future, the Commission will be complaining not about the lack of resources but about 
the growing workload. 
4:4. The lack of political will and co-operation from states 
The experience of the European and American Commissions shows that for several 
years, they had to deal with antagonistic governments who were very sceptical of the 
Commissions. Given the shallow foundations of the African Commission, the 
challenges of human rights that it must confront are enormous. Not only does it struggle 
with meagre resources, it also faces serious doubts from the leaders that established it 
about its efficacy and powers. State parties have woefully failed to comply with their 
obligations under article 62 of the Charter.45 As pointed out, not only do they fail to 
submit their periodic reports, those who do, submit poor quality reports and some do 
not even bother to send representatives to come and present their reports as demanded 
by the Commission. 
Very few states, if any, have incorporated the provisions of the Charter into their 
domestic legislation in conformity with the OAU Assembly's Resolution No 
AHG/165/(XXV), Annex XI of 1989; and even fewer have taken steps to "promote and 
ensure through teaching, education and publication ... of the rights and freedoms 
45 Of the 52 states party to the Charter, only 22 had submitted their reports by October 1998. 
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contained in the present Charter ... ". 46 
Most of the states have deliberately decided to ignore to comply with the 
recommendations of the Commission.47 The Commission has no established 
mechanism to follow up compliance with its recommendations. In communication No 
101/93/Nigeria, for instance, the Commission decided that "... the decree should 
therefore be annulled", but the government of Nigeria instead violated the rights further. 
When the complainant brought the matter back to the Commission, complaining of 
non- compliance, the Commission did nothing. 
The Commission seems helpless in the face of all these obstacles. Some countries like 
Nigeria have tried to intimidate the Commission by charging that the Commission is 
acting ultra vires and has no judicial authority to make such recommendations. 48 
African leaders favour and do co-operate more with the UN Committee than with the 
African Commission. Most of the African states that have not submitted their periodic 
reports to the Commission have done so to the Human Rights Committee. For example, 
Togo, Cameroon, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Central African Republic and 
Gabon have all submitted their initial reports to the Committee.49 Cameroon for 
instance, submitted its second periodic report to the Committee in February 199650 but 
has not submitted even its initial report to the African Commission. This demonstrates 
lack of trust and confidence in the institution. 
46 Article 25 of the Charter. 
47 Nigeria and the former Republic of Zaire have failed or refused to comply with the Commission's 
decisions on Communications 101/93 and 25/92 respectively. 
48 In a letter written to the Commission by the government in reaction to the latter's decision on 
communications against the former, the Nigerian government charged that the Commission has assaulted 
its sovereignty; that it lacks judicial capacity; that it is adopting unconventional procedures and that the 
Commission has breached the confidentiality clause in the Charter. It is worth mentioning that the 
Commission's reaction to this was equally firm. 
49 Official Records of the Human Rights Committee vol II (1988-1989) (New York 1995) CCPR/8/Add 1 
at 13. 
50 See UN Doc CCPR/C/63/Addl. 
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In a bid to address this situation, the Secretariat of the Commission drafted a "resolution 
on states' compliance with the Commission's decisions", for consideration and adoption 
by the Commission during its 22nd ordinary session. This resolution came against the 
backdrop of the wanton disregard and disrespect demonstrated by some state parties to 
the African Charter for the Commission's decisions. Decisions taken on 
communications are usually ignored, and in some cases, where the Commission has 
invoked Rule 111 of its Rules of Procedure calling for the implementation of 
provisional measures, these have not been heeded. 
Despite numerous appeals from the Secretariat of the Commission, reminding states of 
the necessity of complying with its decisions, nothing seems to have changed. There is 
no doubt that such attitudes have negative effects on the activities of the Commission. 
Not only does it indicate to the complainant that the Commission is a "toothless bull-
dog", it also has telling moral consequences for the commissioners who sit to deliberate 
on these cases and see nothing coming from "their sweat". Also, such attitudes tend to 
cripple rather than enhance the work of the Commission and other human rights 
workers in Africa, and retard the development of a viable human rights regime on the 
continent. 
It would be a grave mistake for states to assume that because the Commission is vested 
only with recommendatory powers, it is debarred from adopting decisions, and/or 
resolutions, especially in special cases within the framework of its competence, which 
make determinations or are intended to be operative. 
The Commission is bound by the Charter to consider communications fully, carefully 
and in good faith. When the Commission concludes that a communication describes a 
real violation of the Charter's provisions, its duty is to make that clear to the state party 
and indicate what action the government must take to remedy the situation. 
The table below summarises the number of decisions the Commission has taken on the 
substantive issues of the communications submitted to it since its establishment in 
1987. It illustrates the level of co-operation received by the Commission from state 
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parties in the promotion and protection of human rights on the continent. In all the 
communications, the Commission has found the states concerned guilty of serious 
human rights violations, especially the civil and political rights. 
COMMUNICATION STATE DATE/SESSION OF 
DECISION REMARK 
1 16/88, 17/88 & 18/88 Benin 16th session, November No response 
1994 
2 25/89, 47/90, 56/91, 19th session, March No response 
100/93 Zaire 1996 
3 27/89, 46/91, 49/91, 20th session, October No response 
99193 Rwanda 1996 
21st session, April 1997 recommendation 
4 39190 Cameroon partially implemented 
5 59/91 Cameroon 16th session, November No response 
1994 . 
6 60/91 Nigeria 16th session, November No response 
1994 
7 64192, 68/92 & 78/92 Malawi 16th session, November No response 
1994 
8 71/92 Zambia 20th session, October No response 
1996 
9 74/92 Chad 18th session, October No response 
1995 
10 87/93 Nigeria 16th session, Nov. 1994 No response 
11 101/93 Nigeria 17th session, March No response 
1995 
12 103/93 Ghana 20th session, October No response 
1996 
13 129/94 Nigeria 17th session, March No response 
1995 
14 159/97 Angola 22nd session, November No response 
1997 
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From the above table, one may conclude that the ineffectiveness of the African Human 
Rights system in general, and the African Commission in particular, is not due to a lack 
of financial or human resources, but rather to the lack of political will and co-operation 
from those capable of strengthening the system. This lack of interest and co-operation is 
not only demonstrated with regard to the Commission's decisions, but is also 
manifested in the submission of periodic reports and valuable information requested by 
the Commission. 
4:5 Incompatibility and competing obligations of commissionership 
There is no doubt that the effectiveness of any institution derives for the most part from 
its credibility and reputation. Nothing discourages the public desire to send 
communications to the Commission more than rumours and perceptions of 
ineffectiveness arising from possible conflicts of interest, a situation which tends to 
render illusory the obligation imposed upon Commissioners "to make a solemn 
declaration to discharge their duties impartially and faithfully". 51 The functions of the 
Commission have been further undermined by the competing obligations of the 
members of the Commission 
" ... because [all] the commissioners have full-time obligations and because they sometimes get 
as little as two weeks notice of the biannual meeting, they are not always able to attend even the 
two sessions52 the Commission does hold per year. This is a significant problem not only 
because it further disrupts the continuity of the Commission's work but also because the 
51African Charter article 38. 
52 The European Commission holds about eight sessions per year each lasting at least two weeks. 
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Commission requires a quorum in order to take decisions at its sessions. If no quorum exists, as 
was the case at the meeting in March 1991, the decision must be postponed until the following 
session six months later, aggravating delays which are already impeding the progress of the 
Commission's work". 53 
53 Isaac Nguema, "Legal and Infrastructural Constraints on the Commission", Conference on the African 
Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights Fund for Peace (1991) atl 4-15. 
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SECTION FIVE 
5:0 Perfecting the African Human Rights System 
5:1 Introduction 
While it is not easy to establish a "perfect" working mechanism at first instance, it is 
not impossible to put in place a credible working system over time. The world changes 
every day and new developments and ideas on how to improve the lives of its 
inhabitants come to mind. Framers or drafters of legal instruments or agreements might 
not have been able to foresee certain changes at the time of drafting; or might have had 
a particular motive in mind, such that as soon as that is accomplished, the agreement 
became irrelevant; and the need for revising the agreement or mechanism becomes 
inevitable. In some instances, treaties are created to achieve a particular goal within a 
specific period and as soon as that is done, the treaty is dead. 
The recognition of the need for a possible amendment of an agreement at some future 
stage has necessitated drafters of almost all treaties to outline procedures for any such 
alteration. Amendments have been made to various agreements, ranging from bilateral 
and multilateral treaties and even regional and global agreements. For instance, the 
ECOWAS Treaty signed in Lagos in 1975 was revised in 1993; countries in Eastern 
and Southern Africa decided in 1993 to replace the Preferential Trade Area (PTA) with 
the Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); the European 
Convention established in 1950 has eleven protocols while the Inter American 
Convention has at least two. The African Charter for its part has two draft protocols. 
There are also calls for the revision of the structure of the UN. 
All these measures are being taken to "perfect" a system that was put in place without 
certain shortcomings in mind, and as these institutions face future challenges, there 
shall be need for further amendments. 
The African human rights regrme m general, and its enforcement mechanism m 
particular, can be improved through the following measures: 
• Revision of the African Charter; 
• Establishment of sub-regional Commissions; 
• Establishment of a continental court; 
• Redefining the role of the OAU Assembly in the protection of human rights. 
5:2 Revision of the African Charter 
5:2:1 Introduction 
The African Charter was adopted only seventeen (17) years ago, and came into force 
less than twelve (12) years ago. It would seem premature to talk about the revision of 
the Charter at this stage. However, it should be noted that the effectiveness of the 
African human rights system revolves around the Charter. The failure or success of the 
Commission is determined first by the substantive and procedural provisions of the 
Charter and the powers accorded it therein. 
The preamble to the Charter is the first pointer towards such a revision. Like the OAU 
Charter, the Banjul Charter still recognises the eradication of colonialism, Zionism and 
apartheid; and adheres to the principles of non-alignment for the promotion and 
protection of human rights on the continent. While these stands could have been 
paramount and fundamental at the time of formulation and adoption of the Charter, 
there is no doubt that if the same drafters were to assemble today, they would eliminate 
most of these principles. No country in Africa is still under colonial rule, apartheid has 
been abolished, the cold war is over and there is little or no cause for alignment. The 
aspirations expressed in the preamble can be seen throughout the provisions of the 
Charter. 
The Charter does not empower the Commission to amend or revise, or even to suggest 
an amendment suo moto. By virtue of article 68, only a state party can make a written 
request to that effect, to the OAU Secretary-General. From the wording of this article, it 
would seem that the state party proposing the amendment must have a draft ready. "The 
148 
Assembly of Heads of State and Government may only consider the draft after all the 
states have been duly informed of it and the Commission has given its opinion on it at 
the request of the sponsoring state". 
There is no doubt that the drafting pattern of the Charter and the provisions and 
concepts contained therein are a source of concern for the commissioners. The 
effectiveness of the Commission depends for the most part on how the Charter is 
drafted. Much as the Commissioners may wish to demonstrate some dynamism in their 
interpretation of the Charter, they are constrained by certain provisions. The 
Commission is very conscious of the difficulties posed by the Charter in its efforts to 
protect and promote human rights on the continent, and as such has included the 
Revision of the Charter on the agenda of its past four sessions. Every now and then, 
when NGOs criticise the commissioners for not doing enough, the latter always refer to 
the limited powers accorded them in the Charter. But can the commissioners overcome 
these limitations? And if so, how? 
An example may prove helpful in attempting a response to these questions. A careful 
interpretation of the provisions of the Charter dealing with "other communications" will 
reveal that if the commission were to limit itself to those provisions, the protection of 
human rights would be an illusion. The cumbersome and time consuming procedure to 
be followed renders the whole idea of human rights protection a mockery (see articles 
55 -59). The Commission has managed, to some extent, to circumvent this cumbersome 
procedure by not only adopting international standards, but also by outlining in its rules 
of procedure how to handle such cases. The Commission has undertaken on-site visits 
to member states to investigate human rights abuses; it has been able to use Rule 111 of 
its Rules of Procedure (provisional measures) to prevent irreparable damage being 
caused to victims. However, even this has not been enough to improve the situation. 
Commissioners are still very reluctant to "over-stretch" their power; complainants have 
very little confidence in the system; activities of the Commission are still distanced 
from the people; and decisions of the Commission are often ignored. 
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While the Charter served to put human rights on the agenda of African states and lend 
respectability to those pursuing human rights work in national contexts, it is no longer 
appropriate as the continental centre-piece of the project to ensure well defined and 
enforceable human rights throughout Africa. The enforcement mechanism it creates has 
been prevented from performing effectively by the way in which it is drafted. 
The Charter, when viewed from its historical context reveals that it was essentially an 
instrument of the anti-colonial struggle which at the time of its formulation and 
adoption, was a central preoccupation of Africa. To a considerable degree therefore, the 
Charter was a political statement rather than a legal document intended to be a workable 
domestic Bill of Rights. 
It should therefore be revisited and transformed from an anti-colonial tract to the precise 
and enforceable human rights treaty which could be incorporated and applied by 
domestic courts, and monitored and ultimately adjudicated upon and enforced by a 
regional tribunal. 
The Commission can therefore revise the Charter and lobby a state party within the 
OAU to sponsor it. After all, some African leaders have also been calling for the 
revision of the Charter. Thus it is appropriate, at this stage in the history of Africa, to 
revise the Charter, and more particularly, the strategy for creating an effective human 
rights protection system for the people of Africa. 
5:2:2 Factors to bear in mind 
In drafting a new Human Rights Charter for Africa at this time and age, the drafters 
should take the following into account: 
• Since the late 1980s, there has been a significant change in international politics, 
especially on the continent of Africa; colonialism has been eradicated, apartheid has 
been abolished, the cold war has ended, etc etera. 
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• The end of the cold war and the collapse of the Soviet Union have had a significant 
impact upon attitudes in and towards Africa. Armed struggles of liberation 
movements, materially supported by either the East or the West; dictatorships; and 
collectivists suspicious of human rights limitations upon sovereignty, have been 
virtually wiped out. Today, pluralism and democracy are increasingly embraced and 
practised and national bills of rights have set standards with a precision and 
substance well in advance of the Charter. 
• Some of the concepts in the Charter which seem to be unique to Africa, should also 
be reconsidered in the light of certain contemporary realities. Concepts such as 
"Peoples' Rights and Duties" should be carefully researched and analysed. 
• The role of the different OAU organs must also be critically examined. What is the 
role of the OAU Assembly, the Council of Ministers, the Secretary-General? How 
do all these organs affect the work of the Commission, and how do they enhance the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples' rights on the continent. For 
instance, some analysts have questioned the rationale of article 42( 5) of the Charter, 
which states that the Secretary General of the OAU "may attend the meetings 
(whether public or private), of the Commission. He shall neither participate in 
deliberations nor shall he be entitled to vote .... ". Why then is he/she expected to 
attend? Is he an envoy of the Assembly to oversee who says what? Even though in 
practice he doesn't attend and/or interfere with the deliberations of the Commission 
(at least from the public eye), this particular provision invites suspicion and 
speculation. 
5:2:3 Content of the "Revised African Charter" 
A human rights treaty, be it for Africa, Asia or Europe, must have features of a legally 
binding instrument, capable of being enforced by a tribunal. The African Charter as it 
currently stands exhibits very few such features and this partly accounts for the 
perceived inefficiency of the Commission. A Human Rights Charter for a continent like 
Africa with its diverse cultures and legal systems would embrace, but not be limited to, 
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the following: 
5:2:4 Civil and Political Rights 
The civil and political rights which should be embodied in the Charter include, but not 
limited to, the following: 
• right to life 
• right to personal liberty 
• freedom from torture and forced labour 
• protection from discrimination 
• right to participate in government 
• freedom of religion and worship 
• freedom of expression and the right to information 
• freedom of association and assembly 
• freedom of movement 
• the right to administrative justice 
• right to family life and the protection of the family from unwarranted interference 
• right to privacy of all kinds 
• children's rights 
• women's rights 
These rights should be made justiciable at both national and regional levels. 
5:2:5 Economic Social and Cultural Rights 
These rights should include: 
• right to work 
• adequate standard of living 
• health 
• education 
• shelter 
• right to own property 
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• practice of one's culture 
• to form trade unions 
• to strike 
• to leisure 
Unlike the former rights, these rights should be included in the Charter only as directive 
principles of state policy. This will be a constant reminder to states. 
5:2:6 Collective rights 
These should include all those in the present Charter, including the right of a people to 
assistance ( collective self-defence or security). 
5:2:7 Duties 
While appreciating the correlation between individual liberty and responsibility, it is 
unclear how these duties could be enforced by a human rights body. These duties place a 
moral rather than a legal obligation on the individual. Traditionally, these duties are 
owed to other individuals and the community in which the individual lives. If the 
Charter is to impose a duty on the individual against the state, it should be unambiguous. 
They should be duties capable of being legally enforced, and not at the expense of the 
guaranteed rights. 
5:2:8 Derogation 
All the civil and political rights shall be justiceable. The rights should be stated broadly, 
with a general limitation clause. The Charter should also state in detail the 
circumstances under which this derogation can take place and the procedure to be 
followed, before, during and after the derogation. Above all else, the Charter must 
stipulate those rights that are non-derogable, under whatever circumstances. 
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5:2:9 Procedures and applicable principles 
The procedure for inter-state communication appears adequate. However, the procedure 
for individual communication is in need of thorough consideration. Article 58 becomes 
redundant. The conditions for admissibility are satisfactory save for article 56( 4) which 
appears to present a problem. The requirement that the communication should not be 
based exclusively on news disseminated by the news media is irrelevant, especially if 
we take into account that before a complaint is lodged, the complainant must have 
exhausted local remedies. Also, there is little doubt that NGOs do not go to the 
government to ask whether they have violated human rights, they rely on the media for 
information. And NGOs always investigate these press reports before acting on them. 
Other controversial articles which seem to be a hindrance to the effective development 
of human rights in Africa are articles 58 and 59. There is no reason, for instance, for the 
Commission to draw the attention of the OAU Assembly, let alone its Chairman, before 
considering a communication. What if the Assembly has just met and is to meet again 
after 12 months. Should the victims wait for 12 months? What if the matter is against 
the state of the sitting Chairman? Will he request an in-depth study against his own 
country? Provisions like article 58, therefore, should have no place in the new Charter. 
5:2:10 State Party Obligations 
The state parties to the Charter shall undertake to be bound by the following: 
• Reporting system every two years. 
• Each state party to the Charter shall undertake to make at least seven non-civil and 
political rights justiceable. Three of these rights shall be compulsory, to be enforced 
by all state parties. These include: 
- right to primary education; 
- right to basic health care; 
- right to peace. 
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5:2:11 General Provisions 
These include coming into force, headquarters, remuneration and secretariat equipment, 
number of sessions per year, ratification, adherence, special protocols and amendments. 
5:3 The establishment of Sub-Regional Commissions 
It may seem strange that, while Europe is "merging" its human rights enforcement 
mechanisms to create a single European Human Rights Court, I am advocating the 
creation of sub-regional commissions in Africa. 
But as indicated earlier, western European states were culturally identifiable units with 
the cause of individual human right firmly rooted in their past. Moreover, their citizens 
had a long-standing culture of individual liberty. They were aware of their rights and 
responsibilities, and knew the limits of State actions. Institutions such as the police, the 
army, the judiciary etc. etera. which were usually the main institutions for the protection 
of human rights, all understood their respective roles and were equipped for the task. In 
short, the European human rights system has now advanced to a stage where it focuses 
on protection with little or nothing emphasis on promotion. (The recent merger of the 
protection system bears testimony to this assertion). The Convention does not confer on 
the Commission any promotional power. 
This is in sharp contrast to the African system, where more than half of the population 
is unaware of the rights and freedoms guaranteed in the Charter. Institutions for the 
protection of these rights are still very weak and "controlled" mainly by the executive 
branch of government. Laws imposed during the colonial and one party era are still in 
the statutes books of most of the African countries. In such an "arid condition'', the 
protection of human rights cannot grow. People must be aware of their rights and 
freedoms, institutions have to be equipped and archaic laws repealed to allow for a 
human rights culture to flourish. 
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The promotion and protection of human rights could be achieved simultaneously if sub-
regional commissions, entrusted with promotional activities are established alongside 
the creation of a continental court. Apart from their promotional activities, the 
commissions shall receive communications from complainants within their regions and 
process them in accordance with the provisions of the "Charter". As far as accessing the 
court is concerned, the Commissions "could form a kind of barrier - a practical 
necessity well known to all jurists - which would weed out frivolous or mischievous 
petitions"1 The commissions shall represent citizens at the continental court, in case of 
any appeal from states. 
The creation of these commissions shall also bring the human rights subject closer to 
the people and they shall collaborate effectively with NGOs within their regions. It will 
create a sense of identity and cohesiveness amongst the few States involved and will 
also generate a desire to work in a small rather than a large group. 
These sub-regional commissions can improve the effectiveness of the present human 
rights protection system; they can be of significant relevance where there is insufficient 
protection at national level or where continental or universal instruments are not 
respected. 
It is therefore reasonable, on practical grounds, to set up sub-regional regional 
arrangements for promotion and protection of human rights which should not differ 
from each other, in that the rights to be protected should be essentially the same and are 
substantially those established under the Charter. This reasoning can be supported by at 
least two arguments. Firstly, given the diversity of the modem state system, it is natural 
that sub-regional arrangements of enforcement would be more readily accepted than 
global arrangements. A state cannot be forced to submit itself to a system of 
international control and will do so only if it has confidence in the system. It is much 
more likely to have such confidence if the machinery has been set up by a group of like-
minded countries which may already be partners in a regional organisation, than if this 
is not the case. Moreover, a state will be willing to surrender more power to a regional 
1 MW Janis & Richard S Kay European Human Rights Law (1990) at 39. 
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organ of restricted membership, in which the other members are its friends and 
neighbours, than to a world - wide organ in which it and its associates play a relatively 
small part. Secondly, on a more practical level, it is obviously easier and more 
convenient for a case to be heard within the region than somewhere else. To take 
SADC as an example, it would be more convenient, and probably less expensive for all 
concerned, when a complaint by one State against another, and a fortiori an individual 
application against a State, can be heard in say Zimbabwe, rather than in Banjul. Also, 
it is very easy for States within a sub-region to agree on sanctions against another 
member than at continental level. The cases of Burundi and sierra Leone are glaring 
examples, where East African countries and ECOW AS respectively decided to impose 
economic sanctions on these two countries to force the military regimes to step down. 
This would probably not have been the case had it been left to the OAU to decide on 
what to do. The OAU failure in the Congo (Kinshasa) and Congo (Brazaville) conflicts 
in 1996-1997 is a glaring example. 
The establishment of sub-regional comm1ss1ons will to some extent generate 
competition amongst the various commissions as each will strive to ensure that it does 
not lag behind in matters of human rights, or that it is not publicly criticised as a region 
with the worst human rights record. Each region will take care of the expenses of its 
commission, and since there will be fewer States, a commissioner can be nominated 
from each State, or at least from half the States. This will give a greater number of 
commissioners compared to the current situation. 
Therefore, it would be fruitful to identify sub-regional groups ( e.g. SADC, ECOW AS, 
ECCAS) with common convictions on human rights, preferably associated with other 
functional common interests (history, legal systems, economic, political.) and thus the 
possibility of formulating more substantive procedures combined with a better 
enforcement machinery. 
The commissions shall strive to settle each communication amicably. Only when this 
fails, can they resort to "litigation". They shall apply internationally recognised 
standards, like those pursued by the UN human rights organs, and other regional bodies. 
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5:4 The Establishment of a Continental Court 
One of the major reasons for the success of the European and American human rights 
systems is the establishment of a court. 
" ... [I]t is at least doubtful that a national state would abandon its sodomy laws or reform its 
welfare procedures [and change its anti-human rights legislation] merely by the directive of 
some non-judicial board composed almost completely of foreigners. But these same orders, 
when cast in the form of a judgement of law, have been harder to resist. Resistance would 
evince not merely a (justifiable) disagreement on matters of policy but a defiance of the 
commitment to human dignity and the rule of law made by the state when it adhered to the 
[African] human rights system in the first place" .2 
Therefore, to reinforce the activities of the sub-regional commissions, the establishment 
of a court at continental level which will have an appellate jurisdiction, and be able to 
pass legally binding judgements would be required. The advantages of having such a 
court include, inter alia: 
• The court will deliver legally binding, authoritative and conclusive decision. 
According to Rembe, one of the drawbacks of the Commission is its lack of mandate 
to make final binding decisions.3The Commission is little more than a sub-
committee of the OAU, entitled to investigate and recommend to the parent body, 
but without the power to initiate action. This makes enforcement dependent on the 
institution (governments) against which protection is sought. The Protocol 
establishing the court provides that the court will give final and binding judgments, 
and state parties undertake to "comply with the judgment in any case to which they 
are a party".4 
• The court can also serve as an institution for the implementation of effective 
remedies. Findings of a court being binding, can be implemented effectively. This 
will lead to real sanctions and remedies. The Protocol provides that the court may 
follow a finding with an appropriate order to remedy that violation. 5 
2 Id at xliii-xliv 
3 NS Rembe "The syatem of protection of human rights under the African Charter: Problems and 
prospects" Roma Institute for Southern African Study (1991) at 44. 
4 Article 30 of the Protocol. 
5 Article 29(2) of the Protocol. 
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• If the universality of human rights is taken seriously, not only substantive norms, but 
also procedures and mechanisms should be universalised. States should not pretend 
to adhere to universal norms, while at the same time detracting from the model 
accepted in other international and regional human rights systems.6 
• The establishment of an African Court of Human Rights will also develop an 
African human rights jurisprudence. It is true that the African Charter endow the 
Commission with a mandate to provide guidance to states in respect of the making 
of laws. 7 The Commission has not been very successful in realising the aim of 
developing a uniform law for the promotion, interpretation and enforcement of 
human and peoples rights in Africa. In terms of the Protocol, the court will be 
required to give reasons for both its advisory and contentious decisions. Dissenting 
and separate opinions are also allowed in both instances. 8 In terms of article 10 of the 
Protocol, any party to a case is entitled to be represented by a legal representative. 
All these provide the system with those prerequisites for the development of a 
human rights case-law which have been lacking so far. 
• The establishment of a continental court will also go a long way to maximise 
publicity of the African Court and human rights generally. One of the crucial 
respects in which adjudication differs from mediation, conciliation and arbitration, is 
in its public nature. Dissemination of information about the Commission's work 
(and, as a consequence, about the Charter itself) has been stifled by some provisions 
of the Charter as well as its own interpretation thereof. A court is, by its very nature, 
a public institution. Its activities are more likely to attract media attention and to 
capture the public imagination than those of the Commission. 
6 See M Mubiala "Contribution a l'etude comparative des mecanismes regionaux Africaine, 
Americaine et Europeen de protection des droits de l'homme" (1997) 9 Revue Africaine de Droit 
Internationale et Compare at 52: "on ne peut pas pretendre adherer a un systeme de valeurs en y 
soustrayant ce qui apparait en dffmitive comme la plus grande conquete en matiere des droits de 
l'homme, a savoir la soumission des Etats a lajuridiction intemationale". 
7 Article 45(l)(b) of the Charter. 
8 See article 4(2)( advisory jurisdiction) and article 28(7) (contentious jurisdiction of the Protocol. 
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• Finally, the establishment of an African human rights court will strengthen national 
courts. Applying human rights provisions in states without a human rights tradition 
is sometimes risky and requires a courageous judiciary. The decisions provided by 
an African court may provide domestic courts with precedents which can be applied 
locally. In this sense, the hands of the domestic judges will be strengthened. They 
may justify decisions that could embarrass states with reference to cases already 
decided by an African court. Although such decisions also exist in other 
jurisdictions, in particular, that of the European Court of Human Rights, the use of 
non-African case-law could easily be countered by arguments against the 
"importation of ideologically unsound tenets into African legal system".9 
The human rights court I recommend is in some respect to that envisaged by the 
Protocol. While the Protocol requires the court to be composed of eleven judges I 
suggest it should be composed of 15 judges - three from each of the five regions and 
elected by the different regional bodies. Its functions shall be to entertain appeals from 
decisions made by the different sub-regional commissions. Its decisions would be final 
and legally binding and should be forwarded to the Council of Ministers for 
implementation. 
The judges of the court shall be nominated by the different Bar Associations of the 
different states party to the Charter within each region. Each association shall elect two 
judges from among its members and forward their names to the Assembly of Heads of 
States and government of the different regions which shall finally elect the three to sit 
on the court. The court shall elect its President and Vice-President who shall be full-
time employees. 
9 Frans Viljoen, "Arguments in favour of and against the African Court of Human and Peoples' Rights" paper 
presented at a conference on the theme "The OAU at 35: achievements and prospects", held in Addis Ababa, 
Ethiopia, 3-5 August 1998. 
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5:5 Redefining the Role of the OAU Assembly 
The present African control machinery is made up of; the African Commission and its 
Secretariat, the OAU Secretary-General, and the OAU Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government. 
The Commission carries out its functions as mandated by article 45 of the Charter 
through its Secretariat, with the Secretary of the Commission as the Chief Executive of 
the Secretariat. By virtue of article 41 of the Charter, the Secretary-General of the OAU 
shall appoint the Secretary to the Commission. He shall also provide the staff and 
services necessary for the effective discharge of the duties of the Commission. 
Of all the organs, the OAU Assembly is the ultimate. Unlike in the European system 
where the Committee of Ministers takes binding decisions and supervises the 
implementation of the Commission's decisions, in the African system, the Council of 
Ministers has no role. Instead, the reports and decisions of the Commission are 
submitted to the Assembly and the fate of these is not known. As Judge A Koffi Amega 
observes: "The question that has always preoccupied the Commission is that of 
knowing the fate of these reports, questions left to the competence and conscience of 
the Heads of State and Government". 
It is high time that the role of any political organ involved, directly or indirectly, in the 
promotion or protection of human rights be re-examined. 
As in the European system where the Committee of Ministers supervises the 
implementation of the Commission's or Court's decisions, the Council of Ministers in 
Africa should be .given the same role. However, unlike the European system, its role 
should be limited to supervision of the implementation, with no mandate to review the 
Commission's decision. The role of the Assembly of Heads of State and Government 
should be restricted to receiving reports. 
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As we inch into the new millennium, Africa cannot afford to lag behind in human 
rights, democracy and good governance. The only way to break free of this cocoon is to 
empower the people with knowledge, because as Commissioner Nguema said, " ... it is 
the African themselves who will defend their rights". This can only be effectively 
achieved if the people are made to identify themselves with the different mechanisms -
the commissions and the court. The people have to be sensitised and assisted so that 
they can contribute to the development of the African human rights regime. The 
effectiveness of a human rights court in Africa can only be guaranteed if the people for 
whom it is created are aware of not only its existence but also its relevance, otherwise it 
will be a misplaced priority. There must also be a expressed determination by the 
leaders to ensure protection of human rights. The assertion by Commissioner Nguema 
that the court " ... will replace the Heads of State and take decisions" is true, but the 
court will not replace them to implement the decisions. One of the most practical ways 
of ensuring the effectiveness of the organs established is through public pressure from 
a vibrant and sensitive civil society. Peoples' power has always prevailed and it is our 
responsibility to ensure that the power of the African people prevails over political 
institutions. 
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Table of communications 
Communication Complainant State concerned Allegations/ Commission's 
No. Complaint decision 
1/88 Frederick Korvah Liberia lack of discipline in Inadmissible, under 
the Liberian article 56(2) 
Security Police, 
corruption, 
immorality 
11/88, Henry Kalenga Zambia detention without Amicable resolution 
trial 
15/88 Mpaka-Nsusu Zaire detention without Inadmissible, under 
Andre Alphonse trial article 56(7) 
16/88, Comite Culturel Benin arbitrary arrest and Inadmissible under 
pour la Democratie detention, torture article 56(5) 
au Benin, and degrading 
treatment 
17/88, Badjogoume Benin detention without Amicable resolution 
Hilaire, charge out trial, right 
to work. 
18/88, El Hadj Boubacar Benin arbitrary detention Amicable resolution 
Diawara and right to property 
25/89 World Organisation Zaire torture and Violation found 
Against Torture, degrading treatment 
27/89 Organisation Rwanda unlawful expulsion Violation found 
Mondiale Contre la of nationals 
Torture 
39/90 Annette Pagnoulle Cameroon unfair trial Violation found 
40190 BobNgozi Egypt unfair trial No violation found 
43/90 Union des Scolaires Niger freedom of Inadmissible, under 
Nigeriens - Union association and article 56( 5) 
Generale des assembly, arbitrary 
Etudiants Nigeriens arrests and right to 
au Benin life 
45190 Civil Liberties Nigeria right to liberty and Inadmissible, under 
Organisation integrity of the article 56( 5) 
person, right to 
health 
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47/91 Lawyers' Zaire arbitrary arrests & Violation found 
Committee for detentions, torture, 
Human Rights, extra-judicial 
executions, unfair 
trials, restrictions 
on the right to 
association and 
peaceful assembly, 
expression press. 
56/91 Les Temoins de Zaire freedom of religion, Violation found 
Jehovah, arbitrary arrest and 
right to property 
57191 Tanko Bariga Nigeria money owed to the Inadmissible (under 
complainant article 56 (2) 
59/91 Louis Emgba Cameroon unlawful arrest and Violation found 
Mekongo 
unfair trial 
60/91 Constitutional Nigeria unfair trial and violation found 
Rights Project judicial 
independence 
62/91 Committee for the Nigeria unlawful arrest Closed without Defence of Human a 
Rights decision 
63192 Congress for the Malawi instability in the Inadmissible under 
Second Republic of country article 56(2) 
Malawi 
64/92 Krishna Achuthan, Malawi arbitrary detention Violation found 
67192 Civil Liberties Nigeria arbitrary arrests and Amicable resolution 
Organisation detentions, 
independence of the 
judiciary 
68/92 Amnesty Malawi unfair trial, violation found 
International degrading treatment 
and punishment 
69192 Amnesty Tunisia arbitrary arrests inadmissible under 
International article 56(5) 
71192 Rencontre Aficaine Zambia illegal expulsion of violation found 
pour le de Defense nationals from West 
des Droits de African origin, 
!'Homme unfair trial 
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78/92 Amnesty Malawi freedom of Violation found 
International association and 
assembly 
87/93 Constitutional Nigeria unfair trial, violation found 
Rights Project independence of the 
judiciary 
99/93 Organisation Rwanda extra-judicial Violation found 
Mondial Contre la executions and 
Torture arbitrary arrests 
torture, arbitrary 
100/93 Union Zaire executions, arrests & detention, unfair 
Interafricaine des trials, restrictions 
Droits de l 'Homme on freedom of Violation found 
association, 
movement and the 
press; right to 
health and 
education. 
101193 Civil Liberties Nigeria freedom of Violation found 
Organisation association 
103/93 Alhassan Ghana unlawful arrest and violation found 
Aboubakar detention 
129/94 Civil Liberties Nigeria freedom of violation found 
Organisation Association, 
independence of the 
judiciary. 
138/94 International PEN Cote d'Ivoire freedom of Inadmissible under 
expression. article 56( 5) 
159/97 RADDHO et al. Angola expulsion of violation found 
nationals from West 
African origin, 
unfair trial. 
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